CHAN.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. Another point raised was that the relator, who represents the board of health, might himself do all he is now calling on us to do, and the answer of the defendants to him is, it is your duty, as representing that board, when you find a nuisance being committed in Edmonton, to construct a sewer which would carry off and remove that nuisance; beyond that, you had power by a recent Act of Parliament to communicate with your neighbours, the Tottenham board of health, and, with the assistance of them also, to carry off the sewage through Tottenham, and so remove the nuisance. But in the first place, it is no part of the duty of the Board of Health of Edmonton to tax the ratepayers in order to diminish and remove a nuisance imported wrongfully into their district. It is their duty, I dare say, to remove every evil which cannot otherwise be removed; but if we take this as being an information on behalf of the board of health, simpliciter, I apprehend it is no part of their duty to create expense in order to remove that which they have a much more easy and proper remedy for-namely, the remedy of preventing the evil occurring at all. If they can prevent the evil being inflicted on Edmonton, surely it is more their duty to do so than to take means to remove it, when once it has wrongfully and improperly been committed there. But, independently of that consideration, the information here, although at the instigation of the board of Edmonton, is, in fact, not only on behalf of the inhabitants of that district, but on behalf of the inhabitants of all the districts affected by the evil. We have strong evidence what the evil is, and as to the disease which it is likely to produce, and has produced. Therefore the Attorney-General would not be content with any proceeding which would deal with Edmonton alone, leaving other persons affected by the evil to be still affected by it. Sir Roundell Palmer said there was no evidence of its extending beyond Edmonton. I do not know how that may be; if it be so, I restrict my observations to Edmonton; but I was under the impression certainly that the nuisance was such as, by going down the stream, must affect everything adjacent to the stream. [CHAN. Now I have to compare that which has been done by the Vice-Chancellor in this single instance, and to make one single remark, which will conclude all I have to say on this subject of the form in which his Honour made the order. Merely as a means of arriv ing at what would be a fair, just, and final decision, he has proceeded very much on this-that it was unusual to interfere with anything a judge might think it requisite to do in order to procure the proper and adequate information on which he should ultimately act; that that was a matter for his own discretion; that he should wish to be informed on certain points which pressed on his mind before he came to a final conclusion, and therefore he directed this species of intermediate inquiry. I apprehend that that is clearly not the view which one can reasonably take of a case of this description, because it seems that the learned judge had the evidence before him, and, without a shadow of doubt, had the fact before him that a nuisance had been proved to exist. There fore there was nothing more to learn on the subject; nobody denied or disputed the nuisance. Indeed, as his Honour said, the defendants admitted far too much for the information to be dismissed. It appears, therefore, that it is not a case in which you can fairly direct inquiries to be made when the substantial point in the case is proved. Then again, as to its being wanted in order to come to a decision, it appears to me that that cannot be urged with reference to the particular inquiry which the Vice-Chancellor has directed, because this inquiry is not neces sary for the aid of the court, it is not necessary as affording any guidance or direction to the informant. It is only an inquiry which hereafter, for all I know, on the application of the defendants themselves, may be very valuable to them, if given to them out of court, as telling them what is the best mode of getting out of the difficulty in which they have placed themselves; but it is an inquiry entirely for the defendants to satisfy themselves upon, and not an inquiry with which the court has anything to do. However, my attention has been called to the case of Heath v. Wallington, with regard to the town of Leamington, in which I did take the contrary course, and I at once fairly admit that Now as regards authority, and what is proper to the course I took there was wrong; and also in be done in such a case. As to authority, I would a subsequent case with reference to lights, where rather not quote my own decisions (though still II made an order very much like it in prinentertain a strong opinion as to the proper course to be taken), and I should not have cited them with much confidence if they had not been adopted by other branches of the court. The Master of the Rolls has taken a similar course in deciding a much more slender case. There was an appeal from his decision, and his judgment was affirmed. I refer to the case of Goldsmid v. The Tunbridge Wells Commissioners. Certainly in that case there was very strong evidence to show that the plaintiffs might possibly be mistaken as to the apparent grievance that is to say, on looking into that case I find there was evidence of things being done in the intermediate space between the source of the alleged evil, and the place affected by it. There was strong evidence to show that the intermediate space was not affected, and that no such evil occurred there; but it was a slight matter compared with that which has been now before us for our consideration. Therefore the Master of the Rolls took that course which I adopted in The Attorney-General v. Heath, and which appears to me to be the proper course to take here-namely, to grant an injunction to restrain the defendants, their servants and agents, from allowing any sewage from the asylum-it would not be the district adjacent thereto-to pass into this stream, or otherwise so as to be a nuisance. These are the words which are there used. Then, to suspend the injunction for a stated time, and then to give liberty to apply. ciple. I was corrected there by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth), I think in consequence of having put the order in a form which the Lord Chancellor sitting at that time did not think was justified by the course of procedure of the court There was a case with reference to lights in which I prefaced the order with an expression of opinion that the light had been interfered with. I foresaw there would be great difficulty in showing the exact limits within which a man might build without interfering with his neighbour's light, and that which would transcend that limit, therefore I directed an inquiry at chambers with reference to what steps should be taken with regard to the modification of certain building plans before me, so as to prevent the defendant being injured by the erection of the building. The Lord Chancellor thought that was not the proper mode of dealing with it; that the proper mode was to restrain the defendants from committing the injury, and it hav ing been proved they intended to do that which would interfere with the plaintiff's right, the Lord Chancellor thought the plaintiffs had a right to have an injunction in that form, and that the defendants must be left to relieve themselves from the difficulties as they best could. It was felt in that case, as it was felt by the learned Vice-Chancellor in the court below in this case, that there is a great onus undoubtedly thrown on the defendants who have to comply with the terms of this injunction; but that CHAN.] [CHAN. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. onus is a necessary consequence of his own illegal act, Lord Justice SELWYN-In this case the fact of the existence of a nuisance, and a nuisance of such a serious character as to call for the interference of this court, has been clearly and unquestionably established. The burden is therefore cast on the defendants of showing why this nuisance should not be dealt with by this court, according to its ordinary practice in such cases, and the defence is rested by Sir Roundell Palmer on three points: first, upon the position and character of the defendants; secondly, upon the ground of the delay which has occurred; and thirdly, upon the attempts which have been already made by the justices, the defendants, to remedy the evil complained of. With respect to the first of these points, Sir Roundell Palmer says the justices are a body entrusted with the compulsory discharge of a public duty, and they have no power, like the defendants in the case of Goldsmid v. The Tunbridge Wells Commissioners, to do anything which would get rid of the nuisance complained of. On the other hand, it is plain, not only from the terms in the Act of Parliament to which he referred, but also from the evidence in the case that everything done in this asylum is done by agents and servants of the defendants, and under their order and authority; and the Act of Parliament under which they act, although it has authorised them to maintain these pauper lunatics, has given them no authority to take or injure the property or rights of other persons. But if we were to listen to the argument, at all events to the extent to which it was carried by Mr. Schomberg, that these persons, having authority to establish one or more lunatic asylums, would have the right according to that authority to take other persons' property, and in any manner they may think necessary for effecting their object, they might stop an ancient light, or interfere with or divert public or private rights of way at their Now in the present case, all that has been sanctioned by the Legislature is the erection of a lunatic asylum or lunatic asylums. They may be made in any place; the patients may be so distributed in such manageable numbers as that no nuisance may be occasioned at all. Such sites may be chosen, and such ground taken as to render it impossible to be any nuisance to an adjoining proprietor. It is impossible that an Act of Parliament, merely authorising the erection of such an asylum, would justify an interference with rights of neighbours to the extent contended for on the part of the defendants. Then in addition to that, as the Lord Chancellor has already pointed out in the case of this very asylum, assuming it to be continued as it is now, there are the means, and Capt. Galton has pointed out the means by which the nuisance now complained of may be remedied, that, in fact has been favourably reported on, and is known as Col. Ewart's separate system of drainage. "The asylum lands are 130 acres in extent, of which I am informed 70 acres are applicable to farm purposes. This latter portion is below the level of the asylum, and is so placed that over a great part of it the sewage could be disposed of by gravitation without the necessity of pumping." That plainly shows that, so far from this particular thing which is being done, to use the language of Mr. Justice Blackburn, being authorised by the Legislature, the very thing done contains in itself the means of remedying the nuisance. Then as to delay. Where both parties are public bodies the court would expect to find, and is glad to find, that before one set of public officers enter into litigation with another, before one part of the county enforces the law against those who represent the whole county, the greatest forbearance should be exercised; and I think it would be a bad practice if this court were to look narrowly into the length of time which has been occupied by the negotiations or the attempts made in good faith on both sides, in order, if possible, to remedy the evil. But I think in this case there was no unnecessary delay at all. Then it is said, thirdly, that the attempts which have been made by the justices to remedy the evil (at all events, if they do not render it right for the court to dismiss this information), are sufficient to justify the inquiry the Vice-Chancellor has directed. But I think the matter is also answered by the report of Capt. Galton. It may not have been the fault, but certainly it has been the misfortune, of the justices that, although they made so many attempts, those attempts have all been made in a wrong direction, and have been unsuccessful, while they had within their own property and their own grounds (as now appears by the report of Capt. Galton) the means of remedying the evil. Although those attempts may be used by them as a ground for affording them further time, they cannot be used to the extent of prejudicing the right of the informant here to a decrce for an injunction, which involves a declaration of his right to put an end to this nuisance. With respect to the reference which has been directed, if the inquiries were intended as meaning to leave it to Capt. Galton to say whether the nuisance has been established or not, then I think it is open to the objection which the Lord Chancellor has pointed out that that nuisance has been completely and clearly established, and therefore that the informant is entitled to a declaratory deeree; but, if the inquiry is only meant as to the means to be adopted to prevent or cure the evil, then it is a reference which might possibly be made after the decree. Then the question arises whether the defendants have been doing all that was possible in order to carry into execution the terms of the decree, or whether they ought to be allowed further time to do so. In neither of those cases would it be right to make such an inquiry preparatory to or before the decree. I think, therefore, the order, so far as relates to that inquiry, is certainly inconsistent with the practice of the court. The only remaining point that was raised is that which the Lord Chancellor has fully adverted to, and to which I will only add one word, viz., that the relators are a body who have the power to make sewers, and that they themselves might have remedied this evil. That objection also, I think, is clearly answered in the report of Capt. Galton. Two courses have been suggested; it is said they should have made a sewer and connected it with the system of the general metropolitan sewage discharging itself into the river at Barking, or they might have made another system of sewers carrying it in the direction of the river Lea. But then, as Capt. Galton has pointed out, it is absolutely unlawful to divert any drainage whatever into the river Lea. As respects the alternative plan of carrying it into the metropolitan system, that system was made with reference to one particular area, and has been found, I fear, not more than sufficient for that area; and as he says it would be contrary to the Act of Parliament, and it would increase the evil which we all know has already arisen from the vast amount of sewage discharged into the river at that point if you were to attempt to add to that amount of sewage by carrying into it the sewage of another district not intended originally to be comprised within that system. It is plain that it would be unlawful, and could not be done without the authority of some subsequent Act of Parliament. Therefore neither of the courses suggested was open to the defendants. Although I thought it right to add this, I entirely concur with what has fallen from the Lord Chancellor, that it does not lie in the mouths of these defendants, who have created this nuisance, to say to the relators of the Attorney-General, that they are not entitled to a decree, because they themselves might have performed the duty which, in our judgment, is not cast upon them at all. I think, therefore, the order must be discharged, and that the decree should be made in the form suggested by the Lord Chancellor. I think there should be no costs on this appeal, and that the deposit should be returned. Solicitors: A. T. Cox; and C. and J. Allen and Son. [C. P. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Reported by W. GRAHAM and M. W. MCKELLAR, ESTS., Barristers-at-Law. Friday, Feb. 12. DAVIS (app.) v. SCRASE (resp.) Sale of wine, &c., by innkeeper on Sunday before one o'clock" Except refreshment for travellers”--Onus probandi--2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 42-11 § 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 14-Costs of appeal. A metropolitan magistrate convicted an innkeeper under 2&3 Vict. c. 47, s. 42, for opening his house for the sale of wine, &c., before one in the afternoon of Sunday, the same not being then for the refreshment of travellers, on the ground that the defendant was bound to prove that his guests were travellers in order to bring himself within the exception of that section, according to the proviso contained in the 14th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (Jervis's Act), 66 Held, upon appeal, that this conviction was wrong, the words "except refreshment for travellers" not being an exemption, exception, proviso, or condition in the statute on which" the information was framed, within the words of the proviso in Jervis' Act. Taylor v. Humphries, 17 C. B., N. S., 539; 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 376, considered and affirmed. The Court of Common Pleas reserve to themselves a discretion in each case as to the costs of appeal from a decision of magistrates. Case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. The appellant appeared on the 15th Dec. 1868 before the stipendiary magistrate sitting at the court of the metropolitan police district of Clerkenwell to answer to the complaint of John Scrase, inspector of police. The summons charged that the appellant, being a person licensed to keep the ale house, known by the sign of the Pegasus, in the Green Laues, in the parish of Stoke Newington, in the county of Middlesex, and within the Clerkenwell police district, did on the 13th Dec. inst. unlawfully open the said house for the sale of wines, spirits, beer, and other fermented and distilled liquors before the hour of one in the afternoon, the same not being then for the refreshment of travellers, contrary to the Metropolitan Police Act. The facts deposed to were as follows: The appellant is the landlord of the Pegasus tavern in the Green-lanes, Stoke Newington, situate about a mile and a half from Finsbury Park, and between two and three miles from the Alexandra Park, and about five minutes' walk from the Newington-green station on the North London Railway. Inspector Charles Goble at half-past twelve on Sunday afternoon, 13th Dec., visited the appellant's public house, and found six men in front of the bar. On the counter there were three glasses containing spirits, and two pint pots containing malt liquor, a plate of bread and cheese was put up in front of the bar, and a larder was behind it, but no one appeared to be eating. The defendant said that all the parties there were travellers. Two of the six present, who gave their names as Jones, said that they came from Gun-alley, Southwark, two others from Hoxton, and had been for a drive in the country, and two of them made no answer. The defendant thereupon said that the inspector had no business to question them. Inquiries were subsequently made as to the persons who said they resided in Gun-alley, and no such persons could be found living there. There was no evidence whether the appellant did or did not know of the misrepresentation as to the residence of the men Jones. There was a vehicle outside the public-house. C. P.] DAVIS (app.) v. SCRASE (resp.) [C. P. Between the hours of nine and one on that same | Humphries, in the 34 L. J. 1, M. C., or the 11 L. T. morning about 160 persons entered the public-house. The defendant and his potman were standing outside, and spoke to some of the persons who came up, and several went away. None of the persons who entered the house were known to the inspector or to the policeman who was called. A large number of persons come into the neighbourhood on Sundays, who do not come on other days. The appellant called no witnesses. After hearing the evidence, the magistrate decided that the defendant did unlawfully open his house for the sale of spirits and beer before the hour of one o'clock in the afternoon on the day named, and that there was not evidence to satisfy him that the persons who entered the house were bona fide travellers; and he convicted the appellant, and adjudged him to pay a penalty of 1s. and 2s. costs. It was contended by the appellant that the burden of proof that the parties were not travellers lay upon the complainant; and on the other side it was contended that the appellant, to entitle him to serve them, was bound to show that such persons were travellers. Upon the construction he put on the 14th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, the magistrate decided that such proof should come from the appellant. The appellant, being dissatisfied with this judgment in point of law, requested the magistrate to state a case for the opinion of this court. If, therefore, the court should be of opinion that the complainant was bound to prove affirmatively that such persons were not travellers, and that the appellant ought not to have been convicted, this conviction was to be quashed. Quain, Q.C., for the appellant.-This summons was for an offence under the Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), s. 42: "And be it enacted that no licensed victualler or other person shall open his house within the metropolitan police districts, for the sale of wine, spirits, beer, or other fermented or distilled liqors, on Sundays, Christmasday, and Good Friday, before the hour of one in the afternoon, except refreshment for travellers." The words of the general Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 49), s. 1, are nearly the same: "No licensed victualler or other person in any part of Great Britain shall open his house for the sale of wine, spirits, beer, or other fermented or distilled liquors or sell the same on Sunday before half-past twelve o'clock in the afternoon," or before the termination of service in the neighbourhood, and similarly on Christmas-day, or Good Friday, "except, in all the cases aforesaid, as refreshment for travellers." Upon this general Act, this court, in a considered judgment, decided the case of 1aylor v. Humphries, 17 C. B., N. S., 539. It appears, in that judgment, page 549, that the defendant "further contended that as the exception of refreshment to a traveller is contained in the clause creating the prohibition, the burden of proving that the prohibition has been infringed, and that the case is not within the exception, is cast on the informer; and that if the publican believed, and had reason to believe, when he supplied the drink, that he was supplying refreshment to a traveller, he ought not to be convicted. In this argument we think the appellant is well founded, and that the statute ought to be construed on the principles that he has contended for." The 14th section of Jervis's Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), upon which the magistrate here has based his decision was brought to the notice of the court, as appears at page 545, and although no mention is made of it in the judgment, it could not fail to have been considered by the Lord Chief Justice when he wrote the judgment. [Stopped by the court.] F. M. White for the respondent.-It does not appear from the reports of this case, Taylor v. MAG. CAS.-VOL. V. Rep. N. S. 376, that any allusion was made in the argument to this 14th section of Jervis's Act, and the words of that section are so strong, that if they had been considered by the court, they would have certainly been expressly referred to. That section enacts how a summons is to be heard, and at the end is the following proviso: "Provided always that if the information or complaint in any such case shall negative any exemption, exception, proviso, or condition in the statute, on which the same shall be framed, it shall not be necessary for the prosecutor or complainant in that behalf to prove such negative, but the defendant may prove the affirmative thereof in his defence if he would have advantage of the same." The judgment in Taylor v. Humphries is evidently based upon the rule existing previously to Jervis's Act; the cases on the subject are considered at p. 124 of Paley on Summary Convictions, 5th edit., and it is there said, "In all cases, and before the passing of this statute, it was an acknowledged distinction that where the exceptions came by way of proviso in a separate clause or Act from that which described the offence, and without reference in the enacting clause incorporating them therewith, the defendant must bring himself by proof within the proviso by which he sought to protect himself;" and in the note (same page) Contra if the exception were in the clause containing the prohibition or in one thereby referred tɔ." The judgment in Taylor v. Humphries practically repeals this proviso in Jervis's Act and returns to the old law before that statute, and if that were now affirmed the consequences might be serious. [M. SMITH, J.-The substance of the section his house open on Sundays for travellers, but not creating the offence is that an innkeeper may keep for other people. Travellers can scarcely be said to be the exception to the rule.] My argument must depend upon the application of the proviso in Jervis's Act to this section. Quain was not heard in reply. 66 KEATING, J.-In this case Mr. White has been unable to distinguish the circumstances from those of Taylor v. Humphries. There can be no doubt the 14th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, was brought before the court, and it was probably present to the mind of the court when their decision was formed, for a case is referred to in the judgment which depends upon that authority. Unless it can be shown that there was an absolute mistake by the court in omitting to consider that section, the judgment in that case must bind us. I agree with Mr. White that if we came to a conclusion which could be interpreted as a repeal of the 14th section, the consequences might be serious. But we do not intend to do anything of the kind, nor do we consider that the court had any such intention in Taylor v. Humphries. This is a very peculiar Act, and the only effect of our judgment is that, although the part about travellers appears to be an exception, it is not really so. This was the view of this court before, and a contrary decision would cast upon innkeepers a burden impossible for them to bear. They might be liable to conviction if they served anyone besides their personal friends. We adhere to the decision in Taylor v. Humphries. M. SMITH, J.-I also think we are bound by Taylor v. Humphries. The authority is of great Lord Chief Justice of this court. That, however, is weight, being a considered judgment of the late mitted, involves much difficulty upon this exception. a decision upon this Act only, which, it must be ad The court in that case had before it the common law and the statutes upon the subject; by the common law an innkeeper is bound to supply all who 2 E WARRINGTON ELECTION PETITION. come to his house, and he is liable, if he refuses to do so, either to action or indictment; when the statute limited this duty on Sundays, the liability with regard to travellers was left as it was before. An innkeeper is liable to conviction only if he receives into his house within the forbidden hours knowingly other than travellers. How is he to satisfy himself of the character of his visitors if he is not to take their word for what they are? The substantial effect of the section is merely that an innkeeper must close his house for a certain time to all but travellers. This court decided, after having this clause of Jervis' Act called to their attention, that the informer must show that the guests are not travellers, in order that the innkeeper should be convicted; and I am of opinion that there is good reason to support that decision. BRETT, J.-It is impossible to distinguish this case from Taylor v. Humphries, and there is no ground for thinking that the proviso in the 14th section of Jervis's Act was not brought to the notice of the court in that case. In the 1st section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 49, although the word "except" is used, "as refreshment for travellers" cannot be said to be an "exemption, exception, proviso, or condition in the statute on which" the information was framed. So, understanding the effect of that judgment, this case must follow the rule then laid down. Judgment for appellant. Quain asked for costs on the ground that the commissioners of police were the respondents, and therefore the appellant might have costs without any breach of the rule of this court not to grant costs upon appeal against magistrates. KEATING, J.-This appeal is against the decision of a magistrate, and we think that decision should be reversed without costs. The rule of this court is that costs are discretionary in each case. Attorney for appellant, J. Croft. ELECTION PETITIONS. Reported by F. O. CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. WARRINGTON ELECTION PETITION. Feb. 3 and 4, 1869. (Before MARTIN, B.) | It is not sufficient that a voter hands his voting ticket to some third person, who hands it to the polling clerks. Where a petition alleges that an election is void by reason that the poll was improperly taken, and the seat is claimed, the first inquiry is, whether the person on whose behalf the seat is claimed had a fair majority of the electors. by accident and without fraud an incompetent person is appointed poll clerk, and partly through the acts of the agents of the candidates, he gets into a state of confusion, and votes are not taken which ought to have been taken, that is not sufficient ground for declaring an election wholly void. Price, Q. C. and Campbell Foster for the petitioners. Quain, Q. C. (with Edwards and Coventry) for the respondents. The principal facts appeared to be that at one particular booth-No. 1 in the South-east Ward—a man of the name of George Dickson had been appointed poll clerk by the returning officer. It turned out upon inquiries from the man himself—and he candidly gave an account of himself-and from inquiries made by the voters, that he was utterly incompetent and thoroughly ignorant of his duties. He came to an early breakfast provided by the mayor in the morning, before they went down to the different booths, which opened at eight o'clock. He went to his booth about seven or half-past, and he seemed to have believed it was not his bounden down only such as he thought from time to time duty to take down every vote tendered, but to take were particularly addressing themselves to him. In this case the voters, for the sake of convenience, were all provided with voting cards. The number of the voter on the register, together with his name, are placed on the card which he presents, and he is bound to declare with his voice that he votes for So-and-so. Persons came in that way and presented themselves to him. He took their cards, put them into his pocket, and never entered them in the poll book. He got into a very confused state, and did not know what he was doing. One time he was sitting at one portion of the room where it was almost impossible to have the voters come close up to him. That was pointed out to him, and his position changed so as to give him greater facility to see the voters and take down their names. The result was that in looking over the polling in this particular booth it was found there were altogether omitted from the poll books ninety-three votes. An inquiry was set on foot and the discovery made that the poll clerk thought it was not a matter for him Voting tickets-Mode of voting-Inefficiency of poll clerk-Irregularity in taking poll-What necessary to avoid an election-Adding tendered votes at trial-exclusively to attend to; that in many cases where Procedure. The ticket usually given to a voter by a candidate is no means of voting. By reason of confusion prevailing at a particular booth at an early hour, a poll clerk regularly appointed failed to record four votes which were properly tendered. Four thousand persons voted at the election: the voter called out "Vote for Greenall," he omitted to put it down, and that in other cases his head was so confused that he got hold of the cards and put them into his pocket. These were the facts of the case with regard to the grievance complained of by the petitioners. The omission was not confined entirely to Mr. Greenall's supporters, but some votes for Mr. Rylands were left off in the same way, but Held, that the omission to record the four votes could it was said in nothing like the proportion that Mr. not per se render the whole election void. But where it is proved that legally tendered votes have been irregularly omitted from the books by the poll clerks, it is perfectly competent to the judge to put them in and thus add them to either side during the progress of the inquiry. It is the duty of a voter going to tender his vote to ascertain who is the right person to accept it, and if there is any mistake or error to complain to the deputy returning officer. If a voter make a general announcement at the booth of the candidate for whom he wishes to record his vote, but fails to tender it to the clerk appointed to take it, there is no legal tender of the vote. Greenall's supporters were. facts, and said: The form of petition, following the Price, Q. C., in opening the case, mentioned these words of the Act, is not directed against Mr. Rylands, but is directed against the returning officer. It is obliged to be directed against him. about the matter, that your duty is to follow the I say at once, as I said in London when consulted words of the statute, showing that the poll was not properly taken. The words of the statute are "That the sheriff's officer shall take care that the poll is duly and indifferently taken." It is not intended to impute personal impropriety or personal partiality in the matter, but that in the dis |