other causes? A. Well, there is a difference, but these differences may vary; two persons might have a sunstroke and not be the same symptoms in the one as in the other. Q. Ordinarily, what would be the difference in the symptoms of a sunstroke and being overheated from some other cause the effect the same way generally? A. I don't really remember about that. I don't know."

With the evidence substantially as we have stated, the argument is made by counsel for the casualty company that, although it should be considered that this evidence was sufficient to show with reasonable certainty that the death of Pack was due to sunstroke, the action of the lower court in directing a verdict was correct, because the policy contract did not cover death from sunstroke under the circumstances shown. The policy contract sets out in the beginning that:

"This policy provides indemnity for loss of life, or sight, dismemberment, or loss of time due to accidental injuries, and for loss of time due to sickness, subject to all conditions and limitations contained therein."

And it is urged that, as the purpose of the policy was to furnish indemnity only against death or injury from accidental causes, the sunstroke from which appellee suffered was not an accident within the fair meaning of the contract. In support of this position, the argument is made that it is not the injury or death that comes from an accident that determines whether or not the thing that produced it was an accident within the meaning of the policy, but it is the means or circumstances that preceded or brought about the accident which determine its quality. For example, if a passenger on a train should be compelled without his fault to leave the train between stations and be obliged to walk to the nearest station and on the way should suffer sunstroke, this would be an accidental sunstroke because it was occasioned by an unforeseen accident; but if the passenger voluntarily, and for some purpose of his own, left the train, and while walking to the station met with a sunstroke, it would not be an accident, although he could not reasonably have anticipated that sunstroke would follow his act of walking. Authorities giving some support to this contention are: Schmid vs. Indiana Travelers' Accident Ass'n, 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N. E. 1032; Smith vs. Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147, 106 N. E. 607, L. R. A. 1915B, 872; Lehman vs. Great Western Accident Ass'n, 155 Iowa, 737, 133 Iowa, 752, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 562; Elsey vs. Fidelty & Casualty Co. (Ind. App.) 109 N. E. 413.

[1] But we cannot agree that the views expressed in these authorities should control this case, although it is clear that if this construction should be adopted the sunstroke clause would not indemnify Pack against death, if we should assume that his death was directly caused by sunstroke independent of other causes, because when Pack was stricken he was vountarily pursuing in the

usual way his regular occupation, and there was nothing unusual in what he was doing, nor did anything unexpected or unforeseen or accidental precede the stroke.

We do not think it would be a fair or reasonable construction of the contract to exempt the company from liability if the death of Pack was caused directly by a sunstroke. The policy expressly recognizes that death may result from sunstroke accidently suffered, and undertakes to indemnify the insured against an accident of this nature. So that, if we should come to apply the provisions of this policy to death caused directly by sunstroke, the only question left open would be whether or not a sunstroke suffered under the circumstances described was accidental within the meaning of the policy. The policy stipulates that the company will pay the beneficiary the principal sum of this policy "if sunstroke caused by the direct effect of the sun's rays, accidentally suffered by the insured shall result directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes in the death of the insured within ninety days from the date of the exposure.'

*

* *

[2] Now, is this indemnity to be limited to sunstroke that is preceded by and caused by an accident or an unforeseen or unexpected event, or is it to embrace sunstroke produced by causes that could not be reasonably anticipated and which occur while the insured is going about his business in the usual way? If the latter, then this clause would cover a sunstroke suffered under the circumstances described in the evidence, because it is a matter of common knowledge that sunstroke in this climate is not the natural or probable result of engaging in ordinary manual labor on a warm summer day. On the contrary, it is a very unexpected and unusual occurrence. It is so rare indeed that it may well be called an "accident," which is defined by Webster as:

"An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation. An undesigned, sudden and unexpected event, * * * happening by chance or unexpectedly, taking place not according to the usual course of things."

The same definition in different words is found in Corpus Juris, vol. 1, p. 390, and in A. & E. Ency. of Law, vol. 1, p. 293. And this definition of an "accident" seems peculiarly fitted to the facts of this case. Here Pack was engaged with other laborers in doing ordinary manual labor such as great numbers of laboring men are engaged in every day. They are accustomed to working in exposed places on hot days and do not anticipate any ill effects from the heat. Occasionally, perhaps one of them may have a sunstroke; but, if he does, it is such an unexpected, unforeseen, and unusual thing as to come well within the definition of an "accident."

Unless the clause in this contract providing indemnity against sunstroke is construed to embrace cases like the one we have, it is deceptive and misleading and fails to afford the protection

its reading implies. If an insured who should suffer sunstroke when engaged in his usual occupation or in doing the things he usually does is not to be protected by this clause in the policy, it has little beneficial meaning; for, according to the construction contended for, the insured would not be protected in any state of case unless the sunstroke happened while the insured was by accident or misfortune involuntarily placed in a position or surrounded by conditions that would subject him to the rays of the sun in an unexpected and unforeseen manner. It is, of course, true that sunstroke suffered in this way would be accidental, but not more so than would sunstroke suffered under ordinary conditions when it could not be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that it would happen. The very purpose of accident insurance is to protect the insured against accidents that occur when he is going about his business or attending to his work or affairs in the usual way without any thought of being injured or killed, and when there is no probability, in the ordinary course of human experience, that he will meet with accident or death. The reason why men secure accident insurance is to protect them against unforeseen and unexpected accidents that may happen in the ordinary course of their lives, and when they are pursuing in the usual way their daily vocations, or doing in theordinary way the things that men do in the common, everyday affairs of life. Nearly all accidents happen when people are going about their business in the usual way and are voluntarily doing the things before them to do. There are many clauses in this policy protecting the insured against accidental injury or death, and, if the argument of counsel is sound when applied to the sunstroke clause in the policy, there seems no good reason why the construction contended for should not embrace all of the other indemnity features, with the result that the insured would find himself without protection against the very things for which he secured the insurance as indemnity.

We therefore hold that, although Pack was voluntarily engaged in working in the sun, the sunstroke was, nevertheless, an accident that he could not reasonably have foreseen or anticipated, although, if it might have reasonably been expected that a sunstroke would follow as a natural and probable result of his work on this hot day, the stroke was not an accident within the meaning of the policy. American Accident Co. vs. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547, 23 S. W. 191, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 469, 21 L. R. A. 651, 42 Am. St. Rep. 374; American Accident Co. vs. Carson, 99 Ky. 441, 36 S. W. 169, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 308, 34 L. R. A. 301, 59 Am. St. Rep. 473; Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. vs. Duncan, 166 Ky. 515, 179 S. W. 472; General Accident & Life Assurance Corp. vs. Meredith, 141 Ky. 92, 132 S. W. 191; Bryant vs. Continental Casualty Co. (Tex.) 182 S. W. 673; Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n vs. Smith, 85 Fed. 401, 29 C. C. A. 223, 40 L. R. A. 653:

Fidelity & Casualty Co. vs. Carroll, 143 Fed. 271, 74 C. C. A. 409, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 657, 6 Ann. Cas. 955.

[3] The remaining question is the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the death of Pack was due directly, independently, and exclusive of all other causes to sunstroke. Unless it was, the policy did not furnish indemnity. Upon this issue we think the beneficiary failed to make out a case. The evidence does not sufficiently show any reasonable or natural connection between the sunstroke on the 6th day of June and the death from pneumonia on the 10th day of July, or that the death of Pack was due directly and exclusive of all other causes to sunstroke. On the record as we read and understand it, leaving out of view the evidence for the casualty company showing that the sunstroke could not under the facts stated have produced the pneumonia, it would be the merest speculation to say that Pack died from the effects of the sunstroke. Etna Life Ins. Co. vs. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609, 131 S. W. 523.

The judgment is affirmed.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

ESSEX.

COLLINS

VS.

CASUALTY CO. OF AMERICA.*

1. INSURANCE-"ACCIDENT" INSURANCE-LIABILITY. Under accident policy, insuring against loss of life, limb, sight, and time resulting from bodily injuries effected through accidental means, recovery may be had for the death from a rupture which resulted from a fall, though insured was predisposed to rupture.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1186; Dec. Dig. § 466.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accident.)

POLICY-INJURIES.

2. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE Where a policy insured against loss of life, limb, sight, and time, resulting from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means, the insurer is liable for the death of the insured as a result of an operation necessary to cure a rupture caused by an accidental fall.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1186; Dec. Dig. § 466.) * Decision rendered, May 23, 1916. 112 N. E. Rep. 634.

3. INSURANCE - ACCIDENT INSURANCE-POLICY-CONSTRUCTION.

Where etherization was an incident of the operation, the fact that the death resulted from etherization does not free the insurer from liability.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1186; Dec. Dig. § 466.) 4. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE-POLICY. Under St. 1907, c. 576, § 21, declaring that no warranty made in the negotiation of a policy of insurance will avoid the policy unless it is made with actual intent to deceive or the matter warranted increased the risk of loss, warranties contained in an insurance policy are deemed to be made in the negotiation.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 568, 569; Dec. Dig. § 268.) 5. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE-BURDEN OF PROOF. An insurer, seeking to avoid an accident policy on the ground of false warranty, has the burden of proving that the warranty increased the risk, or was made with intent to deceive, and so fell within St. 1907, c. 576, § 21.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1555; Dec. Dig. § 646[3].) 6. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE-JURY QUESTION. In an action on an accident policy, where the death of insured resulted from a rupture, and his physical structure was shown to be such that he had a predisposition to rupture, the question whether his warranty that he was in sound condition increased the risk within St. 1907, c. 576, § 21, so as to avoid the policy, held for the jury. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1737-1741, 1758-1760; Dec. Dig. § 668[9].)

7. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE-INSTRUCTION. In an action on an accident policy, where the insurer set up the falsity of a warranty contained in the policy, a charge that while persons are presumed to know the contents of a contract which they sign or accept, the presumption is not conclusive was warranted.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. 1774-1776; Dec. Dig. § 669[4].) Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; Joseph F. Quinn,

Judge.

Action by one Collins against the Casualty Company of America. There was a verdict for plaintiff and defendant excepted. Exceptions overruled.

Sweeney & Cox, of Lawrence, for Plaintiff.

Peabody, Arnold, Batchelder & Luther, of Boston, for Defendant.

LORING, J.

This is an action by the beneficiary named in a policy of accident insurance to recover for the death of the assured. The assured on December 15, 1910, went from his office with a coal hod to get some coal from a coal bin near by. While returning with the coal he slipped, fell and ruptured himself. It was in evidence and must be taken to have been conceded, that the plain