must show a compliance therewith and that she properly presented her claim in order to recover, being required to exhaust her remedies within the order before appealing to the courts.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1999, 2000; Dec. Dig. § 817[1].)

Action by Eugenia Musgrove against the Oklahoma Tribe No. 26, Improved Order of Red Men, begun in justice court, and appealed to the superior court. Charge to jury.

1914.

Appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, No. 19, June term,

Argued before Rice and Heisel, JJ.

Andrew J. Lynch and John M. Richardson, both of Georgetown, for Appellant.

Frank M. Jones, of Georgetown, for Respondent.

RIDGEWAY vs. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA. (No. 19994.)*

(Supreme Court of Kansas.)

1. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFICIARY INSURANCE— FORFEITURE-WAIVER.

Where the by-laws of a fraternal beneficiary society provide that the engaging by a member in a specified dangerous occupation shall exempt it from liability on account of his death directly traceable thereto, the acceptance of dues from a member after he has engaged in such occupation, with knowledge of the fact, does not constitute a waiver of the exemption referred to.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1909-1913, 1915, 1916; Dec. Dig. § 755[3].)

2. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFICIARY INSURANCEFORFEITURE-WAIVER.

No waiver results in that situation from the fact that the society, after learning that a member has lost his life through engaging in the prohibited occupation, at the request of the beneficiary furnishes blanks upon which to make proofs of death, without giving notice of an intention to resist payment, otherwise than by a general statement that the supplying or use of the blanks should waive no right to deny liability.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1907; Dec. Dig. § 755[1].)

Appeal from District Court, Saline County.

Action by Belle Ridgeway against the Modern Woodmen of America. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions to render judgment for defendant.

* Decision rendered, June 10, 1916. 157 Pac. Rep. 1191. Syllabus by the Court.

L. W. Hamner, of Salina, Truman Plantz, of Warsaw, Ill., and Geo. G. Perrin, of Rock Island, Ill., for Appellant. Z. C. Millikin, of Salina, for Appellee.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. vs. NELSON.*
(Court of Appeals of Kentucky.)

1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST. One who has no insurable interest in the life of another cannot be the beneficiary in a policy issued upon his life and cannot collect the insurance upon the insured's death.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-138; Dec. Dig. § 114.)

2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST— ASSIGNMENT.

The rule of insurance law relative to insurable interest applies with equal force after a life policy is issued, and the beneficiary is changed by assignment or otherwise as it does to the naming of the beneficiary at the time of procuring the insurance.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 166, 167; Dec. Dig. § 122.) 3. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTERESTCREDITOR.

A creditor, to the extent of his debt, has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 162; Dec. Dig. § 116[5].)

4. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE -INTEREST.

Payment by the insurance company which issued a policy of "industrial insurance," the purpose of which is to provide a reasonable fund with which insured may alleviate his last sickness and secure decent burial, to insured's aunt, his beneficiary, who cared for him in his sickness and buried him, was permissible under the usual "facility of payment” clause in such a policy, providing that payment might be made to the beneficiary or any person equitably entitled, etc., though the aunt had no insurable interest in insured's life.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1485; Dec. Dig. § 583[2].)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch, First Division.

Suit by Elnora Nelson, etc., against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. There was judgment for plaintiff and defendant files a transcript of the record, and enters motion that it be granted an appeal from judgment. Motion for appeal sustained, appeal granted, and judgment reversed for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Clarance Smith and Keith L. Bullitt, both of Louisville, for Appellant. L. Frank Withers and L. A. Hickman, both of Louisville, for Appellee. * Decision rendered, June 8, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 520.

MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK ET AL. vs. SPOHN

ET AL.*

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky.)

1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-RIGHT TO PROCEEDS. Under Ky. St. § 2064, providing that when a devise is made to several as a class or as tenants in common, or as joint tenants, and one or more of the devisees shall die before the testator, and another or other shall survive the testator, the share or shares of such as die shall go to descendants, or, if none, to surviving devisees, unless a different disposition is made by the devisor, a policy of insurance being regarded as testamentary in character, where the insured takes out a policy on his own life for the benefit of his wife, and upon her death for the benefit of his children, and after the death of the wife one of the children dies without issue before the insured, his part goes to the surviving beneficiaries.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1472-1474; Dec. Dig. § 589.)

2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-RIGHT TO PROCEEDS. Under Ky. St. § 654, authorizing a woman without the consent of her husband to insure his life for the benefit of herself and children, where a policy of insurance was for the benefit of the wife of the deceased and the contract showed on its face that the first annual premium was paid by the wife, and that she was to continue to pay the premium, and the policy contained a direct promise to pay the policy to the wife or, if she were not living, to her children or their guardian, the policy was a contract with the wife of the insured, any payments by the insured being made as her agent, and hence the policy is not in the nature of a testamentary disposition, and a child at the death of the mother took a vested interest which he could transmit by will to his widow.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1470; Dec. Dig. § 586.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Harrison County.

Suit by Frank Spohn and others against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York and another. From the judgment against plaintiff Sudie Spohn, she appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Wade H. Lail, of Cynthiana, and Grubbs & Grubbs, of Louisville, for Appellant.

M. C. Swinford, of Cynthiana, for Appellees.

* Decision rendered, June 13, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 633.

NEWPORT BENEV. BURIAL ASS'N vs. CLAY, INS. COM'R. KENTON & CAMPBELL BENEV. BURIAL ASS'N vs.

SAME.*

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky.)

1. INSURANCE-BURIAL ASSOCIATIONS-STATUTES GOVERN

ING.

While Ky. St. § 664, regulating and defining life insurance companies on the assessment or co-operative plan, is broad enough to include assessment burial associations, they are not required to comply with such chapter as to organizing, the Legislature by section 199a having provided special laws governing such associations different from the general insurance laws.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 49, 64, 65; Dec. Dig. § 52.) 2. INSURANCE—BURIAL ASSOCIATIONS—STATUTES GOVERN

ING.

Where the Legislature amended statutes governing assessment and cooperative life insurance companies, and on the same day enacted other sections specifically applying to burial associations, it was conclusive of the intent to separate life insurance companies from burial associations, and place the latter in a class by themselves.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 49, 64, 65; Dec. Dig. § 52.) 4. INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION-REPUGNANCY.

Ky. St. §§ 660-681a, relating to assessment and co-operative life insurance companies, and section 199a, relating to burial associations, are not repugnant to each other, although they deal to some extent with the same subject-matter, and, being capable of enforcement together consistently, both must be upheld and enforced.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.)

7. INSURANCE-BURIAL ASSOCIATIONS-STATUTES GOVERN

ING.

Ky. St. § 199a, subd. 1, provides the procedure for organizing burial associations. Subdivision 2 requires such associations to make a certain deposit with the treasurer, and provides the procedure on dissolution of such associations, but provides that "the provisions of this act shall not apply to corporation, association or company that has no capital stock, pays no salaries or commissions to officers and whose sole resources except necessary expenses are devoted to paying funeral expenses of members." Held, that associations enumerated in the proviso are excepted only from provisions of subdivision 2, and are not from remainder of section 199a, so that they cannot be required to comply with the general insurance law, but are governed only by section 199a.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 74; Dec. Dig. § 57[1].)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County.

Two suits for injunction, by the Newport Benevolent Burial Association, and by the Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Association, against M. C. Clay, Insurance Commissioner. From orders sustaining demurrers to the petition and judgments dismissing both petitions, both *Decision rendered, June 7, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 658.

plaintiffs appeal. The cases were heard together. Judgments reversed and remanded.

Wm. A. Byrne, of Covington, Barbour & Bassman, of Newport, and Byrne & Read, of Covington, for Appellants.

M. M. Logan, Atty. Gen., C. H. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and G. E. Zimmerman, of Louisville, for Appellee.

O'CONNOR'S ADM'R vs. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOCIETY OF UNITED STATES.*

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky.)

1. INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST-ASSIGNMENT OF

POLICY.

The validity of a life insurance policy, as against objection that an assignment thereof was an evasion of the prohibition against the issuance of policies to beneficiaries having no insurable interest, must be determined by the contract between insured and beneficiary prior to or at time of the issuance of the policy, and any subsequent agreement between the insured and the beneficiary cannot affect the rights of the insurer.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 166, 167; Dec. Dig § 122.) 2. INSURANCE-ACTION ON POLICY-EVIDENCE-SUFFI

CIENCY.

In an action on a life insurance policy, evidence held sufficient to support a directed verdict for defendant on the ground that an assignment of the policy was an attempted evasion of the law prohibiting the issuance of policies to persons having no insurable interest in the life of the insured.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1708; Dec. Dig. § 665[1].),

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch, Second Division.

Action by John O'Connor's administrator against the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

David R. Castleman and Pryor & Castleman, all of Louisville, for Appellant.

Humphrey, Middleton & Humphrey, of Louisville, for Appellee.

* Decision rendered, June 9, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 502.

Vol. XLVIII-12.