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BROMBERG vs. NORTH AMERICAN LIFE INS. CO. (No. 210.)*

(Supreme Court of Michigan.)

3. INSURANCE-ACTIONS-LIFE INSURANCE-QUESTIONS

FOR JURY.

Evidence that deceased died from a gunshot wound in the head, that he was not feeling well, that a revolver was found in his hand, with no indication of a struggle preceding the shooting, and that no one had access to his room except his family, together with public records showing suicide, raised an issue of fact for the jury.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1763; Dec. Dig. § 668[12].)

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Howard Wiest, Judge. Action by Aaron Bromberg against the North American Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Argued before Stone, C. J., and Kuhn, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, Steere, Person, and Brooke, JJ.

George W. Bates, of Detroit, for Appellant.
Stellwagen & MacKay, of Detroit, for Appellee.

* Decision rendered, June 2, 1916. 158 N. W. Rep. 141.

NEW ERA ASS'N vs. KUYAT ET AL. (No. 177.)*
(Supreme Court of Michigan)

1. INSURANCE-BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-CHANGE OF BENE

FICIARY.

Where the constitution of an association permitted change of beneficiary upon the signing of a waiver of the original certificate, the insured had the right, without consent of the beneficiary or notice to the beneficiary by the association, to change the beneficiary in his policy, as the first beneficiary has no vested right in the policy.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1949; Dec. Dig. § 783.)

2. INSURANCE - BENEFIT INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY-ESTOPPEL.

Where it did not appear that a post card sent by an agent of the plaintiff benefit insurance association, informing the wife of the deceased that assessments paid by her were on the original certificate in which she was named as full beneficiary, in any way influenced or injured her, the association was not estopped to assert that the original certificate had been waived by the deceased, a new policy issued, and a partial change of beneficiary.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1948; Dec. Dig. § 782.)

* Decision rendered, June 1, 1916. 158 N. W. Rep. 119.

3. INSURANCE-BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-CHANGE OF BENE

FICIARY-MODE-RATIFICATION.

Where deceased personally signed his name at the bottom of a new certificate, he agreed to its terms and ratified a change of beneficiary. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1951; Dec. Dig. § 784[4].)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery.

Interpleader by the New Era Association against Emma R. Kuyat and another. Decree for defendant Sophia Kenzie, and said Kuyat appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before Stone, C. J., and Kuhn, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, Steere, Brooke, and Person, JJ.

Moore & Moore, of Detroit, for Appellant.

Kleinhans, Knappen & Uhl, of Grand Rapids (Lucking, Helfman, Lucking & Hanlon, of Detroit, of counsel), for Appellee New Era Ass'n. James F. Hill, of Detroit, for Appellee Kenzie.

ALEXANDER vs. SOVEREIGN CAMP OF WOODMEN OF THE WORLD ET AL. (No. 11944.)*

(Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.)

4. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT-RIGHTS OF BENEFICI

ARY.

The beneficiary of a mutual benefit life insurance policy, which entitles the insured to change the beneficiary at will, has no vested interest in the policy.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1949; Dec. Dig. § 783.)

Error to Circuit Court, Buchanan County; Chas. D. Mayer, Judge. "To be officially published."

Suit by Charles S. Alexander against the Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, in which Mary E. Alexander was interpleaded on defendant's prayer. From the judgment rendered, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Ferrell & Zwick, of St. Joseph, for Plaintiff in Error.

W. B. Norris and Wm. M. Morton, both of St. Joseph, for Defendant in Error.

* Decision rendered, May 1, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 2.

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1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-OLD-LINE OR ASSESS

MENT.

Life insurance is old-line, and not assessment, the policy providing for payment of fixed quarterly premiums, and containing no provision for payment of death benefits from procceds of assessments, in case of excessive death rate, and referring to no by-law providing therefor, and such a by-law not being brought into the policy by its reference to the application, which contains the agreement of insured that if he omit to make any of the payments at the place and time required by the policy and insurer's by-laws the policy shall be void; the by-laws referred to in the application being only those relating to fixed quarterly payments.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 172, 178; Dec. Dig. § 124.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Johnson County; Samuel Davis, Special Judge.

"To be officially published."

Action by Thomas H. Miller against the Missouri State Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions for judgment.

Nick M. Bradley and M. D. Aber, both of Warrensburg, for Appellant.

Jones, Hocker, Sullivan & Angert, of St. Louis, J. W. Suddath & Son, of Warrensburg, and James C. Jones, Jr., of St. Louis, for Respondent.

* Decision rendered, May 24, 1915. On rehearing, May 22, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 762.

BANKERS' LIFE CO. vs. CHORN, INS. SUPERINTENDENT. (No. 18823.)*

(Supreme Court of Missouri. In Banc.)

1. INSURANCE-PRIVILEGE TAX-STATUTORY CONSTRUC

TION.

R. S. 1909, § 7099, imposing a premium duty or tax on foreign insurance companies, is a part of the general insurance laws, and therefore inapplicable to assessment insurance companies under R. S. 1909, § 6959, excepting such companies from the requirements of the general insurance laws.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 7.)

* Decision rendered, May 15, 1916. Rehearing denied, June 2, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 681.

5. INSURANCE - PRIVILEGE TAX-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION "PREMIUM."

R. S. 1909, § 7099, imposing a duty on the "premiums" received by foreign insurance companies does not apply to "assessments," since there is an essential difference between the insurance companies receiving such payments.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 7.)

(For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Premium.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cole County; J. G. Slate, Judge.

Action by the Bankers' Life Company against Walter K. Chorn, as Superintendent of Insurance. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Lehmann & Lehmann, of St. Louis, and I. M. Earle, of Des Moines, Iowa, for Appellant.

Earl F. Nelson, of Milan, for Respondent.

PASSACONAWAY COUNCIL vs. DOW.*

(Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Rockingham.)

INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-BENEFICIARIES-WHO MAY BE BENEFICIARIES.

Where by-laws of a beneficial association provided that funeral benefits were payable only to certain legal dependents of a deceased member upon death of a member payment was properly made to his widow, although before death he had notified the association to make his iusurance payable to his aunt, a blood relative not dependent on him. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1944; Dec. Dig. § 777.)

Transferred from Superior Court, Rockingham County; Young, Judge. Bill of interpleader by Passaconaway Council against Mrs. Dow and another. To an order in favor of defendant Mrs. Knowles, the other named defendant, excepted. Transferred. Exceptions overruled.

Bill of interpleader to determine the right to a funeral benefit payable upon a certificate of membership issued to Frank L. Knowles. The by-laws provided that funeral benefits are payable only to legal dependents of a deceased member, and that such dependent must be the wife, children, parents, sisters, or brothers, grandparents, or grandchildren or other blood relative or other person who is dependent upon the member. Before his death Knowles notified the Council to make his insurance payable to the defendant, Mrs. Dow, his aunt, who was a blood relative, but not dependent upon him, and at his death he had not recalled this notice. The court ordered payment to the defendant widow, Mrs. Knowles, and the defendant Dow excepted. Transferred by Young, J.

Ernest L. Guptill, of Portsmouth, for Dow.
Eastman, Scammon & Gardner, of Exeter, for Knowles.

* Decision rendered, Jan. 4, 1916. 97 Atl. Rep. 878.

ADICKES vs. DREWRY. (No. 537.)*

(Supreme Court of North Carolina.)

2. INSURANCE-AGENCY CONTRACTS-CANCELLATION. Where an agent rendered services under a written contract with the general agent of an insurance company which was approved by the company, and where there was a supplemental agreement, and later a new contract between the parties increasing the agent's drawing allowance and allowing an additional 1 per cent on the nine renewal commissions allowed him, a subsequent new contract, whereby the drawing amount was again increased and the additional 1 per cent and the first contract was expressly canceled, annulled all previous agreements, and was an accord and satisfaction of them.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 111, 114; Dec. Dig. § 84[1].)

Appeal from Superior Court, Buncombe County; Webb, J.

Action by H. F. Adickes against John C. Drewry. Judgment for defendant on his motion for nonsuit and action dismissed, and plaintiff excepts and appeals. Affirmed.

Bourne, Parker & Morrison, T. F. Davidson, and R. B. Loughran, all of Asheville, for Appellant.

A. B. Andrews, Jr., of Raleigh, and Martin, Rollins & Wright, of Asheville, for Appellee.

* Decision rendered, May 31, 1916. 89 S. E. Rep. 23.

MODERN ORDER OF PRÆTORIANS vs. KENNEDY (No. 7500.)*

(Supreme Court of Oklahoma.)

INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-WARRANTIES. Where a member of a benefit society whose death benefit certificate issued by such society had lapsed for failure to promptly pay an assessment applied in writing for the reinstatement thereof, and neither the constitution nor by-laws of the order required such form of application, held, that the society was without power to impose the making of a formal written application as a condition precedent to the reinstatement of such member, and that in an action by the beneficiary named therein to recover on such certificate, the statements contained in such application were not binding upon such beneficiary as warranties or otherwise.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1921; Dec. Dig. § 761.)

* Decision rendered, May 23, 1916. 157 Pac. Rep. 926. Syllabus by the Court.

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