Where a contract of agency for the sale of insurance, providing for payment of commissions and renewal commissions as long as the contract was in force, was terminated by act of the parties in accordance with its provisions, the agent was not entitled to commissions on renewal premiums received after the date of the termination of his agency, notwithstanding a provision in the contract that, if company was refused permission or ceased to do business in the state, the agent would be protected in rights acquired to renewal commissions.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 112; Dec. Dig. § 84[4].)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Yell County; M. L. Davis, Judge. Suit by A. S. McCray against the Security Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and dismissed.

A. S. McCray brought this suit for the collection of certain renewal commissions alleged to be due him under the terms of his agency contract for writing insurance for appellant company. It is admitted that the written contract was terminated on the 20th day of November, 1914, in accordance with its terms and all commissions and renewals paid to that time; the suit being brought for commissions for renewals from said 20th day of November, 1914, the date of the cancellation of the contract. Section 3a of the contract provides:—

"The company, in consideration of the services to be rendered by the agent, agrees to pay the agent, as long as this contract is in force, on all business written by him, a commission upon the first year's premium of each policy accepted and paid for in cash, and a renewal commission upon subsequent premiums, when paid in cash in accordance with the following tables," which show the commissions to be 5 per cent on all except three kinds of policies designated, and "an additional renewal commission of 2 per cent for five years will be paid on premiums of policies written on the first three plans scheduled above."

Section 18 of the contract stipulates:

"It is agreed that the provisions of this contract may be modified and changed without the consent of the agent if the same shall conflict with any state laws or rulings of any state insurance department; and, should the license of the company to do business in the resident state of the agent, or any other state in this contract, at any time be withheld or revoked, or the company for any cause cease to do business in said state, this contract shall immediately terminate, except as to any rights the agent may have acquired as to renewal commissions."

Appellee testified that he was entitled under the terms of the contract, notwithstanding the termination of it, to the $130 claimed as renewal commissions, and recovered judgment therefor, from which this appeal is prosecuted.

J. T. Bullock, of Russellville, and Bradshaw, Rhoton & Helm, of Little Rock, for Appellant.

John B. Crownover, of Dardanelle, for Appellee.

MISSOURI STATE LIFE INS. CO. vs. CRABTREE.

(No. 33.)*

(Supreme Court of Arkansas.)

1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-OPTIONS-NOTICE. A life policy provided that, in event of nonpayment after payment of two premiums, the policy should be continued as term insurance for such a period as the surrender value would purchase term insurance. A note given by insured for the payment of the third premium declared that, in event of nonpayment, the insured should be personally liable for a sum equal to one-half of the principal, but that the insurer should have an option to treat such liability as indebtedness on account of the policy reducing the surrender value. Held, that the insurer was bound to give notice of its option to treat the indebtedness evidenced by the note as indebtedness against the policy, and, having retained the note without notice, could not deduct one-half of the amount thereof from the surrender value of the policy so as to reduce the period of term insurance.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 934; Dec. Dig. § 366.)

2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY. An insurer cannot by contract with the insured change the vested rights of the beneficiary.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1470; Dec. Dig. § 586.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; W. J. Driver, Judge. Action by Mary M. Crabtree against the Missouri State Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Jones, Hocker, Sullivan & Angert, of St. Louis, Mo., and Block & Kirsch, of Paragould, for Appellant.

M. P. Huddleston, Robert E. Fuhr, and J. M. Futrell, all of Paragould, for Appellee.

* Decision rendered, June 5, 1916. 187 S. W. Rep. 173.

EMINENT HOUSEHOLD OF COLUMBIAN WOODMEN vs. HOWLE. (No. 35.)*

3. INSURANCE

(Supreme Court of Arkansas.)

FRATERNAL INSURANCE DEATH WHILE

VIOLATING LAW-INTOXICATION.

Where the by-laws of a fraternal insurance association barred recovery if the insured should meet his death while in violation of law and the insured was killed when assaulting a marshal, his voluntary intoxication was not, under Kirby's Dig. § 1557, declaring that voluntary Decision rendered, June 5, 1916. 187 S. W. Rep. 176.

intoxication is no excuse for crime, any excuse, and an instruction so declaring the law was improperly refused.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1955, 1957-1959; Dec. Dig. § 787.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, White County; J. M. Jackson, Judge.

Action by Laura O. Howle againt the Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff's instruction No. 9 is as follows:-

The jury is instructed that, if you find from the evidence that at the time the deceased, Howle, made the assault upon the marshal, Sowell, he knew right from wrong, and he knew it was wrong to make said assault, then, under the law, he was sane, unless you find that at the time he was acting under an irresistible impulse arising from a defect in his will caused by the diseased condition of his mind, and was not acting from mere anger or revenge.

Brundidge & Neelly, of Searcy, for Appellant.

Rachels & Yarnell and Jno. E. Miller, all of Searcy, for Appellee.

WILKES ET AL VS. HICKS. (No. 25).*
(Supreme Court of Arkansas.)

1. INSURANCE-BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-CHANGE OF BENE

FICIARY.

Where the by-laws of a benefit society authorize a change of beneficiary at any time, a member's right to change the beneficiary is absolute and can be made at any time upon substantial compliance with the by-laws. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1946; Dec. Dig. § 780.) 2. INSURANCE-BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-RIGHTS OF BENE

FICIARY.

Under the by-laws of a benefit society allowing a member to change the beneficiary in his policy at any time but providing that the change should not take effect until furnished to the officer named and inserted by him in the policy, where the insured wrote a request for a change of beneficiary in the presence of members of the order and directed it to be forwarded to the officer authorized to make the change but died before it was sent, the request being forwarded with proofs of his death, the right of the beneficiary named in the policy to the proceeds of the policy became vested and could not be defeated by the claim of the person named in the request.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1951; Dec. Dig. § 784[2].)

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor. Interpleader by the Knights of Pythias of North America against George Hicks and Carter Wilkes and others. From a decree for defendant

* Decision rendered, May 29, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 830.

George Hicks, defendants Carter Wilkes and others appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Carmichael, Brooks, Powers & Rector, of Little Rock, for Appellants.
Bradshaw, Rhoton & Helm, of Little Rock, for Appellee.

LINNEWEBER ET AL. vs. SUPREME COUNCIL CATHOLIC KNIGHTS OF AMERICA. (Civ. 1823.)*

(District Court of Appeal of California. First District.)

1. INSURANCE-WHAT PROVISIONS GOVERN-AMENDMENT. A provision in a benefit certificate relating to the presumption of the death from unexplained absence would govern as it read at the time of the insured's disappearance, which the court found to have been the date of his death, and not as subsequently amended.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719[1].) 4. INSURANCE - FRATERNAL INSURANCE - DEATH - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Evidence, in an action on a benefit certificate, held sufficient to sustain a finding fixing the date of insured's death, after the presumption of death from unexplained absence had sufficed to prove the fact of his death.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 2002; Dec. Dig. § 817[4].) 5. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL INSURANCE-SUSPENSION. A member could not be lawfully suspended from a beneficiary association for nonpayment of dues at any time after the day on which he was found to have died, and, upon proof of death and the date thereof, the beneficiaries would not be bound to keep such dues paid to preserve their right to receive the benefits accruing by virtue of the insured's membership at the time of his death.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1895, 1896, 1903; Dec. Dig. § 750.)

7. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL INSURANCE-RECOVERY. Where, so far as the records show, the plaintiffs, children of the original beneficiary, were the real and only parties at interest, they were entitled to maintain an action on the certificate, in the absence of the affirmative pleading and proof to the contrary.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1994; Dec. Dig. § 813.)

Appeal from Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco; Jas. M. Troutt, Judge.

Action by Mary Linneweber and others against Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America. Judgment for defendant, motion for new trial denied, and plaintiffs appeal. Judgment and order reversed.

* Decision rendered. April 27, 1916. Rehearing denied by Supreme Court, June 26, 1916. 158 Pac. Rep. 229.

F. W. Von Schrader and Von Schrader & Cadwalader, all of Sar Francisco, for Appellants.

Walter Christie and F. J. Kierce, both of San Francisco, for Respondent.

KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF SECURITY vs. CONSIDINE ET UX. (No. 8639.)*

(Supreme Court of Colorado.)

1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-BREACH OF WARRANTY. Where an applicant for membership in a fraternal order falsely stated in his application that he was not afflicted with disease, had not been treated by a physician and surgeon within five years, and had not undergone any surgical operation, etc., which answers and statements were warranted by him to be true by the terms of the application, his beneficiaries were not entitled to recover for his death on the certificate issued to him.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1863; Dec. Dig. § 723[5].) 2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-FAILURE TO READ APPLI

CATION EFFECT.

Where an applicant for membership in a fraternal benefit order did not ask to read his application and answers before or after he signed it, and was not prevented from so doing, his failure to read it did not, void the consequences of his false statements in the application relative to his bodily condition, made warranties by the terms of the application (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1863; Dec. Dig. § 723[5].)

Error to District Court, Lake County; Charles Cavender, Judge. Action by James Considine and wife against the Knights and Ladie of Security. To review a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant brings error Judgment reversed, with instruction to enter judgment for defendant.

John A. Ewing and Michael F. Ryan, both of Leadville, for Plaintifi in Error.

Hogan & Bonner, of Leadville, for Defendants in Error.

* Decision rendered, May 1, 1916. Rehearing denied, July 3, 1916. 158 Pac. Rep. 282.