APITZ vs. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS & LADIES OF HONOR. (No. 10598.)*

(Supreme Court of Illinois.)

3. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL-BY-LAWS-CHANGE.

By-laws of a fraternal benefit association apply to a benefit certificate issued before their enactment, it reserving the right to the association to amend or change by-laws, and containing agreement of the member to be bound thereby.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719[1].) 4. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL-BY-LAWS REASONABLENESS. A by-law of a fraternal benefit association that a member shall stand suspended after disappearance for a year is not unreasonable as to a certificate issued before its enactment, authorizing changes in by-laws. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719[1].)

Appeal from Appellate Court, Second District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Winnebago County, Arthur H. Frost, Judge.

Action by Lizzie Apitz against the Supreme Lodge Knights and Ladies of Honor. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate Court, and she brings error. Affirmed.

Roy F. Hall, of Rockford, for Plaintiff in Error.

Carpenter & St. John, of Rockford, and Ashcraft & Ashcraft, of Chicago (Edwin M. Ashcraft, of Chicago, of counsel), for Defendant in Error.

* Decision rendered, June 22. 1916. 113 N. E. Rep. 63.

WATSON vs. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK. (No. 20561.)*

(Supreme Court of Louisiana.)

INSURANCE - LIMITATION OF ACTIONS PRESCRIPTION — ACTIONS-LIMITATIONS.

Where by its twenty-year payment life policy a mutual life insurance company agrees to pay the amount therein called for to the named beneficiary at the death of the assured, upon the "condition" that the annual premiums are paid in advance for twenty years, and subject to the "provision, requirement, or benefit" that, after three full annual premiums have been paid upon the policy, the company will, upon the legal surrender thereof, before default in payment of any premium, or within six months thereafter, issue a nonparticipating policy for paid-up insurance, payable as herein provided, for the proportion of

* Decision rendered, June 5, 1916. 72 South. Rep. 189. Syllabus by the Court.

the amount of this policy which the number of full years' premiums paid bears to the total number required," and where, after paying six premiums, the assured defaults in the payment of the seventh and subsequent premiums, and three years later is informed that his policy has lapsed, but that he may have it restored on complying with certain requirements, and where for eleven years following the receipt of that information, and up to the time of his death, the assured takes no further steps in the matter, and his heir takes none for more than three years after his death, the suit of the latter, then instituted, as upon a paid-up policy, for six-twentieths cf the amount called for by the policy originally issued, is barred by the prescription of ten years established against personal actions by Civ. Code, art. 3544, and by the prescription of two years established by Act 68 of 1906 against actions to recover under forfeited policies.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1540, 1544; Dec. Dig. § 622[1]. Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 190, 191; Dec. Dig. § 39[1].)

Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches; Wm. T. Cunningham, Judge.

Action by Mrs. A. W. Watson against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Henry & Gunter, of Natchitoches, for Appellant.

Denegre, Leovy & Chaffe, of New Orleans, and Scarborough & Carver, of Natchitoches, for Appellee.

ROYAL ARCANUM vs. VITZTHUM. No. 52.)*

(Court of Appeals of Maryland.)

2. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-REASONABLENESS OF BY-LAW.

In determining whether a by-law of a fraternal benefit association enacted after a member joined the order is reasonable, reference should be had to the nature and purpose of the contract, read in the light of the objects of the order.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719[1].)

3. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-BY-LAW -REASONABLENESS.

The by-law of a fraternal benefit insurance association suspending a member who has disappeared, if he cannot be located, from the time when the first effort is made by the order to do so, if he does not make known his whereabouts within six months, etc., made after the member joined the order, is reasonable and enforceable against the beneficiary of the member who agreed with the order when he was admitted that, should he voluntarily sever his connection with it, his act should forfeit * Decision rendered. May 17, 1916. 97 Atl. Rep. 923.

his own rights, and those of his family and dependents, to all benefits and privileges of the order.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719[1].)

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Morris A Soper, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Louisa C. Vitzthum against the Royal Arcanum, a corporation. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Judgment reversed without new trial.

Argued before Boyd, C. J., and Burke, Thomas, Pattison, Urner, and Stockbridge, JJ.

Andrew C. Trippe, of Baltimore (J. McC. Trippe, of Baltimore, on the brief), for Appellant.

Samuel Want, of Baltimore, for Appellee.

MCCARTY vs. CAVANAUGH ET AL.*

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Middlesex.)

1. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-"CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION."

A fraternal beneficiary association is not a "charitable organization." (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1824; Dec. Dig. § 687.) (For other definitions, see. Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Charity.)

2. INSURANCE - FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE - RIGHT OF LODGES-"DISBAND."

Evidence held to show that a local benefit lodge "seceded" and did not "disband," where the entire membership withdrew, so as not to require payment to the Grand Lodge of the local funds as required in case of disbanding.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1838; Dec. Dig. § 697.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Disband.)

3. INSURANCE - FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE - RIGHT OF LODGES.

In the absence of charter or constitutional provision to the contrary, a local lodge of a fraternal benefit association has the right to secede from the Grand Lodge without forfeiting its funds.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1838; Dec. Dig. § 697.)

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County.

Action by Julia A. McCarty against Mary Cavanaugh and others. From an interlocutory decree modifying and confirming the master's report and final decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. *Decision rendered. June 21, 1916. 113 N. E. Rep. 271.

Elias Field and Brown, Field & Murray, all of Boston, for Plaintiff. John J. Shaughnessy, of Marlboro, and John M. Maloney, of Boston, for Respondents.

RUANE vs. MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO. (No. 1687.)* (Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.)

1. INSURANCE-"RESERVE FUND."

The equitable value of a life insurance policy constitutes its "reserve fund." (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 931; Dec. Dig. § 364.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Reserve Fund.)

2. INSURANCE-LOAN AGREEMENT-CONSTRUCTION. A provision in a loan agreement between an insurer and the insured that on the death of the insured the amount due on the obligation should be deducted from the amount of the policy meant that, if the insured died when the policy was in force and his indebtedness was unpaid, it should be deducted from the amount payable under the policy. (For other cases, see Insurance, Dec. Dig. § 1791⁄2.)

3. INSURANCE - LAPSE - EXTENDED INSURANCE TION OF LOAN.

DEDUC

A life insurance policy provided that, when it ceased or became void, all previous payments should be forfeited to the company, except that, in case of forfeiture after three or more years' premiums had been paid, the company would purchase the policy at its equitable value, to be determined by it, and a loan agreement provided that on the death of the insured the amount due on the obligation would be deducted from the amount of the policy, and after the payment of premiums for more than three years and lapse of the policy for default in premiums, and when the insured was indebted to the insurer on a loan, the insurer calculated the reserve and deducted from three-fourths thereof the amount due on the loan and applied the balance as a net single premium to the purchase of extended insurance for a period which had expired before the death of the insured. Held that, although the insurer applied so much of the statute, then in force, but not binding on it, as authorized the deduction of one-fourth of the reserve it was not bound to apply the other part of the statute, forbidding the deduction of such loan from the reserve before three-fourths of the reserve was applied to the purchase of extended insurance.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 938; Dec. Dig. § 367[2].)

5. INSURANCE-RESERVE VALUE-LOAN AGREEMENT-SET

TLEMENT.

A provision in a loan agreement that upon default the pledge of the policy should be foreclosed by satisfying the indebtedness out of its reserve. and the balance, if any, paid to the insured in cash or applied to pur

*Decision rendered, May 25, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 1188.

Rehearing denied, June 24, 1916.

Vol. XLVIII-19.

chase extended insurance, is a reasonable and practicable method of settling the contract, not inconsistent with sound public policy, or violative of the constitutional rights of the insured.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Dec. Dig. § 1792.)

6. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-INSURER AS TRUSTEE. An insurer is held as a trustee to fairly and properly treat the assured. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 172, 178; Dec. Dig. § 124.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; E. M. Dearing, Judge. Action by Charles I. Ruane, administrator of the estate of James Ruane, deceased, against the Manhattan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Jones, Hocker, Sullivan & Angert and James C. Jones, Jr., all of St. Louis, for Appellant.

Charles P. Damron, of Newport, Ark., and Anderson, Gilbert & Levi, of St. Louis, for Respondent.

STURGEON vs. PIONEER LIFE INS. CO. (No. 12085.)* (Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.)

1. INSURANCE - LIFE INSURANCE - MEDICAL EXAMINER STATUTE.

A life insurance company could not have complied with Rev. St. 1909, § 6975, forbidding the issuance of a policy to any person until the applicant has been examined by a physician duly licensed and appointed by the company as its medical examiner, by employing an examiner in Missouri who had not been licensed to practice medicine therein pursuant to Rev. St. 1909, §§ 8311-8319.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 195; Dec. Dig. § 130[1].)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; C. A. Burney, Judge. "Not to be officially published."

Action by Q. A. Sturgeon against the Pioneer Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Albert L. Reeves, of Kansas City, for Appellant.

E. H. Busiek and Paul R. Stinson, both of Kansas City, for Respondent.

* Decision rendered, June 12, 1916. 186 S. W. Rep. 1192.