the poison was taken with suicidal intent the provision in the policy limiting the liability to $140 was void under section 6945, R. S. 1909. The policy expressly provided that in the event of death by poison the company would pay a stipulated sum, and it is competent for insurer and assured to contract for an indemnity of one amount for death or injury resulting from certain causes, and a different amount for death or injury resulting from other causes or where the accident happens under certain designated circumstances. Provisions in accident insurance policies, excepting certain classes and kinds of injuries and causes of death, are recognized as valid and binding contracts and provisions by the courts of Missouri and elsewhere. Meadows vs. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 129 Mo. 76, 31 S. W. 578, 50 Am. St. Rep. 427; Hester vs. Fid. & Cas. Co., 69 Mo. App. 186; Lovelace vs. Travelers' Pro. Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104, 28 S. W. 877, 30 L. R. A. 209, 47 Am. St. Rep. 638; McAndiless vs. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 45 Mo. App. 578; Fetter vs. Fid. & Cas. Co., 174 Mo. loc. cit. 269, 73 S. W. 592, 61 L. R. A. 459, 97 Am. St. Rep. 560; Crenshaw vs. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 71 Mo. App. loc. cit. 51, 52; Brown vs. Supreme Lodge K. of P., 83 Mo. App. 633; Mossop vs. Continental Cas. Co., 137 Mo. App. 399, 118 S. W. 680. See, also, 4 Cooley's Briefs on Ins. p. 3175. On page 3193 of the text last cited, under the same subject, in dealing with poison as an exception, we find the following rule deduced from the cases there cited: "Where the policy provides that the insurance shall not extend to death or disability caused by the taking of poison,' the exception includes cases where the poison was taken accidentally, as well as those where it was taken intentionally. McGlother vs. Provident Mut. Acc. Co. of Philadelphia, 89 Fed. 685, 32 C. C. A. 318; Early vs. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 113 Mich. 58, 71 N. W. 500, 67 Am. St. Rep. 445; Meehan vs. Traders' & Travelers' Acc. Co., 34 Misc. Rep. 158, 68 N. Y. Supp. 821; Hill vs. Hartford Acc. Ins. Co., 22 Hun (N. Y.), 187; Pollock vs. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 102 Pa. 230, 48 Am. Rep. 204.” See, also, Shader vs. Railway Passenger Ass'n Co., 66 N. Y. loc. cit. 444, 23 Am. Rep. 65; Campbell vs. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N. Y., 109 Ky. 661, 60 S. W. 492; Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. vs. Jones, 94 Ala. 434, 10 South. 530; 1 Cyc. 257; 1 Corpus Juris, 442, 455. It has been held in the case of Dezell vs. Fid. & Cas. Co., 176 Mo. 253, loc. cit. 292, 75 S. W. 1102, that a provision containing an exception against poison does not include the taking of medicine in good faith which contained poison. With this, however, we have nothing to do in this case, as the admitted facts are that the assured took the poison-carbolic acid-with suicidal intent. That case recognized the legality of making an exception as to poison, but turned on the construction of that provision. [4] As we view this policy, the provision as to taking poison, and other contingencies named in paragraph (j), is not a provision cutting down the amount of insurance, but is a clause providing for the payment of a specific amount on the happening of the contingencies therein named. It no more cuts down the clause where death occurs from accident due to violence than does the provision, contained in the policy, providing for a certain amount in case of partial disability, cut down the amount allowed for total disability, or the provision fixing the amount for the loss of one hand cut down the amount allowed for the loss of both eyes. [5] The only application that section 6945, R. S. 1909, has to this policy is to make that clause in paragraph (j), providing, “or death or disability due to or resulting, directly or indirectly, from injuries intentionally inflicted upon the assured by himself or by any other person, or from injuries inflicted upon the assured by himself, or from injuries received by him while insane," absolutely void. Tennent vs. Union Central L. Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 345, 112 S. W. 754; Schmidt vs. Supreme Court United Order of Foresters, 228 Mo. 675, 129 S. W. 653. This insurance company doubtless writes insurance in a number of states wherein the provision against suicide is a valid provision, and it only becomes invalid by reason of our statute. [6] As we view it, our statute is intended to eliminate suicide as a defense to this kind of policy, and was never intended to authorize a recovery of any amount, or to increase the amount of a policy because of suicide. It was not intended to give a cause of action; death furnishes the cause of action, and suicide, under our statute, is to be no defense to the liability fixed by death. [7] Under the pleadings and declarations of law hereinbefore set out, the fact that intentional death was pleaded by the plaintiff and proven by the plaintiff furnished a cause of action to the plaintiff for $700, whereas had not the suicide been pleaded and proven, the liability under this policy would not have exceeded $140. It is said that while the defendant does not specifically plead suicide as a defense, by pleading this exception it in effect obtained the advantage or benefit of the defense of suicide. To this we cannot agree. The plaintiff had no cause of action for $700 under this policy because the admissions made in the pleadings show that Scales was not insured for $700 if he died from the effects of taking poison; and, had plaintiff's petition been filed to enforce the contract which inured to her benefit, she would then have sued for $140, and the defendant would not have been permitted, on account of the statute, to answer that it was relieved by reason of the suicide. The provision in the policy was not confined to poison taken with suicidal intent; it includes all cases where death results from poison qualified by the rule announced in the case of Dezell vs. Fid. & Cas. Co., supra, and cannot be said to have been inserted in order to avoid the statute. This appears from the fact that an exception, limiting the amount recoverable to the same amount if the assured commits suicide, is contained within the same paragraph. The respondent relies principally on the case of Applegate vs. Travelers' Insurance Co., 153 Mo. App. 63, 132 S. W. 2, and the case of Whitfield vs. Etna L. Ins. Co., 205 U. S., 489, 27 Sup. Ct. 578, 51 L. Ed. 895. The court in the Applegate Case bases its decision on the Whitfield Case. As stated in the beginning, we are unable to distinguish our case from the Applegate Case. We think there is a distinction between the Whitfield Case and the Applegate Case, and that the same distinction exists between our case and the Whitfield Case, and that this distinguishing feature, in our judgment, would have been sufficient basis for a different result in the Applegate Case. In the Whitfield Case the defense was based on an exception in case of suicide, and the court held, under the authorities therein cited, that the Missouri statute pertaining to suicide rendered the provision in the policy void. This is indisputable. As to what the court was deciding in that case will be found at page 496 of 205 U. S., at page 580 of 27 Sup. Ct., and near the bottom of page 898 of 51 L. Ed., where the court, before beginning a discussion of the question, used this language: "Will the statute, in a case of suicide, allow the company, when sued on its policy, to make a defense that will exempt it, simply because of such suicide, from liability for the principal sum?" All that was really decided in that case relevant to the question before us was that our statute against suicide being used as a defense is applicable whether it is invoked as a total or a partial defense. This is clearly shown by that case in its various steps leading to the Supreme Court of the United States, when it was first decided in (C. C.) 125 Fed. 269, and next in 144 Fed. 356, 75 C. C. A. 358. Neither the Whitfield Case nor any of the following cases cited by respondent (Berry vs. Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Ind. Co. [C. C.] 46 Fed. 439; Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Ind. Co. vs. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 108, 47 L. Ed. 139; Logan vs. Fid. & Cas. Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S. W. 948; Keller vs. Travelers' Ins. Co., 58 Mo. App. 557; Christian vs. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268; Schmidt vs. Supreme Court Order of Foresters, 228 Mo. 675, 129 S. W. 653; Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Ind. Co. vs. Berry, 50 Fed. 511, 1 C. C. A. 561) hold that where a policy limits payment of a certain amount in case of a certain cause of death, the suicide statute can be used as a force to lift a cause of action out of one paragraph and into another paragraph of the policy by showing that the death resulted from the cause being intentionally inflicted. The holding in the Whitfield Case on the Missouri statute concerning suicide, the opinion in which discusses at length the purpose of the statute in the light of Missouri decisions, is as follows: "The manifest purpose of the statute was to make all inquiry Vol. XLVIII-23. 352 as to suicide wholly immaterial, except where the insured templated suicide at the time he applied for his policy." It would seem against all public policy to allow an ins company to insure the lives of only such persons as comm cide, and this is intimated in the case of Ritter vs. Mut Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 300, 42 L. Ed. 693. the policy provides that if the injury when fatal results d or indirectly from poison the amount of indemnity shall bee to hold that the company will be bound to pay $140 if the is taken accidentally, and that it must pay $700 if the poi taken with suicidal intent, is in effect holding that a policy ting a premium on suicide, and giving suicide as a preferred of action is a legal and valid agreement. We are of the of that our suicide statute was intended to merely cut off one w ISU of defense formerly in the hands of insurers, and was neve tended to create a cause of action upon affirmatively shor suicide as a cause of the death. EN CC1 Бага 01 dy Ad ne H It seems to us there is a vast difference between holding suicide, under our statute, cannot be made by contract a paig defense or be used to reduce the recovery and holding that competent for an insurance company to provide an indemnit $140 where death results from poison howsoever taken. To he trate: Suppose a policy provided an indemnity of $5,000 initi event of death resulting from a gunshot wound and $500 in death results from poison and contained a clause against suic E and the policy only provided for these two classes. Now.'A though suicide by shooting could not be shown to defeat or crease the first amount, could it be contended that because suic was committed by taking poison the beneficiary could reco $5,000 by reason of the statute? This would be a very differe case from one in which the policy contained a provision to p $5,000 if death resulted from a gunshot wound, but only $500 the wound was inflicted for the purpose of committing suicid The mere fact of suicide would not, in and of itself, creatc greater liability than if death resulted unintentionally from the same circumstances and from the same cause. Under the pleadings in this case the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for $140. Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the circuit court to enter a judgment in accordance with this opinion. However, as the opinion we have rendered is in conflict with that of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the Applegate Case, supra, the cause is certified to the Supreme Court for final determination. Robertson, P. J., and Sturgis, J., concur. e the in policy. STER vs. NORTH AMERICAN ACCIDENT INS. CO. llow an ns as c er vs. Ed. 693 (No. 30831.)* (Supreme Court of Iowa.) 1 resultsSURANCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY-EVIDENCE. ty shall ence held to sustain a verdict that plaintiff's paralytic condition was 40 if the used by being jolted against the top of an automobile and falling ack onto a surgical case in the bottom of the machine. if the other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1719, 1721, 1722; Dec. at a pobig. § 665[5].) preferre of the off one w was new NSURANCE-EXTENT OF INSURER'S LIABILITY—ACCI- insurance policy's limitation of liability as to "disability, due to either ng that ndemnit Appeal from District Court, Lee County; W. S. Hamilton, Judge. Action at law upon a policy of accident insurance issued by defendant . To the plaintiff. Upon the issues joined the case was tried to a jury, .000 inulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $819. Defendant appeals. 500 in st sui Edward St. Clair, of Chicago, Ill., and Craig & Sprowls, of Keokuk, Now Appellant. at or Hollingsworth & Blood, of Keokuk, for Appellee. se suic* Decision rendered, June 24, 1916. 158 N. W. Rep. 401. reco differe to p $500 suici creat Tom COLLOPY vs. MODERN BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICA. led to ed, a to ent as t. Le is cer (No. 19852 [203].)* 1. INSURANCE-ACTIONS ON POLICIES-LIMITATIONS-ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION. The certificate issued by defendant, a fraternal beneficiary society, provided for: (1) The payment of a certain sum to plaintiff's widow upon his death; (2) the payment of a certain sum to him in case of an accidental injury causing the fracture of a limb or the loss of a hand, foot or eye; (3) the surrender of the certificate and payment to him of one-half of the death benefit in case of permanent and total disability; and (4) payments to him of the same amount payable in case of death in ten annual installments, beginning on his seventy * Decision rendered, June 30, 1916. 158 N. W. Rep. 625. Syllabus by the Court. |