6945, suicide was no defense, unless it was not shown that insured contemplated suicide when taking out the policy, although the association was licensed to do business in Missouri as a fraternal beneficiary association, since the statute, not the license, is the true test, and since the term "legal representatives" must be construed to mean personal representatives, and not "heirs," in view of the language of the law under which the association was chartered, which used both the terms "legal representatives" and "heirs" to denote different classes. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1956; Dec. Dig. § 788[1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Legal Representative.) 2. INSURANCE - MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION - BENEFICIARIES-LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF BENEFICIARY. The proceeds of a fraternal beneficiary association, certificate payable to "legal representatives," go to the estate of deceased member. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1973; Dec. Dig. § 795.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren County; James D. Barnett. Judge. Action by F. A. Ordelheide, administrator, against the Modern Brotherhood of America. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed by St. Louis Court of Appeals (139 S. W. 269), and case certified to the Supreme Court. Affirmed. Ball & Sparrow, of Louisiana, Mo.. for Appellant. Instructions examined, and held to fully state the law applicable. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 2010; Dec. Dig. § 826[1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Good Health.) 3. INSURANCE-ACTION FOR DEATH BENEFIT-INSTRUC TIONS-GOOD HEALTH-QUESTION FOR JURY. The trial court properly refused to direct a verdict for defendant. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 2009; Dec. Dig. § 825[2].) Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 3. Error from Superior Court, Muskogee County; H. C. Thurmond, Judge. Action by Schickery Beshara against the Modern Brotherhood of America. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed See, also, 42 Okl. 684, 142 Pac. 1014. * Decision rendered June 20, 1916. 158 Pac. Rep. 613. Syllabus by the Court. N. B. Maxey, of Muskogee, for Plaintiff in Error. S. V. O'Hare, of Muskogee, and A. A. Davidson, of Tusla, for Defendant in Error. FASS vs. ATLANTIC LIFE INS. CO. (No. 9413.)* (Supreme Court of South Carolina.) 1. INSURANCE — AGENTS - RENEWAL COMMISSIONS — CONTRACT-CONSTRUCTION. Contract of insurance agency construed, and held to entitle agent to renewal commissions only during the continuance of his employment by the insurance company. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 112; Dec. Dig. § 84[4].) 2. INSURANCE-AGENCY CONTRACTS-DETERMINATION AT WILL. A life insurance agency contract which fixes no date or time for its duration, and in which the agent has no coupled interest in the subjectmatter is determinable at will, regardless of the agent's understanding to the contrary. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 104; Dec. Dig. § 79.) 4. INSURANCE-AGENCY CONTRACTS-RENEWAL COMMIS SIONS. Under an insurance agency contract expressly providing that agent's right to renewal commissions should continue only while he remained in the employment of his principal, such agent had no coupled interest in the agency such as would prevent the principal from revoking his authority at will. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 104; Dec. Dig. § 79.) 7. INSURANCE-AGENCY-RENEWAL COMMISSIONS-RECOVERY BY AGENT AFTER TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. Where insurance company induced agent to remain in its employment by representations that his renewal commissions would support him and his family in their old age, held the written contract of agency was so modified as to entitle the agent to renewal commissions after revocation of his agency without cause. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 112; Dec. Dig. § 84[4].) Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Dillon County; 'Hayne F. Rice, Judge. Action by Max Fass against the Atlantic Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. * Decision rendered, June 30, 1916. 89 S. E. Rep. 558. GREGORY vs. SOVEREIGN CAMP OF WOODMEN OF THE WORLD. THOMPSON vs. SAME. (No. 9430.)* (Supreme Court of South Carolina.) 1. INSURANCE- - MUTUAL BENEFIT - CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY-WHAT LAW GOVERNS. Assured's change of beneficiary to one who was not a relative, but supported him, is void where prohibited by a statute of Nebraska, where the insurer was organized, although Civ. Code 1912, § 2752, allows such a change if the insurer consents. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1933, 1937; Dec. Dig. 770.) 2. INSURANCE - MUTUAL BENEFIT - BENEFICIARIES-RIGHT TO CHANGE. Under an Alabama statute allowing a fraternal insurance association to limit, by its laws, the scope of its beneficiaries, assured's change of beneficiary is void, where forbidden by the association's constitution and the laws of Nebraska, where it was organized. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1932, 1937, 1938; Dec. Dig. § 769.) 3. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT-WHO MAY BE BENE FICIARIES-STATUTE-WAIVER. A fraternal insurance association cannot waive a restriction as to beneficiaries imposed by the statutes of the state where it was organized. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1933, 1937; Dec. Dig. § 770.) Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Union County; Ernest Moore, Judge. Actions by Mrs. S. E. Gregory and by J. E. Thompson against the Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World. From judgments against the first-named plaintiff and in favor of plaintiff Thompson, said Gregory and defendant appeal. First judgment affirmed, and second reversed. J. Ashby Sawyer, of Union, and Quattlebaum & Cochran, of Anderson, for Appellants. Wallace & Barron, of Union, for Respondent. * Decision rendered, July 3, 1916. 89 S. E. Rep. 391. RELIANCE LIFE INS. CO. vs. BEATON. (No. 7564.)* (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.) 1. INSURANCE-AGENT'S COMPENSATION. In an action by an insurance agent on bonus contract allowing compensation upon the amount of insurance procured, the words "sixty days allowed for settlement," in the absence of testimony showing the sense * Decision rendered. June 10, 1916. Rehearing denied, July 1, 1916. 187 S. W. Rep. 743. in which used, held to mean a grace of sixty days after the year covered by the contract in which to allow the parties thereto to settle among themselves the volume of business which had been procured, and not to have reference to the time allowed for the collection or payment of premiums due for such business. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 111, 114; Dec. Dig. § 84[1].) 2. INSURANCE-COMPENSATION OF AGENT-ACTION-INSURANCE AGENT-EVIDENCE. In an action by an insurance agent on a bonus contract, based upon the amount of insurance procured during the year, evidence of plaintiff and a telegram from the company near the close of the year stating that his territory had procured $1,223,000 life insurance business and asking for more business, held sufficient to support a finding that the business procured during the year exceeded $1,250,000. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 111, 114; Dec. Dig. 84[1].) Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; E. B. Muse, Judge. Action by Ralph A. Beaton against the Reliance Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Harry P. Lawther, of Dallas, for Appellant. Henry P. Edwards and Cockrell, Gray & McBride, all of Dallas, for Appellee. MCDONALD vs. ETNA LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN. (No. 7182.)* (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.) -- 2. INSURANCE LIFE INSURANCE COMPROMISE GOOD FAITH CONTROVERSY. All that is required to validate a compromise on a life policy is that the beneficiary understand the settlement and that the insurer act in good faith in disputing the claim, and the ground of dispute need not be brought home to the beneficiary. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1417, 1419; Dec. Dig. § 579.) Appeal from District Court, Galveston County; Robt. G. Street, Judge. Action by Mrs. Minnie E. McDonald against the Ætna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. King & Hughes, of Galveston, Harry Tom King, of Abilene, and H. C. Hughes and R. L. Pillow, Jr., both of Galveston, for Appellant. Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood and Jno. C. Townes, Jr., all of Houston, and W. T. Armstrong, of Galveston, for Appellee. * Decision rendered, May 25, 1916. Rehearing denied, June 29, 1916. 187 S. W. Rep. 1005. Vol. XLVIII-27. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA vs. YANOWSKY. (No. 5628.)* (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.) 1. INSURANCE - FRATERNAL ASSOCIATIONS ACTION ON POLICY-PARTIES. In a suit on a certificate of a fraternal association originally payable to plaintiff's father and mother, wherein plaintiff claimed to own all their interests by virtue of assignment from the heirs of her father, the failure to make her father a party was not error, where it appeared that he was dead. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1994; Dec. Dig. § 813.) Error from District Court, Bexar County; R. B. Minor, Judge. Action by Minnie Yanowsky, as assignee of Rosie Yanowsky and of the heirs of Shopsy Yanowsky, the beneficiaries named in a policy of insurance, against the Modern Woodmen of America. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed in so far as the judgment affects the interest claimed from Shopsy Yanowsky, and cause remanded. Truman Plantz, of Warsaw, Ill., and Pat M. Neff, of Waco, for Plaintiff in Error. Arnold, Cozby & Peyton, of San Antonio, for Defendant in Error. *Decision rendered, April 19, 1916. On motion for rehearing, May 31, 1916. Rehearing denied, June 21, 1916. 187 S. W. Rep. 728. AMERICAN NAT. INS. CO. vs. NUCKOLS. (No. 5686.)* (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.) 1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-PROOF OF LOSS-ESTOPPEL-POWER OF AGENT. Where the company agent was notified of death and viewed the body and said he was satisfied and that the loss would be paid, and the adjuster recognized his authority until suit was brought, and then denied it, the company was estopped to deny the agency. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1412; Dec. Dig. § 565.) 2. INSURANCE - LIFE INSURANCE PROOF OF LOSS — AUTOPSY-TIME. Where the policy gave the insurer the right to an autopsy, but it was not demanded at the time of death, the insurer could not, six weeks after interment, insist on such right, especially where it was undisputed that the insured died by an accident covered by the policy and the only dispute was whether his neck was broken or dislocated. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1356; Dec. Dig. § 549.) * Decision rendered, June 7, 1916. Rehearing denied. June 27, 1916. 187 S. W. Rep. 497. |