CHEWNING vs. TUCKER. (7057.)* (Court of Appeals of Georgia.) 2. INSURANCE-NOTE FOR PREMIUM-LIABILITY. The uncontradicted testimony shows that the note sued upon was given in payment of the first premium on a policy of insurance, which was still in the possession of the defendant in the court below, who himself testified that he was then insured and was then in possession of the policy for which the note was given. Under the rulings made in Thomson vs. McLaughlin, supra, and Boykin vs. Franklin Life Insurance Co., 14 Ga. App. 666, 82 S. E. 60, the judge of the superior court did not err in sustaining the certiorari and rendering final judgment in the case. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 245, 404, 405; Dec. Dig. § 188[2].) Error from Superior Court, De Kalb County; C. W. Smith, Judge. Action by J. T. Tucker against C. G. Chewning. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Paul L. Lindsay, of Atlanta, for Plaintiff in Error. B. H. Sullivan and Thos. J. Lewis, both of Atlanta, for Defendant in Error. * Decision rendered, April 17, 1916. 88 S. E. Rep. 593. Syllabus by the Court. BROWN vs. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA ET AL. (No. 20044.)* (Supreme Court of Kansas.) 1. INSURANCE-CLAIMANTS UNDER FRATERNAL BENEFIT CERTIFICATE-EQUITY. Generally the rights of holders and beneficiaries under fraternal benefit certificates rest solely upon the contract between the member and the association as found in its constitution and by-laws. But, when potent and manifest equities appear in favor of some of the rival claimants by reason of contracts made and carried out with the deceased member, the association raising no objection, the contest may become one purely for equitable cognizance and determination. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1967-1972, 1980; Dec. Dig. § 793.) 2. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARIES-RIGHTS OF RIVAL CLAIMANTS. While ordinarily the member has no vested right in the fund, still by an agreement to change beneficiaries in consideration of funds advanced * Decision rendered, April 8, 1916. 156 Pac. Rep. 767. Syllabus by the Court. he may so bind himself as to preclude his beneficiaries or heirs from asserting their claim to the proceeds against a party who advanced large sums on the strength of such agreement, although a completed change of beneficiary was not made in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the association. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1954; Dec. Dig. § 784[7].) Appeal from District Court, Riley County. Action by Robert Henry Brown against the Modern Woodmen of America, a corporation, and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded. John E. Hessin and John C. Hessin, both of Manhattan, for Appellant. Dawes & Miller, of Clay Center, for Appellees. LADIES' AUXILIARY OF ANCIENT ORDER OF HIBERNIANS OF MICHIGAN vs. FLANIGAN ET AL. (No. 91.)* (Supreme Court of Michigan.) 1. INSURANCE - MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-BENEFICIARIES. Under a mutual benefit certificate stipulating that any member desiring any change in the certificate should apply to the secretary therefor, and that death benefits would be paid to the persons designated by the insured and otherwise to the personal representative of the insured, the insured's father or mother, designated as her beneficiaries, were entitled to the proceeds, notwithstanding the insured's marriage and the birth of a child which survived her and the payment of dues by her husband, where she had never designated any other beneficiary. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1967-1972, 1980; Dec. Dig. $ 793.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Kent County, in Chancery; Kelly S. Searl, Judge. Interpleader by the Ladies' Auxiliary of the Ancient Order of Hibernians of the State of Michigan against Edward J. Flanigan and wife and George, Holloway, administrator. Judgment for defendants Flanigan, and defendant Holloway, administrator, appeals. Affirmed. Argued before Stone, C. J., and Kuhn, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, Steere, Person, and Brooke, JJ. Carroll, Kirwin & Hollway, of Grand Rapids, for Appellant. * Decision rendered, March 31, 1916. 157 N. W. Rep. 355. ZENDER vs. DETROIT LODGE NO. 1 OF KNIGHTS OF ROYAL ARK ET AL. (No. 82.)* (Supreme Court of Michigan.) 1. INSURANCE-VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION-ASSESSMENT— VALIDITY. Where the laws of defendant voluntary association made it the duty of the president to order assessments upon the death of members by notifying the financial secretary in writing of the assessment, and further provided for forfeiture of members' rights to death benefits for failure to pay assessments, a membership was not forfeited for failure to pay an assessment where not so ordered by the president; notice of the assessment being given by the financial secretary upon his own motion upon learning of a member's death. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1883; Dec. Dig. § 736.) 2. INSURANCE--VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION-VALID ASSESSMENT-RATIFICATION. Where at a meeting of the lodge subsequent to such action by the financial secretary the following entry was made in the minutes of the meeting: "W. O., Deceased. Death Benefit-Died May 26th. $700.00"-such entry was not a ratification by the lodge of the action of the financial secretary in issuing notice of the assessment. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1898-1902; Dec. Dig. § 751[2].) ASSESSMENT— 3. INSURANCE-VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION TIME EXTENSION. Where such notice of assessment was issued by the financial secretary on May 29th, and at a meeting on July 11th the lodge directed the secretary to mail notices of such assessment to each member, and the law of the order further provided that members not paying assessments within 30 days after notice forfeited mortuary benefits, tender of payment of such assessment on behalf of plaintiff's decedent on August 1st was in time to prevent a default, since the action of the lodge on July 11th constituted an extension of time in which such assessment could be paid (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1904; Dec. Dig. § 752.) 4. INSURANCE-FORFEITURE-POLICY-CONSTRUCTION. Whenever it is possible by reasonable construction to prevent the forfeiture of an insurance policy and thereby preserve the equitable rights of the holder, it should be done. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1889; Dec. Dig. § 744.) Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Henry A. Mandell, Judge. Action by Carrie Zender against Detroit Lodge No. 1 of the Knights of the Royal Ark and another. From a directed verdict for plaintiff, defendants bring error. Affirmed. Argued before Stone, C. J., and Kuhn, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, Steere, Person, and Brooke, JJ. * Decision rendered, March 31, 1916. 157 N. W. Rep. 351. James A. Murtha and John H. Dohrman, both of Detroit, for Appellant. Corliss, Leete & Moody and Benjamin S. Pagel, all of Detroit, for Appellee. BRAUNSTEIN vs. FRATERNAL AID UNION. (Supreme Court of Minnesota) 1. INSURANCE-ACTION AGAINST FOREIGN CORPORATIONS -SERVICE ON INSURANCE COMMISSIONER. Where a foreign insurance corporation has been duly authorized to do business in this state and has filed with the insurance commissioner the instrument appointing him and his successors its attorney upon whom process may be served as provided by statute so long as any liability remains outstanding in this state, the stipulation of the corporation in regard to the service of process becomes an obligation of the company precisely as though it were incorporated in the policies issued in this state to citizens thereof, and thereafter actions growing out of policies issued in this state may be commenced by service of the summons upon the insurance commissioner, as provided by statute, whether the corporation continues to do business in this state or not. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1573; Dec. Dig. § 627 [2]; Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2603-2627.) 2. INSURANCE-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-ASSIGNEE-AS SUMPTION OF LIABILITIES-SERVICE OF PROCESS. A foreign insurance corporation duly authorized to do business in this state went out of business and transferred its business and obligations to defendant, a foreign corporation which has never been authorized to do business in this state. Defendant assumed the liabilities of its assignors and predecessors. Held, that one of the liabilities assumed by defendant is the stipulation contained in the instrument theretofore filed by its assignors in the office of the insurance commissioner of this state, and that service of the summons upon the insurance commissioner in an action on an insurance contract made by its predecessor while doing business in this state subjects the defendant to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1573; Dec. Dig. § 627 [2]; Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2603-2627.) Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; James C. Michael, Judge. Action by Fannie D. Braunstein against the Fraternal Aid Union. From an order denying the motion to set aside service of summons, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Wm. G. White, of St. Paul, for Appellant. James E. Markham and A. J. Hertz (both of St. Paul), for Respondent. * Decision rendered, May 5, 1916. 157 N. W. Rep. 721. Syllabus by the Court. BRUCK vs. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. (No. 14354.)* (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.) 1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-ACTIONS-STATUTES. Rev. St. 1909, § 6937, declaring that no misrepresentation made in obtaining a life policy shall be deemed material or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event in which the policy is to become due and payable, and whether it so contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury, is not intended to prevent a court of equity from relieving against actual fraud. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1517-1519; Dec. Dig. § 608.) 2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATIONS. Said statute applies alike to warranties and representations, and draws no distinctions between innocent and fraudulent misrepresentations. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 684; Dec. Dig. § 291[2].) 5. INSURANCE-ACTIONS-LIFE INSURANCE. Testimony of persons who have associated daily with the insured as to his state of health at the time of or prior to his application for insurance cannot be set aside as devoid wholly of evidentiary value. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1711-1716; Dec. Dig. § 665[3].) Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Leo S. Rassieur, Judge. "To be officially published." Action by Katie Bruck against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Leahy, Saunders & Barth, of St. Louis, for Appellant. *Decision rendered, May 2, 1916. On motion for rehearing, May 16, 1916. 185 S. W. Rep. 753. MADSDEN vs. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA. (No. 14301.)* (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.) 2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-AGENTS. As Rev. St. 1909, § 6938, declares that an agent soliciting insurance shall be deemed the agent of the insurer, the soliciting agent, after a life policy was written, who attempted to collect the premium, must in that matter be deemed the agent of the insurer. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 948-951, 956-965; Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) * Decision rendered, May 2, 1916. Rehearing denied, May 16, 1916. 185 S. W. Rep. 1168. |