months in so unhealthy a climate, not one half of the army could be expected to be in a state fit for service. But, what was the object for which a British army was thus to be sacrificed, and the island of Sicily deprived of the forces destined for its defence? Supposing the expedition crowned with success and Napies recovered, was there any, the remotest possibility, in the present state of Europe, of the Neapolitan troops being able to maintain their conquest? But, if the recovery of Naples was contemplated as a temporary occupation only, what could be intended by it but the gratification of revenge, by the de struction and plunder of the city and massacre of its inhabitants. But there was no chance of even this degree of success, unless from the effects of surprise and panic among the French; and yet, (such in every view was the unpromising aspect of the affair,) it was certain that before the attempt could be made, the whole plan and details of the expedition would be known at Naplės. For the court of Palermo was surrounded by French and Neapolitan emigrants, who found it easy, such was the indiscretion of those entrusted with its seerets, to penetrate into all its designs, which they as regularly communicated to the ministers of Joseph Bonaparte. But, unless the French were taken by surprise, and panic struck by an unexpected insurrection at Naples, little was to be expected from Sicilian and Neapolitan troops acting against them. The Neapolitan and Sicilian soldiers were brave and capable of discipline, but they were ill-officered, ill-appointed, ill cloathed, ill paid, and from bad usage ill affected to their

government. It had been the fatal policy of sir John Acton to discou rage Neapolitan and Sicilian gentlemen from engaging in the military service of their country, by a sys tematic preference of foreigners to natives in the army, without re, gard to character or merit, or to any other consideration, but that of not being a natural born subject of his Sicilian majesty. The officers of the Neapolitan army were, therefore, in general, foreigners, and many of them adventurers without education, taken from the lowest ranks and occupations of society. Such men, equally destitute of military talents and experience, as of birth, fortune, acquirements, or probity, brought the profession to which they belonged into discredit;. and were contemned for their mean. ness, and hated for their dishonest and fraudulent practices by their own soldiers, So little confidence was to be placed in most of them, that when sir John Stuart had Sicilian troops acting under him in Calabria, a British commissary was employed to distribute their rations, as the only means of ensuring that the soldier received his allowance, and that it was not intercepted and detained by his officer. Nothing could exceed the aversion and contempt with which the subjects of his Sicilian majesty viewed the military service of their sovereign; but, though the corporal punishments used in the British army filled them with horror and disgust, as fit only for galley slaves, they were eager to engage in the English service, and proud of being treated and consi, dered as English soldiers.

Thwarted in its plan of operations by the refusal of the English goneral to co-operate in a project,

every part of which he disapproved of, the court of Palermo was ultimately compelled to abandon its designs upon Naples; though it affected for some time an intention of pursuing the enterprize with its own forces, the greater part of which it assembled on the north coast of Sicily, under the prince of Hesse, on pretence of inspecting, arming, and cloathing the troops. But, when the resolution of general Fox not to concur in the expedition, was found to be unalterably fixed, the project was entirely given up, though with much reluctance and ill-humour against the English.

While their Sicilian majesties were thus intent on the recovery of Naples, the importance of Sicily, the resources which it might be made to afford, and the means necessary to be taken for conciliating the affections of its inhabitants, and rousing them against the enemy, seem never to have entered into their contemplation. When the royal family were driven a second time to Sicily for shelter and protection, the Sicilians had vainly imagined, that in return for their assistance and fidelity they would be relieved from jealous and injurious restrictions on their commerce and navigation, and raised to greater weight and consideration in the councils of their sovereign, than they had hitherto attained. Their ancient constitution, the venerable forms of which were still existing, they were desirous to re-establish, and no less attached to the English by ancient traditions than by hatred of the French, they fondly expected from us assistance and countenance in this great undertaking. But, it has been the misfortune of England, in the long war she has sustained against the different rulers of France,

that, whether contending with a republic, an oligarchy, or a monarchy, she has never had the people of any country on her side. The protectress and champion of the old governments of Europe, she has never availed herself of her power and influence, to mediate between the prejudices and fears of her allies, and the just claims and expectations of their subjects. Kingdom after kingdom has been subdued, throne after throne has been subverted, without teaching governments that there is no safety for them but in the affection of their people, and that the price of affection is to deserve it and return it. Two expulsions from Naples had not impressed these lessons on the court of Palermo. The Sicilians were neglected and despised; their grievances were not redressed; their complaints were not listened to; their government was in the hands of strangers, surrounded by traitors; and the power of Eugland, instead of being extended to their relief, served only to uphold the authority of these who slighted and oppressed them.

As the transactions in Naples had little connection with the scenes passing in the rest of Europe. we have brought down the preceding narrative to the close of the year, without digression or interruption; and for the same reason we shall proceed next to give an account of the affairs in Cattaro and Ragusa between the French and Russians; and afterwards revert to the more important but fatal events in the north of Germany.

Cattaro, a small barren province, situated to the south of Ragusa, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in the Adriatic; and from

the skill of its seamen, who form the chief part of its population. This province was one of those transferred to France by the peace of Presburg, by the articles of which it was stipulated that France should take possession of Cattaro within six weeks after the exchange of the ratification of the treaty. At the expiration of that period, the French officers appointed to receive the province from the Austrians had not arrived at Cattaro. An agent of the court of Russia at Cattaro took advantage of this delay, and succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who are chiefly Greeks, that France having failed to take possession of the place at the time appointed, Austria was released from the obligation of maintaining it, and justified in withdrawing her troops and leaving it to the first occupant. This reasoning, though satisfactory to the inhabitants of Cattaro, made no impression on the Austrian commandant, who occupied the forts with a garrison of 1500 men, till supported by the irruption of a band of Montenegrins from the mountains, and by the ar rival of a Russian line of battle ship from Corfu. The marquis de Ghisilieri, commissary-general of the Austrian army, appointed to deliver up Dalmatia and Cattaro to the French, happened at that moment to arrive at Cattaro, whither he had preceded the French generals, on hear ing of the mutinous spirit of the inhabitants; but, instead of resisting the Russians and their allies, as with the garrison in the forts he might easily have done till the arrival of the French, he consented, after a short negociation, to evacuate the

place, which was immediately occupied by the natives, and by them transferred to the Russians. This strange transaction took place on the 4th of March, when the French were within a few days march of the plare. The Austrian officers in gar rison at Cattaro were scandalized at this proceeding, and so indignant with Ghisilieri, that they made a formal protest against the evacuation of the forts; and when the conduct of that officer came afterwards to be enquired into at Vienna, the reasons he assigned for giving up the place appeared so unsatisfactory to the tribunal before which he was tried, that he was dismissed from the im. perial service, and sentenced to be imprisoned for life in a fortress of Transylvania. There can be no doubt, from a review of his conduct in this affair, that he was either bribed by the Russians, or actuated by a false persuasion, that he should render an acceptable service to his court, by frustrating the expectations of the French, without impli cating its character or honour in the transaction.

The French, disappointed of Cattaro, with that profligate contempt of the rights of independent states, which so strongly characterizes the transactions of the present day, took possession of Ragusa, to which they had no claim, on pretence of securing it against the incursions of the Montenegrins, who had not even threatened to violate its territory. The Montenegrins are a barbarous tribe of freebooters, inhabiting the chain of mountains adjoining to Cattaro, from one of which, called Monte-negro, they derive their name. They were at

this time in close alliance with the Russians, and, therefore, the occupation of Ragusa by the French, instead of protecting that republic from their violence, afforded them a pretext for invading and laying it waste. Several skirmishes ensued, in which both sides claim the victory. The French, however, were in the end compelled by the Russians and Montenegrins to shut themselves up in Ragusa, where they stood a siege of several weeks, while the Montenegrins ravaged the country, and committed horrible excesses on the inhabitants. General Lauriston who commanded in Ragusa, was at length relieved from this embarrassing situation, by the arrival of general Molitor from Dalmatia, with a French army collected in that province. It was now

⚫ July 6th.

the turn of the Russians and Montenegrins to retreat, which, after the loss of their artillery and plunder, the former effected to their ships, the latter to their mountains, and in a few days the territory of Ragusa was cleared of these barbarians. No event of importance followed till the end of September, when the Russians and Montene grins, having assembled in great force near Castel-Nuovo, general Marmont marched against them from Ragusa, and having enticed them by a military stratagem to quit their entrenchments, attacked and defeated them with great loss +. But, notwithstanding this defeat the Russians continued in possession of Cattaro and Castel-Nuovo at the end of the year.