final determination of Prussia, to risk the chances of hostility with France, we presume not to decide. But we apprehend, that her reluctance to part with Hanover, her indignation at the treacherous conduct of France in that affair, and the growing influence of public opinion upon her counsels, were the chief causes that stimulated her to that resolution. The king himself, is said to have been the last person in his cabinet, who was brought over to the opinion for war. At what time all hopes of peace were abandoned, and hostilities finally resolved upon by Prussia, we are equally uncertain. Her government began to make preparations about the middle of August, and to put her army on the war establishment. It is generally understood, that Knobelsdorff was sent to Paris, in the beginning of September, for the purpose of gaining time, and not with any view to an amicable adjustment of the differences between Prussia and France. Lucchesini, who had been long the Prussian minister at Paris, when he foresaw that war between France and Prussia was inevitable, had contrived, that one of his dispatches to his court, full of complaints against the French government, should fall into their hands. Incensed at the tone of his dispatch, the French demanded his recall from Paris, and imputed to his misrepresentations, the misunderstanding that had arisen between France and Prussia. With this demand the court of Berlin willingly complied, and congratulated itself on the success of a stratagem, which, it hoped, had given a false direction to the suspicions of its enemy. To prolong the deccit, it made choice of ge neral Knobelsdorff to be its minister at Paris, a warm partizan of France, sincerely attached to peace, and quite unsuspicious of the artifice, which he was sent to practise. The professions of peace, which he made by desire of his court, after it had determined on hostilities, were on his part sincere; and so little was he aware of the secret designs, either of his own government or of that to which he was sent, that when Bonaparte left Paris to take the command of his army against Prussia, Knobelsdorff enquired with the greatest simplicity, whether he should not accompany his majesty the emperor to head quarters, little suspecting against whom his march was directed. Such a negotiator might be duped by his employers, but could not long deceive the penetration of Bonaparte and Talleyrand. Knobelsdorff arrived at Paris, on the 7th of September, with a letter from his Prussian majesty to Bonaparte, full of civil and friendly expressions, to which corresponding returns, probally equally sincere, were made. On the 11th, a note was addressed to him by Talleyrand, complaining of warlike preparations in Prussia, which were publicly stated at Berlin, to be directed against France; and adding, amidst professions of regard for Prussia, and of regret that she should listen to counsels so much at variance with her true interests, that the emperor had ordered reinforcements to be sent to his army. Knobelsdorff in reply, assured the French minister, that his master had entered into no concert with the * Sept. 12. enemies enemies of France, and that the warlike preparations of Prussia had arisen from a misunderstanding, which the emperor's late interesting conversations with himself and Lucchesini, he had no doubt, would remove. On receiving these assurances, Bonaparte authorized his minister to declare,* that he should make no public declaration on the subject of his differences with Prussa, till the effect of Knobelsdorff's report at Berlin was known.A second communication from Talleyrand, complaining that the intelligence from Berlin wore every day a more hostile aspect, and expatiating on the natural ties between France and Prussia, war between which, he said, appeared to the emperor a political monstrosity, maintained for some time longer the appearance of a negotiation with a view to peace. But, in the mean while, the French troops were continually advancing towards the future scene of action, and on the 24th of September Bonaparte left his capital to take the command of his army, having three days before summoned the confederates of the Rhine to furnish their contingents. On the first of October the mask, which Prussia had so ineffectually worn, was at length laid aside. A note was presented by Knobelsdorff, demanding as a preliminary to negotiation, that the whole of the French troops should instantly repass the Rhine; that no obstacle should be raised by France to the formation of a northern confederacy, including all the states not named in the fundamental act of the confederation of the Rhine; and that the basis of the negotiation ⚫ Sept. 13. should be the separation of Wesel from the French empire, and the reoccupation of the three abbies by the Prussian troops. To these demands the French emperor did not even deigu to answer. But Talleyrand, in a report on the causes of the war, availed himself of them with great dexterity, to shew, with some degree of plausibility, if not with perfect truth, that had France been willing to gratify the unjust ambition of Prussia at the expence of her weaker neighbours, the flames of war would not have been rekindled on the continent. Prus sia had in truth been as perfidious, as unprincipled in her ambition as France; but she had conducted herself with less ability and with less success. Her morality had been the same; but, after selling her honour and reputation, she had been defrauded of the price. It was a great error of his Prussian majesty, when he determined upon war with France, to continue the same persons in his government, who had directed his counsels during the whole of the late disgraceful proceedings. These persons had given abundant proofs of incapacity, in all the negotiations they had conducted; and such was their reputation, that they had no means of inspiring other governments with confidence in the sincerity of their professions, but by embarking their master, alone and unassisted, in a contest with Bonaparte. Whether it was from this conviction, or from a vain hope, in which they indulged to the last moment, of adjusting their differences with France, they were strangely remiss in communicating to other powers their intention to + Sept. 18. + Oct. 6. go to war. It was from Russia only, that Prussia could expect, in the first instance, to receive cffectual aid. But, though a letter from his Prussian majesty had informed the emperor of Russia, in the month of August, of the relations in which he then stood towards France, no intimation was given to Russia of the approaching war; nor was any measure taken for obtaining from her assistance, till the 18th of September, when count Krusemack left Berlin for Petersburg, charged with such a commission. Krusemack arrived at Petersburg on the 30th. Orders for marching, though expedited immediately after his arrival, could not reach the Russian army in Poland till the 5th or 6th of October, nor could that army arrive at the scene of action in Germany before the middle of November; so that Prussia voluntarily exposed herself for a whole month, without assistance, to resist the best army and the best generals of Europe. With such men as Haugwitz, Lombard and Beyme at the head of affairs, it ceases to be a matter of surprize, that no overtures of friendship or alliance had been proposed to the court of Vienna, nor even an attempt made to sound the intentions of that government, or to open with it a confidential intercourse. But, considering of how much importance, in the present circumstances of Prussia, was a good understanding between the courts of Berlin and Vienna, it is surprizing, that his Prussian majesty should have retained ministers in his confidence, whose presence in his councils was sufficient to prevent so desirable an end from being attained. Of the minor powers in the north of Germany, Saxony was the un 3 willing ally of Prussia. Hesse, in expectation of a subsidy from England, affected neutrality. Mecklenburg was really neutral. The Swedish army had reoccupied the dutchy of Lauenberg, abandoned by the Prussians. to Scandalous as had been the conduct of Prussia towards England, and unwilling as she was still to give up Hanover, which she fore. saw must be the price of any assistance from Great Britain, the desire and hope of a subsidy got the better of every consideration, and induced her ministers, when they sent count Krusemack Petersburg, to communicate to Mr. Thornton, the British minister at Hamburgh, the disposition of his Prussian majesty to accommodate his differences with the king of Great Britain. A desire was expressed, that some person should be authorized by the English government to open a negotiation for that purpose; but no communication was made by the Prussian ministers of the nature of their differences with France, nor assurance given of their readi ness to adopt for the basis of nego tiation, the restitution of Hanover to its lawful owners. The English ministry, though they had reason to believe, that the quarrel between France and Prussia, originated in the offer of the former to give back Hanover to the king of Great Britain, hesitated not a moment to comply with their request, but appointed Lord Morpeth to proceed without delay to the head quarters of the Prussian army, there to enter on negotiations for peace. Lord Morpeth left London on the 1st of October, and having passed off Heligoland a packet with baron Jacobi on board, the late Prussian minister minister at London, who was returning in that capacity to England, be arrived at Hamburgh on the 6th, and reached the head quarters of the Prussian army at Weimar on the 12th. This promptitude did not suit the views of the Prussian ministry. They were on the eve of a great battle, which might decide the fate of the campaign; and they were unwilling, while the event was acertain, to pledge themselves to an act of justice, or entangle themselves in connections of no immediate utility. If victory remained to the Prussians, Hanover might sul be theirs. If defeated, they were afraid, lest their having contracted engagements with England might be prejudicial to them, should they be compelled to solicit peace from France. Persisting to the last his duplicity and irresolution, Hangwitz, who had been named to negotiate with the English minister, contrived by breaking his word and by other disingenuous shifts, to avoid seeing him at Weimar and Erfurt; and subsequently to the battle of Auerstadt, but while the result of it was unknown, Lord Morpeth having asked Lucchesini, whether the court of Prussia was ready to enter on immediate negotiation, the Italian unguardedly replied, "that it would depend on the issue of the battle which had just been fought." The English ministry, when they appointed Lord Morpeth to nego. tate with Prussia, gave further proof of the sincerity of their disposition to reconciliation, by removing the blockade of her ports and rivers, which had hitherto sub 'sisted with great inconvenience to the north of Germany. After this review of the conduct of Prussia and of the causes that led her to engage in hostilities with France, we must admit, that her provocations were great, numerous and galling; but we look in vain for such open insult or impending injury, as leave states, against which they are directed, no alternative but an immediate appeal to arms. If the indulgence of her resentment was her object in commencing hostilities, prudence should have restrained her anger, till means of gratifying it had been secured. If her motive was an honourable desire of asserting the liberties of Europe, and setting bounds to the encroachments of France, greater caution might have been expected from her govern. ment, than to have embarked with such inadequate means, in so ardu. ous an enterprize. But if Hanover was the cause of her quarrel, nothing could be more absurd than to make war, in order to maintain her pretensions to a country, which she must begin by ceding to its lawful owner, for his assistance to enable her to carry on the contest. Having brought the affairs of France and Prussia to the breaking out of the war, it is necessary to revert to the transactions between France and England, and to give an account of the negotiations for peace, in which these two powers and Russia were during a great part of the present summer unsuccessfully engaged. We shall afterwards return to the short but disastrous history of the Prussian campaign. *Sept. 25. CHAP. CHAPTER IX. Negotiations for Peace between England and France-Circumstances which led to the first Overture from France-Mr. Fox proposes that Russia should be a Party to the Negotiation-Objections of M. Talleyrand to the Intervention of Russia-Discussions on this Subject, and Failure of the Negotiation-Second Overture from the French Government through Lord Yarmouth-Favourable Nature of the Terms proposed-Minute of Lord Yarmouth, containing the Particulars of his Conversation with M. Talleyrand-Return of Lord Yarmouth to Paris-French retract their former Offers-Impression which their shuffling Conduct makes on the English Ministry, and particularly on Mr. Fox-His Unwillingness to give up SicilyInstructions to Lord Yarmouth-M. D'Oubril signs a separate Peace for Russia-Lord Yarmouth produces his full Powers-Resolution to send Lord Lauderdale to Paris-Joint Representation to the French Negotiators from Lord Lauderdale and Lord Yarmouth-Delays created by the French Negociators-Emperor of Russia refuses to ratify D'Oubril's Treaty-Whereupon the French are ready to give more favourable Terms to England-But the English Minister refuses to sign any but a provisional Treaty without the Concurrence of Russia-Violence and Impatience of Bonaparte moderated by his Ministers-Final Conference of Lord Lauderdale with M. Champagny-Mistake of supposing that the Negotiation broke off on Account of the Refusal of the French to cede Dalmatia to the Russians-Review and Justification of the Conduct of the English Cabinet throughout the Negotiation-Reception of the News of the Failure of the Negotiation in England-Account of D'Oubrils' Treaty-Favourable Disposition of the new Russian Cabinet towards England. As S the correspondence and intercourse, which took place between the governments of France and England, though they lasted for no less than six months, were finally broken off, without any treaty of peace, a brief relation of the conduct and of the leading events of the negotiation, will be sufficient to explain the principles of the respective parties, and to ascertain the causes, which led to the unfavourable termination of these important discussions. The sentiments of Mr. Fox on the subject of the war, were generally known throughout his own country and Europe; and it was supposed, that he had selected the office of secretary of state for foreign affairs, with the |