the hopes of being able to accomplish with greater facility the favourite object of his heart-a general and permanent peace. The period, however, at which he was at length called to his majesty's councils, was peculiarly unfavourable to such an immediate overture to the French government as in any other circumstances he would no doubt have wished to resort to.The recent successes of the French had been so signal and decisive, that an overture would have appeared an acknowledgment of weakness rather than a desire of pacification. Sufficient time had scarcely elapsed since the battle of Austerlitz and treaty of Presburg, to ascertain the feelings of the Russian government; and in addition to the difficulty of speculating upon the impressions which the late calamities might have produced on that distant court, a change of administration was expected in that capital; any decided step, therefore, without previous concert with the new ministers at Petersburg, might become the cause or the pretext for some estrangement of that cabinet. In this predicament Mr. Fox seems to have determined on making no direct overture to France, till some event might give rise to it, or at least till the views and wishes of the court of Petersburg had been fully ascertained, and the form, object, and nature of any negociation previously concerted with that cabinet. But the French government, perhaps, sincerely desirous of putting an end to hostilities, or possibly deluded by an idle hope that Mr. Fox's strong inclination to peace would betray his prudence, and lead him to measures, that would impair the stability of the connection between Russia and England, availed itself of the first opportunity of making direct overtures for a negotiation. The circumstances from which they arose, are too sin gular in themselves, and too honourable to the English minister and nation, to be passed over in silence. About ten days after Mr. Fox came into office, he received a letter from a person calling himself Guillet de la Gevrillière, stating that he was arrived at Gravesend without a passport, and requesting Mr. Fox to send him one, as he had very lately left Paris, and had something to communicate, which would give Mr. Fox satisfaction. On receiving this letter, Mr. Fox gave orders through sir Francis Vincent, under secretary of state, to Mr. Brooke of the alien office, to send for the man from Gravesend, and a private interview having been solicited, to bring him on his arrival in London to Mr. Fox's house in Arlingtonstreet, instead of taking him to the foreign office. In consequence of these orders, the Frenchman was next morning carried to Mr. Fox's house, and there admitted by him alone into his closet; when after some unimportant conversation, he pro ceeded to the object of his journey, which was to inform Mr. Fox that a plan had been entered into for the assassination of Bonaparte, and a house hired at Passy, from which it could be carried into effect with cer tainty, and without risk. Surprized and confounded with the auda. city of the villain, in making him the confident of so execrable a design, Mr. Fox, without enquiring Feb. 14, further further into the particulars of the plot, instantly dismissed the French. man from his presence, and desired Mr. Brooke to send him as soon as possible out of the kingdom. But on reflection he ordered him after wards to be detained, till such information could be given to the French government, as might prevent the perpetration of his crime, if really projected; and with that view he transmitted to M. Talleyrand,* a short and simple statement of the occurrence, and of what he had done thereupon. + The answer to this communication‡ was a natural and well turned compliment to the honour and generosity of Mr. Fox's character, and was accompa, nied by an extract from the emperor's speech to the legislative body, in order, as M. Talleyrand observed, "that Mr. Fox might know, if the advantages of peace were duly appreciated, on what terms it might be discussed." The extract was a simple offer "to con-, clude peace, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens." Mr. Fox considered this communication as a distinct overture, and proceeded to answer it in that frank and direct style, which is the characteristic of all his public dispatches. He objected to the uncer. tainty of the basis of Amiens; the variety of modes in which it had been interpreted; and the delay, * Feb. 20. which the explanations on the meaning of it would unavoidably occasion, even if no other objection should exist. "The true basis of such a negotiation, he observed, between two great powers, equally despising every idea of chicane, would be the reciprocal recognition of the following principle; viz. that the object of both parties should be a peace, honourable for both and for their respective allies; and at the same time, of a nature to secure, as far as in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe."— He then proceeded to state the impossibility of treating, much less of concluding any thing unless in concert with Russia, but suggested the practicability of some previous discussion of the principal points, and some provisional arrangements, while they were waiting for the ac tual intervention of that power; and he forestalled an objection, which might be made to his statement, founded on the few material points in issue between Russia and France, by insisting upon, and extolling the interest taken by that power in all that concerns the greater or less degree of independence enjoyed by the different princes and states of Europe. He ended this letter with an expression of his desire of peace, and a short but firm exposition of the ability of Great Britain to con. tinue the contest. A correspondence of some length The Frenchman continued in custody till the 7th of March, when he was sent under the care of a messenger to Harwich, and embarked on board of a vessel bound for Husum. He had arrived at Gravesend in a vessel called the Toby, Van Zoust master, declared from Embden, under Prussian colours, but supposed to have come direct from Holland. + March 5. March 2. Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, March 26. ensued, which France seemed to feel so much repugnance. Whether M. Tallyrand calculated on the probability of such communications between the two courts, or was only anxious to prolong a correspondence, which might ultimately lead to a negotiation, he wrote a letter on the 2d of June, in the form of an answer to Mr. Fox's dispatch of the 20th of April, in which, after some vague observations on the nature of alliances, and some trivial objections to a joint negotiation, he proposes, ensued, in which, as M. Talleyrand observes, there is a character of openness and precision, that had not hitherto been seen in the communications between the two courts. The great difficulty consisted in the admission of Russia into the negotiation. M. Talleyrand endeavours with much ingenuity to represent that power as interposing its authority between two great nations fully competent to adjust their own differences, but Mr. Fox insists on her being a party in the question, and an ally of Great Britain, whose interests are insepara-"first, to negotiate in the same prebly connected with her own. To bring the discussion to a point, Mr. Fox states explicitly, that his majesty was willing to negotiate conjointly with Russia, but would not consent to negotiate separately. A month elapsed without any answer being given to this dispatch, and the first overture may be said to have failed in consequence of the determination of England not to negotiate separately, and the unwillingness of France to admit the intervention of Russia. But, though no arrangement took place, the spirit of conciliation manifested on both sides, was considered as a great advance to peace ;" and in the course of the month of May, the English cabinet were, no doubt, enabled to ascertain with greater precision, the views and intentions of the court of St. Petersburg, and enabled to determine how far the substance and advantage of a joint Degotiation might be preserved, without insisting on the forms, to * Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, April 20. Id. to Id. April 8. liminary forms, which were adopted during the administration of the marquis of Rockingham, in 1782; forms, which were not renewed with so much advantage in the negotiations of Lisle, but which were perfectly successful in the negotiations which preceded the treaty of Amiens;-secondly, to establish as a basis two fundamental principles ; the first, taken from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March, namely, "That the two states should have for their object, that the peace be honourable for them and their respective allies, and at the same time, of a nature to secure, as far as it is in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe," the second principle to be an acknowledgment on the part of the two powers, of their mutual right of intervention and guaranty in continental, and in ma. ritime affairs. ‡ The English government does not seem to have returned any immediate answer to this letter. Indeed, From M, Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, June 3d. though though the form of the proposals contained in it, gave it an appearance of great precision and exactness, some time seems to have been necessary to understand the meaning of the French government, in making a reference to the preliminary forms in the administration of lord Rockingham, and those which preceded the treaty of Amiens; for they were not only dissimilar, but it appears from Mr. Fox's answer, that by adopting the precedents of 1782, the French would have completely established the mode of negotiation, to which they objected, and admitted the principle, against which M. Talleyrand, in the very letter containing that offer, peremptorily protests. Whether these considerations, or an expectation of further communications from the Russian cabinet, induced Mr. Fox to suspend the correspondence, no answer was made to this letter, till the 14th of June, by which time a new channel of communication was opened, and a fresh overture was made from the French government, which led to all the subsequent negotiation between the two countries. As, however, Mr. Fox answered the letter of the 2d of June without any reference to this new negotiation, it may be right to close our account of the direct correspondence between M. Talleyrand, and the English minister, by stating the substance of the last letter of that correspondence.* It consists of a civil but convincing reply to the objections urged by M. Talleyrand to a joint negotiation, a simple statement of the preliminary discussions in 1782, and a compa rison of the situation of England then with relation to the allies of France, with that of France to the allies of Great Britain, at the date of the letter, and an offer of the same forms of treating, which France at that time thought proper to insist upon. "We then treated with France and her allies., Let France now treat with us and our allies." After acquiescing in the basis offered in the second proposi tion, upon condition that the two powers mutually agree to abstain from all encroachment on the greater or lesser states of Europe; and after expressing his hope, that no difficulties in form rather than in substance should retard the restoration of peace; he implies, that any mode of negotiation, to which Russia will assent, will be agreeable to Great Britain, and takes that opportunity of observing, that an honourable peace was no less Conformable to the wishes of Rus sia, than to those of England and of France. Thus ended the direct corres pondence between the two ministers for foreign affairs; and Mr. Fox had probably strong reasons from his communications with Russia, as he had undoubtedly from the assurances he had lately + received through lord Yarmouth, to foresee that the question of joint or separate negotiation would no longer be an obstacle to a more regular and formal discussion of the inte rests and pretentions of Great Britain and her allies. In the course of the above related Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, June 14th. correspondence, correspondence, and in conse. less liable to public observation; and quence of the conciliatory manner in which it had been conducted, Mr. Fox had solicited as a personal favour the release of several of his private acquaintance prisoners at Verdun, the peculiar circumstances of whose detention had rendered any arrangement for their exchange impracticable, as it would have been derogatory to the dignity of the country to have acknowledged the principle on which they had been detained. The applications of Mr. Fox were in many instances successful, and among the persons named by him was the earl of Yarmouth, only son of the marquis of Hert. ford, who together with his wife and family, had been detained in France since the commencement of the war. On lord Yarmouth's ar. rival in London, early in June, he communicated the substance of a conversation with M. Talleyrand, which had passed at the desire of that minister, for the purpose of conveying through a secret and confidential channel, the sentiments and views of France, and the outlines of the terms, on which peace might be restored between the two countries. The terms sketched out in the conversation seemed so faTourable, that the English cabinet lost no time in conveying to M. Talleyrand their disposition to commence a negotiation, on the basis contained in them. The bearer of the proposition was better able to judge of, and to enforce the adherence to the terms proposed, than any other person whatever; the residence of his family in France rendered lord Yarmouth's return it was understood,* that excepting himself, no one would have been permitted to remain twelve hours in France, without producing full powers to negotiate a treaty of peace. These were probably the reasons, which induced the English cabinet to direct lord Yarmouth to return. Before his departure, Mr. Fox, with an observation that we were all mortal, requested him to commit to writing the heads of the proposals made by M. Talleyrand. His memorandum of a conversa tion with that minister, preserved in the secretary of state's office, and afterwards laid before parliament, is the only written evidence of the proposals which induced Mr. Fox to treat directly for peace with the French government. As the unwillingness of France to adhere to her original offers not only occasioned the first departure from that spirit of conciliation, in which the former correspondence had been conducted; but was the real cause of the ultimate failure of the nego tiation, the substance of those overtures necessarily forms the most important part of the whole transaction. Unfortunately lord Yar month could not foresee the neces sity of the disclosure of so confiden. tial a paper. It consequently is not drawn up in that methodical style which is generally desirable in a public document. The want, however, of official precision, and the omission of some inferior points were amply supplied by his lordship's comments and explanations in the house of commons, when the subject came into discussion. From * Lord Yarmouth's speech in the House of Commons, Jan. 5, 1807. : the |