Froposal of lord Lauderdale. It is manifest from this circumstance, as well as from other passages of the correspondence, that the impatience of Bonaparte would have brought the negotiation to an abrupt and violent conclusion, but for the frequent and wise interposition of his ministers, who sometimes by address and sometimes by representation, contrived to soften the tone and moderate the language of their official communications. The English negotiator in his reply to the abovementioned paper, though he took as much notice of the offensive topics introduced into it, as was essential to the maintenance of his own dignity, very judiciously combined it with the personal assurances of M. Talleyrand, and considered it as amounting to a full admission of his proposal. But on the renewal of the conferences it did not appear that France was disposed to relax in any one of her pretensions. In the mean while Bonaparte had left Paris for the army on the Rhine, and one of the plenipotentiaries (gen.Clarke,) as well as M. Talleyrand accomcompanied him on his journey. M. Champagny, who remained to conduct the negotiation, was neither authorized to trelinquish the claims of Joseph upon Sicily, nor to acquiesce in such an arrangement as would have satisfied the court of St. Petersburgh. The negotiation was therefore at an end, and lord Lauderdale peremptorily insisted on his passports. In the last conference M. Champagny, though he had previously doubted his powers of hearing lord Lauderdale upon the subject of Russia (notwithstanding

the assurances contained in §the pub. lic note and conversations of M. Talleyrand) offered to cede the full sovereignty of Corfu to that power. This was rejected as insufficient, which has led to the erroneous opinion that the negotiation was broken off solely because Great Britain insisted on the cession of Dalmatia to Russia.

It appears, however, that even if Great Britain, departing from the principles which had guided Mr. Fox in the commencement of the negotiation, had considered her own views of the interest of Russia rather than the wishes of that court, in a treaty provisionally signed for her approbation, yet it would have been impossible, in the shape in which it was proposed, to acquiesce in the relinquishment of Dalmatia, without incurring the risk of forfeiting the confidence of Russia, and neither accomplishing a general, nor even a separate peace after all. Had the English ministers completed the part of the treaty relating to Russia with out securing to that power the ob ject of which she was most desirous, the French, by insisting on stipula tions, which England considered as utterly inadmissible, but to which Russia was comparatively indifferent, would have thrown upon them the imputation of sacrificing the interests of their ally. This was the more to be apprehended, because on points of that description, especially Sicily, the French had shewn no disposition whatever to relax. The consequence would have been, that the strength of the alliance between the two courts would have been broken. The feeling of a common cause

Papers, (No. 52.) || Papers, (No. 52.) would

would have been destroyed, and the two powers would have incurred, both in appearance and effect, the disadvantage of contending with France for objects essentially dif. ferent, and upon distinct and separate grounds. The obvious policy of France, when she despaired of any separate peace with Great Britain, was to induce her to admit in the project of a treaty such terms as she foresaw would alienate the affections, and shake the confidence of her ally the emperor of Russia. The honourable determination of our cabinet, and the firm but temperate conduct of our negotiator defeated this design, and his earnest and peremptory demand of passports was at length granted, though they were accompanied with a note evidently composed under the immediate direction of Bonaparte. This paper insinuates that the principles of Mr. Fox had been abandoned by his colleagues and successors; that a departure from the basis laid down by him had thrown the first obstacle in the way of pacification, and that to the loss of that great man alone was to be ascribed the further continuance of the calamities of war. To these charges lord Lauderdale delivered a spirited, manly, and convincing reply. Indeed no impartial person can peruse the early part of the negotiation, without being persuaded, that if the French had con. ducted themselves towards Mr. Fox as they did towards his successors, the result must have been precisely the same. Whether, if the life of Mr. Fox had been fortunately preserved, confidence in that great cha

racter, reliance on the stability and permanence of his power at home, and apprehension of the authority of his name throughout Europe, and in France in particular, might not have induced Bonaparte to relax in his pretensions, and to revert to the councils of moderation which seem to have dictated M. Talleyrand's first correspondence, is mere matter of speculation. We have good reason to believe that Mr. Fox himself despaired of any such event, and if our confidence in the weight of his character is greater than his own, it can in no degree affect the merits of his successors and colleagues who met with no such forbearance or mo

deration in the councils of the enemy. The charge," that the British government had resolved to forego the prospect of a peace," though probably intended by Bonaparte to inflame the English public against the administration, was little calculated to produce that effect. Through the industry of those most hostile to the ministry, the public were more prepared to censure the terms of a peace than to lament the continuance of war, and the rupture of a negotiation was the last accusation which a court party would have thought it prudent, at that time, to urge against the servants of the crown. The animosity so studiously excited at the commence. ment of the war, was by no means extinguished in the public, and an incident soon occurred to shew that motives yet more inexcusable contributed to the general sentiment in favor of the rupture of the negotia tion. Though the grounds upon which the discussions had been bro

council summoned specially for that purpose; and after comparing it with the instructions given to M. D'Oubril before his departure, and with the subsequent orders sent to him at Vienna, it was declared by the council, that M. D'Oubril, in sign. ing these articles, had not only de. parted from his instructions, but had acted directly contrary to their sense and spirit; and upon this ground his imperial majesty was advised to withhold his ratification of the treaty. His resolution to that ef. fect was accordingly signified without delay to the French government, and notified by a circular letter to all the Russian ministers at foreign courts. M. D'Oubril was disgraced and exiled from court, but neither deprived of his rank nor of his appointments.

Notwithstanding the declaration of the Russian council, that D'Oubril, in signing this treaty, had acted in the face of his instructions, the very slight punishment to which he was conden ned for conduct so in. excusable, if truly represented, leaves some doubt upon the mind, whether he had so far deviated from his secret instructions as to justify the imputations cast upon him. On the other hand, the difficulty of giv. ing any rational explanation of the change of opinion on the subject of peace, which must be supposed to have taken place in the court of St. Petersburg after his departure from Vienna, if he negotiated in confor mity to secret instructions which were afterwards disavowed, inclines

us to believe, that he must have deserved in some degree his disgrace; and his remarkable expression after siguing the treaty, that he would carry to Petersburg his work and his head, and lay them before the feet of his master," seems to imply, that he was conscious of having incurred a dangerous responsibility, by acting in opposition to his instruc tions. It has been said, that he was led into this error by a private conversation which be had with the em. peror before his departure from St. Petersburg, in which he imagined that he discovered a more pacific spirit and more accommodating po licy in his sovereign, than was contained in the public instructions of the ministers; and to this circumstance, if true, may perhaps be imputed the mildness of his punish. ment. It has been also said, that in addition to the impression made on his weak and pusillanimous character by the menacing language of the French, he was precipitated into the fatal measure of affixing his name to the treaty, by an erro. neous opinion, that the new ministers at St. Petersburg were less favourably inclined to England than their predecessors. In this idea, however, he was widely mistaken. General Budberg, the successor of Czartorinski, was a man of inferior talents and reputation, but equally attached to the connection of Russia with England, and disposed to make every sacrifice and exertion to maintain the alliance of the two powers.

CHAP.