ment, than it was when count La Lippe began to attempt its reformation. In this government, so administered and so supported, the people, far from placing any confidence, took no manner of interest, and there could be little doubt, that had the French invaded the country, their progress would have been ob served with perfect indifference by the great body of the inhabitants. These things were not unknown at Paris, where, except the negotia tions with England and Russia, nothing now remained, since the peace of Presburg, to occupy the attention of Bonaparte, and to delay his favourite project of subduing the last ally of England. Should those negotiations fail, as there was but too much reason to fear they must, from the extravagant pretensions of the enemy, and the general repugnance of both the court and the people in this country, to any such peace as the situation of the continent entitled us to expect; then it was evident that the invasion of Portugal would be the first step of the French government, Scarcely any thing else, indeed, remained to be done for it was the only stake which England still had to lose on the continent of Europe.. And even during the course of the negotiation this threat was held out in the plainest terms, while authentic intelligence from different quarters, proved that some advances were made in carrying the menace into execution. The British government, therefore, saw clearly that at all events Portugal must be invaded; that a blow would in all probability be struck at that defenceless ally, during the progress of the negotiation, and for the purpose of has

tening its conclusion; that to a certainty, even if it were delayed so long, the rupture of the negotia tion would be the signal for immediately marching an army from Bayonne to the l'agus. It became, therefore, the first care of the British ministry to provide the means of assisting our ancient ally with forces proportioned to the magnitude of the threatened danger, and with he promptitude which its imminency demanded.

Orders were immediately dispatched to the earl of St. Vincent, who was then cruizing off Brest, at the head of the Channel fleet, and within little more than a week after the intelligence had been received of the threatened attack, and only ten days after the menace had been held out to the British negotiators at Paris, that famous commander rode at anchor before Lisbon, with a squadron of six sail of the finest ships of the line. By treaty we are restricted from keeping more than this number in the Tagus at one time. So that the admiral ordered another vessel which accompanied him to cruize off the coast, and made the other ships relieve her by turns. The rest of the Channel fleet, and the squadron off Ferrol, were in readiness to reinforce this detachment at a mo. ment's notice, if any occasion should require it.

In the mean time, and with the same dispatch, a large and well ap. pointed army was assembled at Plymouth, the destination of several detachments of our forces having been changed for the present, in order to afford the means of speedily assisting the Portuguese government. Lieutenant-generals Simcoe and the

earl of Rosslyn, with their staff, were immediately sent to join lord St. Vincent in the Tagus *, and to open, in conjunction with him, such a communication with the court of Lisbon, as might at once lead to a full understanding of the extent of the threatened danger, the means of resisting it, and the best mode of co-operating for that purpose. General Simcoe was taken ill on the voyage, and his malady increased so rapidly after his arrival, that he was under the necessity of speedily returning to England, where he died a few hours after he landed. The negotiation was, therefore, carried on by lord Rosslyn and the admiral. It would have been difficult to find persons better qualified for the management of this important affair. The high name of lord St. Vincent, so renowned over every part of the world, was held in particular vencration in Portugal, where he had so often commanded, had gained his greatest victory, and from which, indeed, he had even taken his title after that memorable exploit. He had lived so much among he Portuguese, and rendered himself so popular both with the court and the country, that they never thought of him as a foreigner, but familiarly termed him a cou tryman of their own. Lord Rosslyn, whose services in the Mediterranean were well known in these parts, had also served as second in command with sir Charles Stuart for several years, the last time t at an English army was sent to the assistance of Portugal. His talents for affairs, and the activity of his disposition, as well

as his conciliatory manners, qualífied him peculiarly well for carrying on the communication between, the British government, or the military force sent to the Tagus, and the court of Lisbon. Add to this, that both the admiral and the general enjoyed, in the greatest degree, the confidence of the English administra ion, to which, by the political sentiments, as well as by personal connexions, they were intimately attached. The army collected and embarked at Plymouth, was held in readiness to sail at a moment's warning, as soon as the state of the negotiation at Lisbon required it. But it was with a becoming caution and a dne tenderness for the critical circumstances of our ally, that the British government did not send it over in the first instance, but waited until the precise extent and imminency of the danger should be ascertained. Had an army been suddenly sent with the fleet to the Tagus, a pretext would have been afforded to Bonaparte for his meditated invasion; and the transaction would have borne an appearance, of all others the most to be avoided, of imposing on the Portuguese government the necessity of adopting our plan of defence. It was better on every account to delay the expedition until the enemy should actually invade Portugal, or until our ally should require our assistance and co-operation for her defence.

It was the obvious and single intention of the British cab net in the whole of this proceeding, to assist Portugal against France, and to give

this aid in the way that should be deemed most acceptable by herself. Upon his plain and certain principle the instructions of lord St. Vincent and his coadjutors, were entirely founded. They were ordered, in the first place, to communicate the intelligence received from various quarters, of the hostile designs entertained by France, and to encourage. by every offer and argument, any disposition to resist them, which they might perceive in the prince regent or his ministers. In a word, they were to offer the whole naval, military, and pecuniary resources of England, in so far as the same were disposable, to assist the Portuguese in defending themselves from the threatened invasion. It was, how ever, to be considered as a possible case, that the court of Lisbon might be found either too timid, or too slothful for the crisis in which it was placed. The influence of the councils, or the terror of the army of France, might prevent our ally from adopting the vigorous measures prescribed by the dangers of the occasion. Or, it might be, that upon a full and fair investigation, Portugal should be found wholly incapable of defence, against the combined at tacks of France and Spain. In this case another offer, equally liberal, was to be made on the part of the British government. In the event of his finding that the court of Lis. bon either could not or would not defend itself, lord St. Vincent was instructed to offer the whole of his fleet, with the army already embarked, and waiting his signal to sail, as well as the most liberal supplies of money, for the purpose of securing the Portuguese government a safe retreat in the Brazils, and establishing them there as an inde. VOL. XLVIII.

pendent state. Thus, if the court of Lisbon either chose to defend Portugal, or was afraid to run the hazard of such a contest, or found itself unable to resist the enemy, or from whatever cause, preferred a retreat, in either case the British government offered to place the whole resources of the empire at its disposal; without a single equivalent, except that of saving an ancient ally; without any security for the future; upon no condition or bargain whatever, except that Portugal should do her best to resist or to escape. The transactions so disgraceful to the English name, which have recently taken place elsewhere, render it necessary to add, what might otherwise have been taken for granted, that no idea whatever was entertained of taking the fleets or arsenals of Portugal in security or as a deposit; and that such a demand was never hinted at, either in the instructions of the mission, or in the communications held with the court of Lisbon.

There was, however, a third case, highly improbable no doubt, but still within the bounds of possibi lity, and to be provided for accord. ingly. If the court of Lisbon should, from indecision and the influence of a French party in its councils, both refuse to defend its dominions in Europe, and to retreat to those in South America; if it should persist in a resolution neither to fight nor to fly, but determine to remain and be voluntarily swallowed up, with its whole resources, by the invading enemy, it then became the duty of England to prevent those resources from falling into the hands of France, and accordingly the admiral and general were instructed to declare, that should the enemy Q

invade

invade Portugal, and should the court refuse both to oppose him and to escape from him, then it would become necessary to prevent the fleet from falling into his hands. This was, indeed, a thing so selfcvident, that it was scarcely necessary to mention it; but the British government, for the sake of preserving to the end that frankness and plain dealing which had all along marked their proceedings towards this old ally, deemed it proper to add the above to the other instructions. The case to which it should be applicable was scarcely a conceivable one, but it was more safe and accurate to provide for every possible combination of circumstances.

During the interval between the sailing of Lord St. Vincent's squadron, and the opening of the communications at Lisbon, in the beginning of September, a considerable change had taken place in the aspect of affairs in the North. The Emperor of Russia had refused to ratify D'Oubril's treaty, the king of Prussia had begun his preparations for making war upon France, and it was also apprehended that Austria would not remain neutral in so extensive a contest. The natural consequence of this unexpected change of circumstances, was the abandonment of the designs upon Portugal for the present; the troops on their march to assemble at Bayonne were countermanded; the French ambassador at Lisbon, general Junot, instead of proceeding to his destination, was sent away to the army in Germany; a large body of Spanish troops was marched to the assistance of France in the North, and Bonaparte and his miDisters left Paris to join the armies.

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A respite was thus obtained for Por tugal, which it was evident must last at least as long as the new war should continue; and that country might be considered as altogether safe, until the allies should be again completely conquered, and their new coalition dissolved.

When this change took place, time had only been afforded the negotiators at Lisbon to open their business, and ascertain the disposi tion and resources of the Portuguese government. They found on the part of the prince regent, the best possible disposition towards England. The cabinet was, indeed, feeble, both in talents and spirit, but was well inclined to do whatever might reasonably be expected, should the threatened dangers approach nearer. The liberal and disinterested offers of the British government were received with the warmest expressions of gratitude, and the friendly solicitude shewn by that generous ally, made a deep and lasting impression upon the prince. When the unexpected intelligence arrived, that hostilities were recommencing in the North, the court of Lisbon deemed it advisable no longer to request the protection of the British admiral, and it was evident, that for the present, the landing of any English force in Portugal, could only serve to give umbrage at Madrid, without answering any good purpose. The troops were accordingly disembarked at Plymouth, lord St. Vincent returned to his station off the Tagus, and lord Rosslyn sailed for England, carrying back with him the most friendly and sincere expressions of the prince regent's gratitude to the British government, and the strongest protestations of his increased confi

dence

dence in so faithful an ally. The universal sentiment of the court of Lisbon was, that for the present they were not exposed to danger; as soon as the necessity should return, they would expect the same kind assistance from England, either in defending them from the enemy, or in helping them to retreat to Brazil, should resistance be deemed impossible. In the mean time the happiest effects resulted from this mission; the union between the two courts was drawn closer

than before; the most salutary reforms were undertaken in the military establishment of Portugal, as well as in the finances, in concert with England; and no doubt could remain, that if a proportionate degree of prudence and promptitude, should be shewn hereafter, in as. sisting the prince when the moment of attack arrived, he would either make a stand in conjunction with us, or retire to his American dominions under our protection,

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