of Good Hope had sailed from England in autumn 1805, at the monent when hostilities were breaking out on the continent, and when from the plan of operations concerted between the British government and its allies, it might have been expected, that the whole of our disposable force would have been employed in some continental diversion; instead of being directed to an object, which however valuable and important in itself, should never have been permitted to interfere with the deeper and more important game, in which we were engaged nearer home. But it was the constant error of Mr. Pitt's administration, to be engaged in the pursuit of two objects at once, and his misfortune, and that of his country, that, in attempting both, he often succeeded in neither, and was sure always to fail in the most important. In the present instance, though Europe was lost, the Cape of Good Hope was taken and reduced under subjection to Great

Britain.

The force destined for this conquest consisted of about 5000 land troops under sir David Baird, with a proportional naval force, commanded by sir Home Popham. Having touched at San Salvador for refreshments, the expedition sailed from that place on the 26th of November, and reached Table Bay on the 4th of January, 1806. It was the intention of the commanders to have disembarked the troops without delay; but when the fleet arrived at its anchorage, the evening was too far advanced to attempt a landing; and next morning the surf ran so high, that it was found impracticable to land the troops where it was at first intended; nor could

In

any safer or better landing-place be discovered, after a close examination of the shore from Lospard's Bay to Cape town. In this emergence, it was determined to go northward to Saldaina Bay, about 18 or 20 leagues distant from Table Bay,and, however difficult the march from thence to Cape town, it was judged better to submit to that inconveni ence than to hazard any further delay in disembarking the troops. consequence of this determination brigadier general Beresford was seut to Saldahna Bay with the 38th regiment and 20th light dragoons, the rest of the army being next day to follow him; but next morning the surf was so much abated, that it was resolved to land the army at Lospard's Bay, as at first intended. The disembarkation was conducted with great order under the protec tion of the fleet, and though a few sharp shooters appeared on the heights and somewhat annoyed the troops, only two persons were wounded by their fire, and the landing would have been attended with no greater loss than this, but for the accident of a boat upsetting, by which 35 soldiers were drowned. The whole of the army having landed on this and the following day, except the detachment sent to Saldahna Bay with general Beresford, sir David Baird began his march to Cape town on the morning of the 8th, and having reached the summit of the Blue Mountains, he there des cried the enemy drawn up in the plain and prepared to receive him, They were commanded by general Janssens, governor of the colony, and their force amounted to about 5000 men, chiefly cavalry. Their position was good,and was strengthened by 23 pieces of cannon.

The

force

the Cape, no instruction, direct or implied, public or confidential, had been given to him, which could authorize his leaving that colony, and employing the force, under his command, in any service uncennected with its conquest or preservation. His mind, however, which had been formerly occupied with schemes of conquest in South America, was some time after the reduction of the Cape, again turned to such speculations, in consequence of information received of the weakness of the Spanish colonies on the Rio Plata, and exaggerated reports of the disaffection of the people towards their government. Having also got accounts from Europe of the dissolution of the third coalition, and of the reduced state of the French marine, in consequence of the battle of Trafalgar, and being satisfied, that the squadron of Villaumez, originally destined for the Cape, had gone to the West Indies, he was so far influenced by these considerations, and by the prospect of public and private gain from the conquest of Buenos Ayres, that, forgetful of his duty as an officer to remain in the station which his superiors had assigned to him, he determined on carrying off the whole of the naval force at the Cape, and attempting with it some exploit in the Rio Plata; and having persuaded sir D. Baird to acquiesce in his plans, he obtained from that officer a small body of troops under general Beresford, to co-operate in any enter. prize he should attempt.

Thus assisted, he sailed from the Cape about the middle of April, leaving that settlement without an armed vessel to protect it from insult, and directed his course in the

first place to St. Helena, where he had the address to procure from the governor a small reinforcement to his little army, which after all did not exceed 1600 men, including marines. With this very inade quate force for so great an enterprize, he steered for the Rio Plata, and arrived at the mouth of that river in the beginning of Jane. It was now debated, whether an attack should be made on Buenos Ayres or Montevideo, and the former being preferred, the troops were removed from the line of battle ships into the transports and frigate that accompanied the expedition, in which, after surmounting with great skill and perseverance the difficulties of a most intricate navigation, they arrived before Buenos Ayres on the 24th of June, and next day disembarked without resistance at the Punta de Quilmes, about twelve miles from that city. A body of Spaniards placed on a height at two miles distance, witnessed the landing of the British army without opposing it, and general Beresford having marched against them on the following morning, they fled with precipitation at the first fire, leaving behind them their artillery. other difficulty occurred after this success, except the passage of a river, which it was necessary to cross, before getting to Buenos Ayres; but this being effected with the help of rafts and boats, the bridge having been burnt by the enemy, general Beresford entered the city on the 27th, the viceroy having previously abandoned it and fled to Cordova, with the small body of troops under his com mand.

No

While the army was thus employed

ployed in the conquest of Buenos Ayres, the line of battle ships of the squadron made demonstrations before Montevideo and Maldonado, in order to alarm and occupy the garrisons of these places, in which, as it afterwards appeared, were stationed the regular troops of the colony, while the defence of Buenos Ayres, from its situation supposed to be less liable to attack, had been committed to the militia. To this accident, and to the misconduct and timidity of the viceroy, who was quite inexperienced in military affairs, the success of an expedition, undertaken not more in defiance of the rules of discipline than in opposition to the dictates of prudence, may in a great measure be attributed. In justice, however, to the British commanders it must be added, that in the execution of their enterprize, they displayed great boldness and intrepidity, and that after victory they shewed a degree of forbearance and moderation to the vanquished, which reflects on them the highest credit. Though the town was without defence when the English army advanced to it, favourable articles of capitulation were granted to the inhabitants; and not only was the private property of individuals on shore religiously respected; but the coasting vessels found in the river, which by the laws of war were good prize to the captors, though valued with their cargoes, at a mil. lion and a half of dollars, were re. stored by proclamation to the rightful owners. Policy had no doubt its share in this liberal conduct; for there were not seamen to spare from the fleet to navigate these vessels, and if they had been destroyed, the views of traffic, in

which the expedition originated, must have been entirely frustrated; as these coasters afforded the only means of maintaining a commercial intercourse with the interior, except the expensive, and in the present state of the country, uncertain communication by caravans. About 1,200,000 dollars of public money were found in the town and sent to England; besides which, public property in quicksilver and Jesuit's bark, to the value of near three millions of dollars, was seized for the benefit of the captors; but, before it was secured on board of ship, the place, as we shall after. wards have to relate, was retaken by the enemy.

We have already noticed the extravagant joy and delusive expec tations, which the news of the capture of Buenos Ayres diffused through every part of the Britisk empire. A circular manifesto from sir Home Popham to the principal mercantile and manufacturing cities, announcing and certainly not underrating the value of the market he had opened, spread widely and rapidly the most exaggerated notions of his conquest; and led, as was naturally to be expected from so unusual and unprecedented an address from such authority, to many rash and improvident mercantile speculations, in which the adventurers had reason afterwards amply to lament their credulity. The delusion was universal, and allowing much for ignorance and want of reflection, incredibly and unaccountably great. It was for. gotten, that Buenos Ayres and other parts of South America had been always supplied with English goods through Spanish or neutral bottoms; and, though a

direct trade, by affording our ma nufactures at a cheaper rate than a circuitous one, might increase the demand for them, it was not to be supposed, that this could be in any proportion to the sanguine expec. tations and over speculations of the public. Inexhaustible mines; fertile, salubrious plains; an innocent, unoffending population, cruelly oppressed by their former masters, and gratefully repaying with sub. mission and obedience the British valour that had rescued them from slavery; were the false and flat. tering images, that dazzled every eye, and banished sober and cool reflection from every bosom. It was not considered, that our new acquisition was 1800 miles distant from the mines of Potosi ; that the intermediate country was inhabited by a hardy, unsettled race, expert in the management of their horses and spears, and as invincible in defensive war as the Arabs of the de. sert; nor that Buenos Ayres itself owed its wealth and importance, not to its natural resources derived from the fertile but uncultivated territory that surrounds it, but to its accidental and artificial pre-eminence, as the capital of an extensive government and emporium between the mother country and her more distant colonies. They who knew any thing of South America, were sensible that the possession of Buenos Ayres, though inconvenient to Potosi and Peru, no more led to the subjugation of these countries, than the possession of Macao leads to the conquest of China. They foresaw, that our invasion, whatever might be its ultimate consequences, would in the first in

stance destroy the established channels of commerce, and they were not sure that it would open others in their room. They allowed, that Buenos Ayres was an excellent agricultural farm; but it must first be settled and improved, they con tended, before it could afford a market for our manufactures. But such reasoners were few in number, and amidst the general delusion their voice was unattended to and unheeded.

When intelligence reached go. vernment of sir Home Popham's unauthorised departure from the Cape, and meditated invasion of South America, orders were instantly dis. patched to recal him home, and put a stop to his expedition. These orders were too late to prevent his enterprize; and when the news of his success arrived, the strong ob. jections to his plan were drowned in the universal joy at the fortunate result of his operations. Α conquest, which the government would not have made, it had not the resolution to abandon; or pos. sibly, deceived by the ease with which the victory had been gained, it gave in to the popular delusion, and supposed that South America required only to be attacked, in order to be subdued. It cannot be said, that it countenanced or promoted the sanguine calculations of the mercantile part of the com. munity, except by issuing the customary order of council for regulating the trade of his majesty's subjects with the countries that fall under his arms;* but on the other hand, it took no pains to dissipate these errors, or to undeceive the public with respect to the grossness

of