CHAPTER II.

THE COUNCIL.

THE maintenance of the democracy depended on the condition that there should be no other body in the state which, owing to wealth position birth, or reputation, could act independently of the Assembly. The Greeks saw clearly that power gained by one department must be at the expense of another. There was nothing to which they attached so much importance as the preservation of a due balance of power between the various institutions. This is shown in the dread of men of conspicuous ability which was so common. But in a democracy the true balance, or proportion in the government was that the Assembly should have all the power: anything which could interfere with it was a distortion1. It was as much the object of a good democrat to

1 That is in administration. The theory of Greek constitutional law was that the Assembly should be free only within the limits of the laws; these were normally unchangeable (cf. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aus Kydathen); legislation was not one of the regular functions of the people. But (this always excepted) in a true democracy its power would not be impeded by the competition of any other legally constituted body.

weaken all other assemblies and institutions as it was of a tyrant to kill all other able men. And this is what the lot did at Athens1.

For any state which is not governed by an assembly of all the citizens must be governed either by a smaller council, or by one or more magistrates. This the Greeks saw clearly enough, just as they saw that the power of one of these organs depended on the weakness of the others. They themselves divided the city states into three classes: Monarchy, Aristocracy or Oligarchy, Democracy; and to these added the state with a mixed constitution-the TOMITEía as Aristotle calls it. In all of these we find existing more or less developed the three organs of government, the ẻκkλŋoía or great assembly of citizens; the Bovλn or senate, a smaller select council; and the executive magistrates. The power was divided among these three, and what was gained by one was lost by another; and just as a Democracy was a state where the KKλnoía maintained its power and held the government in its own hands, so in an Aristocracy or Oligarchy we find the chief power held by the Bovλn or smaller council. It would be equally correct if we substituted for the Greek words, "Rule of the Many," "Rule of the Few," the expressions, "Rule by the Assembly," "Rule by the Council." To preserve the Democracy it was necessary to keep up the power of the eκкλŋoía as

1 Aristotle expressly tells us that in a democracy all other offices (ἀρχαί) will lose power: τέταρτος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας περὶ πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας, τὰς δ ̓ ἀρχὰς περὶ μηθενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ προανακρίνειν. Pol. vi. (iv.) 4, 1298.

against that of the Bovλn and the magistrates; and this is what the lot did.

Of course it seldom happened that there was a state where any form of government was quite perfect. Even a complete monarchy, where the executive ruler was quite independent and irresponsible, was rare; though the Greek states under the tyrants had had some experience of such an arrangement. But this was a passing phase, and Athens had never fallen under the despotism of a constitutionally appointed executive body as Sparta to some extent had, and the danger of this does not seem at the beginning of the fifth century to have been great. There was no tyrant, the continuation of whose rule interfered with the independence of the assembly: the more pressing danger to be met by those who wished to establish a democracy was the rule of the aristocratic council; for it was round a council that the power of the old nobles had centred.

The power of this council is the most striking The fact in the history of all city states; in medieval council in the city Germany and in Italy just as much as in all the state. ancient cities, Greek Latin and Phoenician, which were scattered round the shores of the Mediterranean. It does not matter whether a seat in the council be hereditary, whether the appointment be by cooptation, or even by direct or indirect popular election; with the council rests the real power of the state, and to become a senator is the object of ambition for all who themselves aim at power. It is the councillors, the senators, the rathsherrn who

are looked up to by their fellow-citizens as their rulers; it is they who have a monopoly of the distinctions and rewards of government; it is on their decision that the welfare of the town depends; to be one of them is to be admitted to the arcana of government. There may be a sovereign popular assembly to which certain rights are reserved; but its power is uncertain and its practical importance small, compared with that of the council. And though there are of course magistrates with special duties who have a formal precedency over all other members of the council, yet as a matter of fact we generally find that the magistrates have little independence. They act not as individuals, but as members of the greater body to which they belong; the man who is consul or bürgermeister for a year is hardly distinguished from his associates in the council who have held office or will succeed him in it.

When the common man meets a senator or councilman in the street, he looks on him with the respect or envy which is due to one who has by his office an authority which no ability nor experience can counterbalance; he is before one who is politically his better. Whether the council is filled by men of good birth and great wealth, or whether men are elected to it for their merit, those who belong to it are an exclusive body; they are a ruling clique within the state; between them and all other citizens there is a great gulf fixed.

The government in an Aristocratic or Oligarchic state is then government by a council: and all experience shows that a small body is likely to get

into its hands more power than legally belongs to it. But a council of some kind is necessary. A large assembly of many thousands cannot alone govern a state. The problem of ancient democracy was therefore to find a form of council which would help the assembly in the work of government, but would not usurp further power. There must be a council which would be efficient, but not exclusive; which would help the exкλŋσía, but not lead or oppose it.

Now at Athens there had been in the old days an aristocratic government which was centred round a council. The founders of the Athenian democracy had therefore a double task: they had to destroy, and to build up. They had to take away the power of the old council, and invent a new one which would do the work without making for itself an independent place. For both tasks they used the same instrument, election by lot. By it they broke down the influence of the old council, and by it they made a new one which answered all the requirements of a complete democracy.

Our knowledge of the history of the change is unfortunately very small; for the most important facts we are reduced to guess-work: we have therefore to be content with relating what happened. How events happened, what brought them about, what the immediate causes were, we cannot know.

Areopagus.

(1) How election by lot was used to deprive The the old aristocratic council of its power is so well known that I need not dwell on the subject. Grote has pointed out how when once it was decided that the Areopagus should consist of all ex-archons, and