must be essentially a Russian province. Having however, as we have remarked, left this difficulty entirely out of view, and supposing the only danger to be that of actual territorial aggrandizement by Russia, which could only take place in time of war, he appears to have calculated first that the vast weight of a joint intervention of all the great European powers could hardly fail to succeed, and would thus be attended with perfect safety; or supposing it even to fail, that the relation established between Russia and the other powers, by this concerted system of action, would enable them to prevent any abuse by her of the results of the partial war which would then follow. Of these two calculations the former has already been shown by the event to have been erroneous; but, it is proper to add, it has been defeated in part by the accidental occurrence of the battle of Navarino. The latter was in the main just, as respects the conclusion; for although we doubt the ability of the other powers to oppose by force any permanent barrier to the aggrandizement of Russia, we believe that they are secure enough from any danger of that kind, in the moderation which has prevailed for a long time past in the councils of that empire, and has now, greatly to its honor and advantage, become their habitual characteristic. We are satisfied for this reason, that, in the event of war, there is no probability that Russia will claim more than a fair proportion of the common spoil. But had both these calculations been completely justified by the event, it would have still, as we remarked above, left in full force the main objection to an intervention, politically considered; to wit, that it must, if successful, place the Greeks in any event virtually under the protectorate of Russia, and in this way, as well as by proportionally diminishing the power of Turkey, augment the influence of the formidable rival of Great Britain. We may therefore conclude, that the treaty of July, however agreeable to the friends of humanity, who care less about the comparative weight of England and Russia, than about the immediate relief of their oppressed and agonising fellow-creatures, was, when viewed as a merely British measure, at best very questionable. From the precipitation with which it was hurried through, and the indiscretion with which it was so prematurely published, we may perhaps suspect that it was somewhat hastily and rashly determined upon by Mr Canning, under the influence of the sort of intellectual fever with which he seems to have labored for some time previous to his death (occasioned

no doubt in part by this cause), and which threw a sort of extravagant and inflammatory coloring over all his late proceedings and speeches.

If the policy of this treaty, considered as a British measure, was in some degree doubtful, the details of the arrangement appear to be also liable to serious objections, of which events have shown the validity. The alternative offered to the Porte under the treaty of July, was substantially that of acquiescence in certain propositions, or of war. Nevertheless, the three powers abstain from pronouncing the fatal word, and only declare that in the event of refusal, they will interfere by force and separate the combatants. Not only this, but they affect, ever since the battle of Navarino, to deny the existence of war. The battle, they say, was fought by the Allies in bare self-defence; and if the peace be after all broken, it will not be their fault. This language appears singular; nor is it easy to see in what quarter it is intended to produce effect. It must clearly fail with the Turks, whose moral faculties are by no means delicate enough to seize the nice distinction made by the Allies. The hesitation of the latter, in pronouncing the decisive word, was doubtless construed at Constantinople into timidity, and tended of course to defeat the arrangement. The real object of giving it this form appears to have been, to deprive Russia of the pretext which she might otherwise have had, for putting her armies in motion in the event of the non-acceptance of the proposals. As the Allies are not to make war, but merely to step between the combatants, and separate them where they are actually engaged, and as this is not the case on the northern frontier, there is of course no occasion for Russia to move, and the active part of the interference falls entirely into the hands of Great Britain. This ingenious scheme, which takes for granted that Russia is ready to seize the first opportunity of aggrandizing herself by violent means, and that she can be prevented from so doing by such a diplomatic contrivance as the one in question, is far from complimentary, either to her moderation or sagacity. Conscious of possessing superior power, and intending to use it with a just regard for the rights of others, the giant of the North may probably have smiled with pity at this feeble attempt to fetter him with cobwebs, and pursued his course with unaltered tranquillity; but it is evident, that such a display of jealousy and want of confidence on the part of an ally, at the very moment of establishing a concert of action, if it

did not irritate and offend, had no tendency to concilitate, or to improve in any way the state of affairs. This device therefore, while it was wholly ineffectual for every good purpose, was of a nature to embarrass the operations of the Allies in the event of refusal, and even to place them morally in the wrong, if that were a point worth considering with the Turks. In the intercourse of nations there is no middle course between war and peace. If the Allies intended to remain at peace with the Turks, they had no right to interfere between them and the Greeks, whether the latter be viewed as enemies or rebellious subjects. If they intended to make war, they had then doubtless a right to assist the Greeks, but were bound in the first place to give due notice of their intentions by a public and intelligible declaration. In this, as in most other cases, a perfectly frank, open, and manly course would have been on all accounts the most politic, as well as the most honorable and just. By keeping firmly in view and announcing distinctly to the Porte, that the real alternative was that of peace with the Greeks or war with themselves, the Allies would have had a better chance of avoiding this extremity, and would have been certainly better prepared to meet it, if unavoidable, than they were found to be when the crisis arrived.

It is comparatively easy to be wise after the event, but in the doubtful situation in which things were placed by the provisions of the treaty, the occurrence of some such affair as the battle of Navarino seems to have been probable; and if this action be, as it certainly is, and has been publicly declared to be by the British government, for them at least, an untoward event, it furnishes a strong illustration of the impolicy of these provisions. It is not necessary to our present purpose to enlarge upon the circumstances of this affair. Considered as between the Allies and the Turks, it was on the part of the former a manifest infraction of all the ordinary rules of public law; and the feeble attempts made in England to justify it on the principle of self-defence, only prove, that those who make them. are conscious of having done a wrong action, without being willing to acknowledge and repair it. The fault, however, lies with the governments, and not with the naval commanders. The British admiral was not expressly authorized by his instructions to go the full length to which he went; but he nevertheless appears to have played the part of a gallant and efficient officer, following in general the tenor of his orders, and con

struing them, when doubtful, in favor of prompt and energetic action. He is therefore, we conceive, in no way to blame, but rather entitled to thanks and credit, as well for going into battle, as for his excellent conduct when engaged. The real difficulty lay in the false position of the Allied and Turkish forces in relation to each other; and this was a necessary result of the terms of the treaty, for which the ministers, and not the admirals, were responsible. The former had so arranged matters, that the latter, by performing their duty in a manly and vigorous way, could hardly fail to precipitate the war which the Allies were so anxious to avoid, and which, if they thought it unavoidable, they ought to have declared themselves, instead of leaving the Turks to learn it from the total destruction of their fleet. This event, confessedly untoward in its effect on the question of peace and war, is not perhaps in other respects precisely in accordance with British interests. The sort of instinct, which leads a British naval commander to attack any foreign flag upon the least appearance of pretext or provocation, and which in some former cases, as in this, has occasioned the destruction of whole fleets belonging to powers with which Great Britain was at peace, is generally a safe and wholesome one, because it tends even in its excesses to promote and secure the naval ascendency of the kingdom. When, for example, a British admiral attacked, in time of peace, and completely destroyed the Spanish fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, which cardinal Alberoni had with so much ability created in the course of a few months, the mistake, though unpleasant perhaps to both parties, was far less injurious to the interests of Great Britain, than to those of his Catholic majesty. But in the present instance (to which the occurrence just alluded to furnishes the nearest parallel to be found in history), the operation of the principle was less favorable. The Turks, if not an ancient, are, at least since the great recent developement of the Russian power, an actual ally of England, the more important and useful, inasmuch as their naval strength, though considerable, at least before the late event, can never be dangerous. When therefore we see the British and French fleets joining in an annihilation of that of Turkey, the only permanent check to the increase of the maritime greatness of Russia in the quarter where it was most to be apprehended, we are bound to recognise with due humility the hand of Providence, overmastering the ordinary motives that govern

human actions, and making them subservient to the promotion of his own all-wise and inscrutable designs.

Such was the anxiety entertained in England for the preservation of peace, that the government, disposed to believe what they so ardently desired, did not entirely abandon all hope even after the battle of Navarino. It was doubtless one of the objects of the new ministerial arrangements, to facilitate as far as possible this result; and the feigned moderation of the Porte rendered it for a moment apparently not quite desperate. Even the appearance of the Turkish manifesto, though in substance and form an undisguised and even insulting declaration of war, does not seem to have entirely dissipated the illusion. If at least we can draw any conclusion from the tone of the newspapers, hopes are even yet indulged, that, by the effect of the change of ministry, the crisis may be avoided. The passage of the Russian armies over the Pruth, the great new Rubicon, not of Rome, but of Asia and Europe, though often announced, is not, while we are writing, ascertained to have taken place. It may yet be averted by efforts hidden from the public eye, and on which it is vain to speculate. But in the aspect of things, as it now presents itself to us, on this side of the water, war is inevitable.

It is not unlikely that war has actually commenced. When, how, where it will end,-whether it will prove a passing commotion, like those which have disturbed the south of Europe since the fall of Bonaparte, or whether it will turn out one of those tremendous hurricanes which from time to time convulse the European system for twenty or thirty years together, are questions which time and the hour' alone can solve. That the Turkish empire, wholly incapable of contending successfully with either of the great powers now leagued against it, must give way before the union of them all, is a matter of course; and the results of the struggle will therefore depend almost wholly upon the form which policy or accident may give to the relations between these powers. From the jealousy entertained by England and France of the progress of Russia, it will doubtlesss be their effort to limit the duration and theatre of the war, and to secure the original objects of the intervention with as little diminution as possible of the power of Turkey. On this supposition, the war will be speedily terminated, and the principal direct result will be the emancipation of Greece, a consummation highly agreeable in itself to the