A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry Into the Freedom of the Will.": Containing I. Statement of Edwards's System. II. The Legitimate Consequences of this System. III. An Examination of the Arguments Against a Self-determining Will |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute necessity absurd according action affirmed agent antece antecedents and sequents argument atheism called causation causative act cause and effect cause of volition cessity conceive connex connexion between volition consciousness consequences considered correlation deny direction divine volitions doctrine doctrine of necessity Dugald Stewart Edwards Edwards's system emotions endeavour eternal existence faculty fixed follows fore foreknowledge freedom future greatest apparent Hence human impossible infi infinite series infinite wisdom knowledge liberty likewise lition lute means metaphysical metaphysical necessity moral certainty moral inability moral necessity natural ability neces necessarily determined necessary connexion necessitarian necessitated nexion nisus obey opposed to necessity opposition pantheism particular determination passion perfect phenomena philosophy physical causes possible prescience present principle produce question reason and sensitivity reference relation relative respect sary sense sensi simply strongest motive supposed take place thing tion tive truth voli volition or choice walk wrong
Popular passages
Page 136 - He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle: and herb for the service of man; That he may bring forth food out of the earth...
Page 145 - This negation must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe, remains unshaken.
Page 148 - ... that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent, as for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments, and though...
Page 69 - That which has the power of volition or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of the will, and not the will which he is possessed of.
Page 52 - Moral Inability consists not in any of these things ; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary.
Page 19 - The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will, and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise.
Page 273 - To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things ; is to suppose God's Knowledge to be inconsistent with itself.
Page 63 - ... keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing when he can do it if he will.
Page 172 - There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them.
Page 117 - Whatever is comprised in the chain and mechanism of cause and effect, of course necessitated, and having its necessity in some other thing, antecedent or concurrent — this is said to be natural ; and the aggregate and system of all such things is NATURE.