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Statement of Facts.

the original notes, and upon express agreement, that if this note should not be paid at maturity, the corporation might surrender it to the maker, and thereupon the cause of action on those notes should revive: Held, That the new note was upon a sufficient legal consideration; and that the corporation, holding and suing upon all the notes, could recover upon this note only.

This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment for the defendant in an action brought on April 4, 1884, by a corporation formed for the purpose of erecting a market-house in the city of Washington and carrying on a marketing business there, upon twenty promissory notes made by him to the plaintiff, dated January 1, 1875, for $171.05 each, two payable in fiftytwo months, two in fifty-eight months, two in sixty-four months, and two at the end of each succeeding six months, the last two being payable in one hundred and six months after date, and all bearing interest at the yearly rate of eight per cent.; also upon a promissory note made by the defendant, dated August 5, 1881, for $1881.60, payable in ninety days. after date; and upon a promissory note, dated March 11, 1881, for $394.08, made by one William S. Cross, and guaranteed by the defendant, and payable in sixty days after date; each of the last two notes bearing interest at the yearly rate of six per cent.

The judgment was rendered upon a case stated by the parties, in substance as follows: The plaintiff is and since May 18, 1874, has been a corporation, duly incorporated under the general incorporation act in force in the District of Columbia, Rev. Stat. D. C. §§ 553-593, by which it became a corporation for twenty years, and capable of suing and being sued, and of taking, holding and conveying any reai and personal estate necessary to enable it to carry on its business. On January 1, 1875, being the owner in fee of a parcel of land in the city of Washington, and having built a market-house thereon, it offered for sale by public auction leases for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, of the stalls in the market-house, at a specified rent, the highest bidder being entitled to his option of the stalls. At the sale the defendant was the highest bidder for a stall, and made and delivered to the plaintiff, in part payment

Argument for Defendant in Error.

of the purchase money for the option of that stall, the twenty notes for $171.05 each, and afterwards received from the plaintiff such a lease of that stall, and took and has since retained possession of the stall under the lease. On August 5, 1881, the defendant, with full knowledge of the foregoing facts, including the fact that by the terms of incorporation the plaintiff's corporate existence was limited to twenty years, made and delivered to the plaintiff the note for $1881.60, in compromise of the twenty original notes, and upon express agreement that, if this note should not be promptly paid at maturity, the plaintiff might surrender it to the defendant, and thereupon the plaintiff's cause of action upon the original notes should revive. The note for $394.08 was made by Cross and guaranteed by the defendant under like circumstances, and in consideration of the surrender of two other notes similar in amount and consideration to the twenty notes before mentioned. All the notes in suit remain unpaid, otherwise than by the giving of the note for $1881.60, and all are still held by the plaintiff.

Mr. R. T. Merrick and Mr. J. J. Darlington for plaintiff in

error.

Mr. James G. Payne for defendant in error.—The corporate existence of the company being limited to twenty years, the company was without power to make a lease. for ninety-nine years with renewals. There was an entire failure of the consideration for which the original notes were given, the undertaking of the plaintiff being absolutely void. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71. This disposes of the claim on the original notes. As to the note alleged to have been given in compromise, it was given and accepted upon the express agreement that if not promptly paid at maturity the plaintiff might surrender it to the defendant, and its cause of action upon the original notes should thereupon immediately revive. The plaintiff sues upon the original cause of action. This disposes of that claim. If it be claimed that the new note was a renewal of the original debt, we answer that as a renewal it would be open to the same objection of want of

Opinion of the Court.

legal consideration. Merrifield v. Baker, 9 Allen, 29, 34; Pearce v. Railroad Co., 21 How. 441. The same considerations apply to the notes upon which the defendant is sued as guarantor.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. He recited the facts as above stated, and continued:

The plaintiff insists that the original notes were valid, because a corporation, empowered to hold and convey real estate for the objects of its incorporation, may convey an estate in fee or any less estate in lands which it has purchased, and may therefore make a valid lease of them for any term of years, though extending beyond the limit of its corporate existence. But it is unnecessary to express a definitive opinion upon that point, because it is agreed in the case stated that the defendant gave, in compromise of the original twenty notes for $171.05 each, the new note for $1881.60. If the plaintiff had exceeded its corporate powers in making the original contract, yet it had authority to compromise and settle all claims by or against it under that contract. Morville v. American Tract Society, 123 Mass. 129. The compromise of the disputed claim on the original notes was a legal and sufficient consideration for the new note. Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S. 559; Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Met. 551; Riggs v. Hawley, 116 Mass. 596. By the terms of the agreement of compromise, the plaintiff's cause of action on the original notes was not to revive, in case of the new note not being paid at maturity, except upon the surrender of this note to the defendant. The plaintiff, not having surrendered it, but holding and suing upon it as well as upon the original notes, has not performed the condition on which the revival of the right of action on the original notes depended.

It follows, that the plaintiff cannot recover in this action on the original notes for $171.05 each, but is entitled to recover on the new note for $1881.60, and also, for like reasons, on the note for $394.08, made by Cross and guaranteed by the defendant. Judgment reversed, and case remanded with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the twenty-first and twenty-second counts.

Opinion of the Court.

TUCKER & Another v. MASSER & Others.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.

Submitted January 9, 1885.-Decided January 26, 1885.

A patent for a placer mining claim, composed of distinct mining locations, some of which were made after 1870, and together embracing over one hundred and sixty acres, is valid. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, was carefully considered, and is again affirmed.

The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. L. C. Rockwell and Mr. Charles J. Rowell for plaintiffs in error.

No appearance and no brief for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment for the possession of three lots in what is known as Stevens' and Leiter's subdivision of the City of Leadville, in Lake County, Colorado. The complaint is in the usual form under the practice established in that State, where the action is brought to obtain possession of land alleged to be part of the public domain, but of which the plaintiff claims to have a better right of possession than his adversary. It alleges that on the 10th of .March, 1879, the plaintiff was and still "is the owner, by prior actual possession on the public domain, and by superiority of possessory title, and entitled to the immediate possession" of the described premises, and that they are of the value of $5,000; that on the 20th of that month the defendants wrongfully and unlawfully entered upon the premises, and wrongfully and unlawfully withheld them from the plaintiff to his damage of $1,000; that the rents and profits of the premises, from the date of the ouster, have been $200 a month, and aggregate $3,000. The plaintiff, therefore, asks judgment for the possession of the premises and for the damages, rents and profits. The answer of the defendants denies the general allegations of the com

Opinion of the Court.

plaint, and avers that they are the owners of the premises and entitled to their possession.

On the trial the plaintiff offered proof tending to show prior occupation of the premises, the erection of some buildings thereon, his forcible dispossession by the defendants, and the damages he had sustained.

The defendants introduced in evidence a patent of the United States to William H. Stevens and Levi Z. Leiter, bearing date November 5, 1878, which covered the premises in controversy, and traced title from the patentees through sundry mesne conveyances. The patent was for a placer mining claim, and the plaintiff was allowed, against the objections of the defendant, to introduce, for the purpose of impeaching the patent, the proceedings before the Land Department of the government upon which it was issued, And the court decided that as it appeared upon such proceedings that the patent was issued upon four mining locations made after 1870 united in one claim, embracing two hundred and ninety acres or thereabouts, the patent was invalid and passed no title to the patentees, holding, in effect, that several distinct mining locations could not after that year be thus united in one claim for which a single patent could be issued. The plaintiff accordingly recovered.

The validity of a patent for a placer mining claim, composed of distinct mining locations, some of which were made after 1870, and together embracing over one hundred and sixty acres, was sustained in the case before us at October Term, 1881, of Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636. All the questions presented in the case at bar were there fully considered after two arguments of counsel, and we have seen no reason to question the soundness of the conclusions we then reached.

Upon the authority of that case,

The judgment below is reversed, and the cause remanded for

a new trial.

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