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2. The act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 526, enlarged the grant made to

Minnesota by the act of March 3, 1857, from six sections per mile to ten sections; and the limits within which the indemnity lands were to be selected to twenty sections, and further provided, that "any lands which may have been granted to the Territory or State of Minnesota for the purpose of aiding in the construction of any railroad, which lands may be located within the limits of this extension of said grant or grants, shall be deducted from the full quantity of the lands hereby granted." Prior to the act of 1865, a grant had been made to a railroad of lands located within the limits covered by said extension grant: Held, (1) That the grant by the act of 1857 was a grant of land in place, and not of quantity; (2) that the enlargement of the grant by the act of 1865 did not change its nature as to the six sections originally granted; (3) that as to tħe remaining four sections the grant is one of quantity, but to be selected along and opposite the completed road; (4) that where the earlier grant to aid in the construction of the Minnesota and Cedar Valley Railroad interferes with the extension grant to the plaintiff in error, the earlier grant takes the

land, and the extension must be abandoned. Io. 3. The line of definite location of a railroad, which determines the rights

of railroad companies to land under land grant acts of Congress, is definitely fixed, within the meaning of those acts, by filing the map of its location with the Commissioner of the General Land Office at

Washington. Kansas Pacific Railroad Co. v. Dunmeyer, 629. 4. Under the acts granting lands to aid in the construction of a line of

railroad from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, the claim of a homestead, or pre-emption entry, made at any time before the filing of that map in the General Land Office, had attached, within the meaning of those statutes, and no land to which such right had at.

tached came within the grant. 16. 5. The subsequent failure of the person making such claim to comply with

the acts of Congress concerning residence, cultivation and building on the land, or bis actual abandonment of the claim, does not cause it to revert to the railroad company and become a part of the grant. The claim having attached at the time of filing the definite line of the road, it did not pass by the grant, but was, by its express terms, excluded, and the company had no interest, reversionary or otherwise,

in it. 10. 6. The act of July 3, 1866, 14 Stat. 79, which authorized the Seoretary of

the Interior to withdraw certain lands from sale, on filing a map of the general route of the road with him, did not reserve such lands from entry under the pre-emptory and homestead laws. Io.

LEASE.

See CORPORATION, 3;

PARTIES, 3.

LEVY OF EXECUTION.

See ACTION ON THE CASE.

LIEN.

See EQUITY PLEADING, 2;

WATER RATE.

LIMITATIONS, (STATUTES OF). 1. The Statute of Limitations for writs of error, $ 1008 Rev. Stat., begins

to run from the date of the entry and filing of the judgment in the court's proceedings, which constitutes the evidence of the judgment.

Polleys v. Black River Improvement Co., 81. 2. A State statute of limitations as to rcal actions begins to run in favor

of a claimant under a patent from the United States, on the issue of the patent and its transmission to the grantee. Bicknell v. Comstock,

149. 3. The lapse of time provided by a statute of limitations as to real actions

vests a perfect title in the holder. Ib. 4. The statute of Arkansas that “All demands not exhibited to the execu

tor or administrator, as required by this act, before the end of two years from the granting of letters, shall be forever barred”—begins, on the granting of letters of administration, to run against persons under age, out of the State with no guardian appointed within the State, and whose claims are alleged to be founded in frauds which were not discovered until after the expiration of the two years fixed

by the act. · Morgan v. Hamlet, 449. 5. Although the debt for unpaid purchase money in this case was barred

by limitation under the local law, the lien therefor on the land was not barred; for there was no such open adverse possession, for the period within which actions for the recovery of real estate must be brought as would cut off the right to enforce the equitable lien for purchase money. Hardin v. Boyd, 756.

LOCAL LAW.

A suit in equity is the proper remedy, in the courts of the United States,

to enforce the statutory liability of directors to a creditor of a corporation, (organized under the act of the legislature of South Carolina of December 10, 1869), by reason of the corporation debts being in excess of the capital stock. An action at law will not lie. Stone V. Chisolm, 302.

See LIMITATIONS (STATUTES OF), 2, 3, 4;

RIPARIAN Rights.

LONGEVITY PAY.

Officers on the Retired List of the Navy are not entitled to longevity pay.

Thornley v. United States, 310; Brown v. United States, 568.

LOUISIANA.

See CONFIBCATION, 1.

MAIL AGENT.

See COMMON CARRIER.

MANDAMUS.

See ACTION ON THE CASE.

MEMORANDUM.

See EVIDENCE, 8.

MICHIGAN.

See PROBATE COURT.

MILL ACTS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A. 2.

MINERAL LANDS.

1. A written notice of a claim to fifteen hundred feet on a mineral-bearing

lode or vein in Colorado, signed by the discoverer thereof, and posted on a stake at the point of discovery, when made in good faith, and not as a speculative location, is a valid location on seven hundred and fifty feet on the course of the lode or vein in each direction from that point, and gives the right of possession to the discoverer until the other steps necessary for completing the title can be taken according

to law. Erhardt v. Boaro, 527. 2. The forcible eviction of the discoverer and locator of a mineral-bearing

lode or vein from the lode or vein before the sinking of the shaft which the statutes of Colorado require as one of the acts to complete title, and the prevention of his re-entry by threats of violence, excuse him, as against the party keeping Kim out of possession, and so long as he is kept out of it, from complying with the requirements of the

act in respect of a shaft. 18. 3. Discovery and appropriation are recognized as sources of title to min

ing claims ; and development by working as the condition of contin

ued ownership, until a patent is obtained. Ib. 4. Whenever preliminary work is required to define and prescribe a located

mineral claim, the law protects the first discoverer in the possession

of the claim, until sufficient excavations and developments can be

made, so as to disclose whether a vein or deposit of such richness , exists as to justify work to extract the metal. Ib. 5. A mere posting of a notice that the poster has located thereon a mining

claim, without discovery or knowledge on his part of the existence of metal there, or in its immediate vicinity, is a speculative proceeding, which initiates no right. 16.

See PUBLIC LAND, 8.

MISSOURI.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B. 1;

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

MORTGAGE.

1. A decree confiscating real estate under the confiscation act of July 17,

1862, 12 Stat. 589, has no effect upon the interest of a mortgagee in

the confiscated property. Adegno v. Schmidt, 293. 2. In & suit in equity for redeeming unoccupied and uninclosed city lots

from & mortgage, the mortagee in constructive possession is chargeable only with the amounts actually received by him for use and

occupation. Peugh v. Davis, 542. 3. It would be unreasonable to charge him with interest on the loans

secured by the mortgage. 16. 4. Respondent defended against complainant's claim to redeem, by setting

up that the alleged mortgage was an absolute conveyance. This being decided adversely, Held, That, in accounting as mortagee in constructive possession, he was not liable for a temporary speculative rise in the value of the tract, which subsequently declined-both during the time of such possession. 1b.

See ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR;

CONFISCATION, 1;

TRUST, 3 ;
WATER RATE.

MOTION TO AFFIR).

Unless there is some color of a right to a dismissal, the court will not

entertain a motion made to affirm. . Davies v. .Corbin, 687.

MUNICIPAL BOND.

1. A municipal bond, issued under the authority of law, for the payment,

at all events, to a named person or order, a fixed sum of money, at a designated time therein limited, being indorsed in blank, is a negotiable security within the law merchant. Ackley School District v. Hall, 135.

2. Its negotiability is not affected by a provision of the statute under

which it was issued, that it should be “payable at the pleasure of the

district'at any time before due." 16. 3. Bonds issued by Anderson County, in Kansas, under legislative

authority, and in payment of its subscription to the stock of a railroad company, after the majority of the voters of the county had, at an election, voted in favor of subscribing for the stock and issuing the bonds, recited, on their face, the wrong statute, but also stated that they were issued “in pursuance to the vote of the electors of Anderson County, September 13, 1869.” The.statute in force required that at least 30 days' notice of the election should be given, and made it the duty of the Board of County Commissioners to subscribe for the stock and issue the bonds, after such assent of the majority of the voters had been given. In a suit against the board on coupons due on the bonds, brought by a bona fide holder of them, it appeared, by record evidence, that the board made an order for the election 33 days before it was to be held, and had canvassed the returns and certified that there was a majority of voters in favor of the proposition, and had made such vote the basis of their action in subscribing for the stock and issuing the bonds to the company; and the court directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff; Held: (1.) The statement in the bonds, as to the vote, was equivalent to a statement that the vote was one lawful and regular in form, and such as the law then in force required, as to prior notice; (2.) As respected the plaintiff, evidence by the defendant to show less than 30 days' notice of the election could not avail; (3.) The case was within the decision in Toron of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. 8. 484. (4.) The rights of the plaintiff were not affected by any dealing by the board with the stock subscribed for; (5.) The issue or use of the bonds not having been enjoined, for two years and a half, between the day of election and the time the company parted with the bonds for value, and the county having, for 10 years, paid the interest annually on the bonds, it was estopped, as against the plaintiff, from defending on the ground of a want of proper notice of the election. (6.) As the bill of exceptions contained all the evidence, and the defendant did not ask to go to the jury on any question of fact, and the questions were wholly questions of law, and a verdict for the defendant would have been set aside, it was proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff Anderson County v. Beal, 227.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. A provision in a city charter, which confers power on the city council

to levy and collect taxes annually on real and personal property, to pay uebts and meet the general expenses of the city, not exceeding fifty. cents on each hundred dollars, relates only to debts and expenses for ordinary municipal purposes; and not to those debts and expenses

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