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We are not, however, sorry that these provisions did not pass into a law, because we think most injurious inquiries would have been stimulated, and set on foot, in respect to the validity of contracts which might otherwise have passed sub silentio, and left the parties in the full and undisturbed possession of all the comforts of a legitimacy which was their natural right. It would have tempted efforts of nullity that might otherwise never have been, and will not now be, thought of. It is due to the honourable framer of the bill to state, that iu the measure which he introduced to the consideration of the House in 1817 there was no such permission, and in his speech he mentioned that it was with extreme reluctance he opened the door to the institution of suits of this description, and allowed any interval between the contract and its validity. The evil of the old Act was at no period curable; no sub sequent act of recognition, no cohabitation after majority, no tract of time (to speak technically), could remedy the defect.

*

Another suggestion was, that on account of the injurious consequences of the publication of banns, for the clandestine marriages of minors, in parishes entirely unconnected with the actual residence of the parties-by which the real object of the Act, notoriety, was com pletely defeated-all such publications and marriages should be liable to avoidance, by the institution of a suit on the part of the parent or guardian during the minority, in the same way as by licence. Judeed, one prominent object of the new bill is the assimilating as nearly as possible the cases of banns and licence. The inequality of the

• Tract temporis non convalescunt,

This was subversive of the fundamental

law of prescription, the best basis of possession. It exceeded, too, the law of

inheritance: a period of 60 years arrests all molestation in property, but this provision had no limit.

CHRIST. OBSERV. No. 249.

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"In directing our attention to this part of the subject, we must be instant, ency of the law. The same act which ly struck by the anomaly and inconsist fulminates such terrible denunciations against those who contravene its provi sions, and inflicts such inexpiable pe nalties on their unborn issue, with respect to marriages by licence, literally affords no protection whatsoever to a minor who may be unwarily entrapped marriages under a publication of banns. into the worst possible description of In the one instance, the marriage can never be legalised; in the other, it never can be called in question. With the view of preventing clandestine mar riages, the statute enjoins that banns shall be published in the church of the parish within which the parties reside; but, by a subsequent clause, it forbids parties after a marriage has taken place. any inquiry as to the residence of the The consequence has been, that the enactment on this head has become, as it were, felo de se, and banns have of late years furnished the most effectual cover for evasion, deceit, and fraud that the ingenuity of man could have devised." Speech, p. 67.

We may remark here, by the way, that no very effectual preventive has been introduced against this evil. Marriages, by the new Act, are declared valid, although the ed. Where, then, is the use of true names have not been employpublication? Is not its very essence. destroyed? Is the publication of banns for the marriage of the minor Titia, likely to be forbidden by the unconsenting parents or guardians of Sempronia? This is a cruelty to a parent or guardian, over which. he has no controul. We apprehend, too, that neither a false descripwould vitiate the marriage, any tion, nor an incorrect residence, more than false names of parties. lous parishes, to prevent clandestine How is it possible then, in popu marriages?

And we may ask, whether "bauns will not still" (to use the language of the learned Doctor, who laments the evil" in late years,"). " furnish the most ef

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fectual cover for evasion, deceit," un extrait de l'acte de publication and fraud, that the ingenuity of sera et restera affiché à la porte man could devise?"" la maison commune pendant les buit jours d'intervalle de l'une à l'autre publication." This mode of publication might, however, naturally occur to the framers of the Act, without reference to the French code, from our own too common practice of affixing various lists and notices to the church doors.

Instead of the affidavit as to residence, &c. now required to be delivered to the minister, a notice in writing was to be deemed sufficient: the fixtures on the church door, &c. were required, and are retained. The parents or guardians, who were to have power given them to institute suits of nullity, were empowered to proceed in the absence of the offending party, if he had absconded, upon the service of the usual process. The concluding provisions, as to the limited durability of the licence and bauns, and the application of the Bill to England only, were the same as in the present Act: the exception as to Jews and Quakers did not appear.

We have noticed the similarity of a provision in the matrimonial law of France, in reference to the republications; but there are various other coincidences, which almost induce us to think that the framers of the new Act had recourse to that law, and have imported from it several of the new provisions, In respect to the period which is allowed for the impuguing of a marriage, the law of France says, "Le mariage contracté par des epoux qui n'avoient point encore låge requis, ou dont l'un des deux n'avoit point atteint cet age, ne peut plus être attaqué, lorsqu'il s'est écoulé six mois" (the very period suggested as above)" depuis que cet epoux, ou que les epoux ont atteint l'âge competent."

And again: "Lorsqu'il y a un erreur dans la personne le mariage ne peut être attaqué, que par celui des deux epoux qui a été induit en erreur." Other provisions, again, mit the power of impeaching the validity to the persons whose consent was not obtained. (See cap. iv. §. 180, 2, 5, &c.)- Another similarity is the provision with respect to the names being affixed on the church doors, &c. The French code provides that

In remarking now on the various · sections of the modern law, we shall not observe any particular order, but point them out as they severally occur to us.

of

We know not if it was the intention of the legislature to make the alteration, but the new Act certainly deprives all the inferior eccle. siastical authorities, such as deans and chapters, and archdeacons, &c. of privileges immemorially enjoyed by them, and destroys their juris dictions in reference to the grant licences, by confining that power to the archbishops and bishops, and vesting it in their authority exclu sively. The propriety of this restriction we do not dispute: indeed, it might have been as well to have crippled these minor provincials entirely, and taken from them the power of granting probates of wills and letters of administration, from the abuse of which power great evils often arise. But the restric tion will certainly occasion no little inconvenience in a variety of cases, We have heard, indeed, that it is in the contemplation of some members of the legislature to attempt an entire abolition of marriage li cences: if so, this is but a preli minary step to it: but it is a measure which we sincerely hope will not be resorted to, not only on account of its opposition to the temper of English people, but. on account of the excessive difficulties that will be thrown thereby in the way of mar riage-difficulties which, in some cases, we venture to predict, will be found nearly insurmountable. The impediments at present are sufficiently great. But with regard to

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We regret to find the Act replete with marks of inattention and neglect. One gross blunder, directing the names and houses of the parties to be fixed on the church door, or some conspicuous part of the church, was pointed out in the progress of the bill by the SolicitorGeneral, but was not corrected. We might only in addition ask, who is the person required to make these fixtures, and who would be punishable for the neglect? The Act mentions no person. If the provision had been adopted in order to supersede the present inconvenient custom of publishing the banns in the midst of Divine service, the motive would have been commendable: but the affixing is in addition to the publication.

The eighth section appears to lose sight of the primary intention of the Bill, in reference to the production of the certificates of baptism on the grant of licences for the marriage of minors. In the case of persons above twenty-one years of age, even of widowers and widows, a baptismal certificate is necessary (however old the parties may be): so that a venerable couple, desirous, not of sharing together the joys of youth, but of mutually smoothing the cares of age, can be admitted to the altar only by the production of entries from their baptismal registers, be their native villages as obscure and distant as they may, and the registers themselves perhaps carelessly kept; while, at the same time, the martiage of a widowed minor is clogged

by no such impediment, for no certificate is required.

In reference to the production of baptismal registers, it was appre hended that considerable inconvenience would be entailed upon a class of the community whose religious tenets induce them to postpone their performance of the rite of baptism till a later period in life; and some indeed never perform it at all. It was asked, how the requirements of the Act are to be complied with in these cases? and although the question is evidently open to the reply, that the Act cannot mean to require impossibi lities, and the eighth section exempts the cases of persons whose baptismal entries cannot be found; yet, although that might apply to the case of the religious community in question, it is not clear what would be held sufficient proof that such registers could not be found, or what extent of search must be made for them. Again: the threats contained in the Act against perjury are pretty strong; and yet some part of its enactments cannot be complied with, unless the par ties do contract the guilt of it: for the eighth section, as above re marked, enacts, that "if a licence is required for the marriage of persons, both, or either, of whom shall be above twenty-one, they shall respectively make oath that they are, and each believes the other to be, of the full age of twenty-one years." In practice, where one party is above, and the other under age, the oath will no doubt be modified accordingly, under the reasonable presumption that this is what the clause meant, but it certainly is not what the clause itself says.

Again in the case of banns, the required affidavit as to residence, age, &c. is to be made before the minister or a justice of peace. No power, however, is given to the clergyman to administer an oath, which he did not before possess, unless he united in himself the two,

not always homogeneous, characters of clergyman and justice. We know, indeed, that wherever an Act directs, it also empowers; but the Act here does not direct the clergyman, but the parties. At all events, how much preferable would it be to avoid the ambiguity, by the introduction of a short parenthesis, which would have cured the defect. The clergy certainly are not compellable by the Act to administer the oath, though in most cases, we presume, they will do it. It may be extremely painful to a young woman, or even to a man of delicacy, to encounter the remarks and pub licity of a magistrate's office on such an occasion.

Onerous duties are imposed by the Act on the parochial ministers, particularly those empowered by the Bishop to act as surrogates; and all their care and vigilance must be exercised, lest they expose themselves to the penalconsequences denounced against informalities. The new affidavits, the entries, the individuality of parties, and the republication, demand the closest at tention. We conclude, however, that the parties concerned will be allow ed to indemnify themselves for their trouble, by corresponding fees.

The Act is grossly deficient in not furnishing an outline of the necessary affidavits in all contemplated cases. Forms have been drawn up for the purpose by individuals. We give one of these forms in a note*.

"On the

day of

appeared personally A. B., of the parish [or chapelry, or extra-purochial place of adjoining the parish or chapelry] of in the county of Gentleman (or as the case may be) Bachelor [or Widower], and C. D., of the purish [or as above] of in the county of · -, Spinster [or Widow], intending to intermarry. And the said A. B. made oath, that his true Christian name is A., and that his true surname is B., and that he knoweth of no lawful impediment by reason of any former marriage, consanguinity, affinity, or any other lawful means whatsoever, to hinder the said

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But by far the most inconvenient of the oversights in the Act, is one which is found in what constitutes its most prominent feature, the marriage of minors without consent. That part of the old Act which is the subject of animadversion in the new, while it made consent necessary, defined what consent it was that was required. We have already remarked, that it was, first, of the father-then of the guardiani appointed in his will-then the mother, if a widow-and then the Chancery guardian. It is not neces sary to comment on the wisdom or equity of this gradation. By the new Act we have seen that this provision was repealed: repealed instanter: both the necessity and the definition of consent, as men. tioned in the old Act, were swept away together, (though the substitute did not take effect till two

intended marriage, and prayed a pub lication of banns in the church [or chapel] of

in order to the solemnization thereof in the said church [or chapel]. And the said C. D. made oath, that her true Christian name is C., and her true surname is D.: and both the parties made oath that house [or No.

in

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street, or

cottage at ] within the said parish [or chapelry] or extra-parochial place of –, adjoining to the parish [or chapelry] of

has been the abode of the said A. B. or C. D. for

thereof [or as lodger therein]; and that days [or weeks] as occupier the said A. B. and C. D. have attained the age of twenty-one years, [or if the parties are under that age," that the said A. B. and C. D. are under the age o twenty-one years," or if one of them only is under that age, "that A. B. (or C. D., as the case may be) is under the age of twenty-one years."]

(Signed)

A. B. C. D. "Sworn before the Rev. E. F.,

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months afterwards). In this interval, it was asked, how were the marriages of minors by licence to be celebrated? By what consent? Necessarily, by the law as it stood prior to 1753. And what was the state of the law prior to 1753? The canons. of 1603 were then the regulators of marriage, for there was no statute requiring consent: and by the 100th of these canons, to the marriage of a minor the consent of "parents or guardians" was made necessary of parents or guardians, that is, of both "parents, &c." and so it was ruled. Applications for licence by minors, with the consent of the father only, were refused: for the explanation of the loose language of the canon was no longer in force. And now this interval is past, how does the case stand? Precisely the same, for the dilemma was not seen: the 9th section proceeds evidently upon the presumption that only the invalidating clause, and not that of the consent, was repealed: it speaks of the affidavit of the person, or per sons, whose consent is required by law, &c. By what law? The canon law, and that only, must be the answer. This is a return indeed to the obscurity of ancient days, and a restoration of its inconveniences. It does not require much ingenuity to conceive of cases where the father may be desirous of the marriage of his child, and the union be of a highly advantageous character, but the other parent, from some insufficient cause or other, may withhold her consent; and yet no marriage can now take place without it. The consent of the mother too, where the father is dead, is even to be preferred to that of a testamentary guardian appointed by the father's will; and that even although she may have married again: and thus the beneficial interpretation of the requisite consent

The code of France has provided against this expressly. "En cas de dissentement le consentement du pere suffit."-Tit. v. cap. i. § 148.

given by the late statute, which prevented the undue influence arising from such a preference, is totally lost. It surely was not in the contemplation of the legislature to return to so indefinite, confused, and often inequitable a requirement as this. But what would have been the case, if by any chance (which was as likely as not to have' happened) the statute of Geo. II. had expressly repealed the canon requiring consent, and substituted its own enactment in the place of it? Why, the effect would have been, that in consequence of the first section of the new Act repealing the provision of Geo. II., the rights of parents and guardians would have been all abandoned, or at least have suffered an interregnum till the next session, and the marriages of minors have taken place with the most pernicious and unrestrained liberty, without any consent at all, and without any fear of nullity whatsoever.

Against the retrospective clause in the Act strong objections were entertained. It was argued, that the effect of the two Acts would present an anomaly in legislation. The first declared certain contracts, not voidable, but ipso facto void. In some of these contracts a sentence had been past, which sentence did not make them nullities, but only declared that they were so. In others, no such sentences had past; the contracts being, however, not a whit the better on that account. Now the new Act steps in and repeals the old, and by the retrospective clause says, Some of these nullities shall be valid contracts, others shall be nullities still. This, it was said, was blowing hot and cold with the same breath. This reasoning we do not defend. In the first place, it is perfectly competent to a legislature to alter its provisions, and to establish at one time what it unsettled before. Suppose, for instance, it could be proved, to the satisfaction of government, that it had no right to punish forgery

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