1853. EVATT V. HUNT. dale J. says that the preamble of stat. 17 G. 3. c. 26. "may be considered as virtually incorporated" in stat. 53 G. 3. c. 141. Lord CAMPBELL C. J. I am of opinion that this is not a case within stat. 53 G. 3. c. 141. The point is decided by Blake v. Attersoll (a) and other cases, some of which have been cited. I approve of these decisions: and, if the question were res integra, I should take the same view. Although the preamble of stat. 17 G. 3. c. 26. is not copied into stat. 53 G. 3. c. 141., we must suppose that the Legislature had the same object in view in the two statutes: namely, to protect needy persons from the arts and extortion of money lenders. Now this transaction does not fall within the meaning of the Legislature, so understood. The plaintiff was entitled to the interest of the money during her life, and Mary Ann Hunt was entitled to the principal sum after the plaintiff's death; but the plaintiff, if she survived Mary Ann, was entitled to the principal. The money was not the money of the plaintiff; she had only a contingent interest in it: nor was even money's worth given the plaintiff merely had the money to lay out so as to produce an income during her life; and this she does by allowing it to remain in the hands of the defendant, Mary Ann Hunt's husband. This has no resemblance to the purchase of an annuity requiring a memorial. As to Hood v. Burlton (b), it is completely explained by the remark of my brother Erle: that was the case of a purchase of an annuity for a sum of money. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to our judgment. (a) 2 B. & C. 875. (b) 2 Ves. Jun. 29. COLERIDGE J. I am of the same opinion. The transaction, as stated in the plea, is that the plaintiff, being entitled to the income of 3007. for life, and also to the principal 3007. in the event of her surviving Mary Ann, consents to the placing the principal in the hands of the defendant, taking a bond to secure the payment of the income during her life. This is a transaction exactly within the principle of Blake v. Attersoll (a), where 10,000l. was to be paid under a marriage settlement, but the party who was to pay died without making the payment: and the party beneficially interested agreed to take from the executors an annual payment of 1257. in lieu of 5000l. of the 10,000l.: and it was held that the annuity did not require enrolment. That case was, in my opinion, rightly decided, and governs the present. ERLE J. The principle to be extracted from Blake v. Attersoll (a) governs this case. This is not an annuity granted for a "pecuniary consideration," the words used in stat. 53 G. 3. c. 141. s. 2. In the column, in that section, headed "consideration and how paid," the examples given are both of money paid. In Blake v. Attersoll (a) the Court construed the transaction not to be one of borrowing money. The words in the 10th section, "pecuniary consideration or money's worth," do not appear to me to shew that the statute will apply to such a case as the present. That section excludes from the operation of the Act annuities granted without "pecuniary consideration or money's worth:" but it does not follow from this that the Act includes all that is granted for money's worth. (a) 2 B. & C. 875. 1853. EVATT V. HUNT. 1853. EVATT V. HUNT. CROMPTON J. This was merely a family arrangement. The plaintiff could protect herself by keeping the money in her own hands: she waives her right to do so; and really that is all. We cannot call this an annuity, within the Act, unless we overrule Blake v. Attersoll (a). The annuity must be granted for money or money's worth, such as goods. But, in such an arrangement as this, neither money is given nor money's worth. Judgment for plaintiff. (a) 2 B. & C. 875. MARTIN MOORE against JOHN SHEPHERD, The THIS HIS was an action brought against defendant as deputy master of the Trinity House, Deptford Strond, for the recovery of 4l. 1s. And by consent of the parties, and by the order of Platt B., according to The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court without any pleadings, substantially as follows. The defendant is sued as a nominal defendant, according to the provisions of stat. 32 G. 3. c. 74. s. 52. (a), on behalf of the Trustees of the harbour of Ramsgate, mentioned in that Act and in the several subsequent Acts of Parliament relating to the said harbour, viz. (a) "For the maintenance and improvement of the harbour of Ramsgate, in the county of Kent; and for cleansing, amending, and preserving the haven of Sundwich in the same county." Not printed at length in the Statutes at Large. 37 G. 3. c. 86., 55 G. 3. c. lxxxiv. (a), all of which are to be referred to as part of this case. Stat. 32 G. 3. c. 74. recites the passing of Acts of Parliament in 22 G. 2. (b) and 5 G. 3. (c); and that the trustees named in the first of these Acts were thereby empowered to settle and impose certain rates and duties to be paid by the master or owner of every British or foreign ship, vessel, or crayer, of the respective burthens therein mentioned (except fishermen and coasters), for every loading, or discharging, or ship in ballast, from, to or by Ramsgate, and on every chaldron of coals or ton of grindstones, Purbeck, Portland or other stones, for the purposes mentioned in such recital; and further recites that, the revenue of the said trustees having of late exceeded the expenditure very considerably, and that the interest of a balance of 41,2257. 3s. cash unfunded at Midsummer then last invested in the public funds would, without the income arising from the money already vested therein, be much more than sufficient to provide for the growing payments of certain annuities (the whole whereof, amounting only to the sum of 9437. 15s., from the advanced age of the annuitants might be expected to end in a few years); and further recites that, the Act of 22 G. 2. having been found defective, it was expedient that the same and the Act of 5 G. 3. should be wholly repealed, and a new Act passed for the purposes mentioned in such recital. The said recited Act of 22 G. 2. and the recited Act 5 G. 3. c. 82. are to be taken as parts of this case. By the first section of stat. 32 G. 3. c. 74. the recited Acts are repealed; and, by the 2d section, certain (a) Local and personal, public. (b) C. 40. (c) C. 82. 1853. MOORE V. SHEPHERD. 1853. MOORE V. SHEPHERD. persons were appointed trustees for carrying the Act into execution. Sect. 8 of stat. 32 G. 3. c. 74. is as follows: "And be it further enacted, that the said Trustees or any such fifteen or more of them as aforesaid, at a public meeting (previous notice whereof shall be given" &c.) "are hereby authorized to settle and impose the several rates and duties hereinafter mentioned, which rates and duties shall commence and become payable from and after the 25th day of June 1792 inclusive;" "that is to say, any rate or duty not exceeding 3d. per ton to be paid by the master or owners for every ship, vessel, or crayer, of the burden of twenty tons or upwards, and not exceeding the burden of three hundred tons, whether the same be laden or in ballast, passing from, to, or by Ramsgate, whether on the East or West side of the Goodwin Sands, or otherwise passing by or coming into the harbour there (other than and except ships laden with coals, grindstones, or Purbeck, Portland, or other stones), not having a receipt testifying his payment before on that voyage; and for every ship, vessel, or crayer which shall exceed the burden of three hundred tons any rate or duty not exceeding 1d. for each ton of such ship (except ships laden with coals, grindstones, Purbeck, Portland, or other stones) and for every chaldron of coals or ton of grindstones, Purbeck, Portland, or other stones, a rate not exceeding three halfpence; and the said duties shall be paid every time such ship, vessel, or crayer shall sail from, arrive, or come into harbour at or pass by Ramsgate as aforesaid (except as hereafter is mentioned); and such rates or duties, when settled by the said Trustees, shall be forthwith published in the London Gazette, for the information of all parties concerned, the same to be |