The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the AuthorA series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages. |
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Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |
Game Theory and Experimental Research | 162 |
Randomization of Promises and Threats | 175 |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly chance choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value fact game theory guess identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff matrix payoffs penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players reach recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game