The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author

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Harvard University Press, 1980 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 309 pages
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.

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Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy
3
An Essay on Bargaining
21
Bargaining Communication and Limited War
53
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
83
Enforcement Communication and Strategic
119
Game Theory and Experimental Research
162
Randomization of Promises and Threats
175
The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
187
The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
207
A Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
257
B For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game
267
Reinterpretation of a Solution Concept
291
INDEX
305
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About the author (1980)

Thomas C. Schelling was Distinguished University Professor in the Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, at Harvard University. He was co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.

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