but have long ceased to be a party different in principle from themselves. This great party is itself convulsed by feuds and subdivisions, and cabals in behalf of different favorites-But all these become subservient to the paramount antipathy entertained against their ancient rivals. The only object in which they are unanimous, is so to concert operations as to keep power in the hands of the Republican family, when in truth there is no difference between a member of the Republican family and the persons they persecute, but what consists in this very spirit of intolerance and exclusion. On this principle they act openly and universally-They have never departed from it a momentAnd no man from the President of the United States down to the Tub Orators, affects to disguise it. It is of no consequence in this connexion that the leading men are not agreed upon who shall be in office. They are perfectly of a mind as to who shall be disqualified. No matter, in this view, which candidate comes to be President; it being understood that each under the pains and forfeitures of treachery to his party is to maintain them in their monopoly of honor and office. Here then I venture to affirm is a personal division of parties, more formidable than the world has ever seen, whether we regard numbers, or the means possessed by one of strengthening itself and oppressing others. When this state of affairs is considered, and one reflects that the tyranny too often exercised in republics by one popular faction over another, has been displayed in every variety of violence and oppression that are imputable to other species of despotism; it is imposible to look down the vale of futurity and to ruminate "On rising kingdoms and on falling States," without sad misgivings. It is a new political problem to be resolved; what will be the fate of a republic, where a vast number of citizens, in all respects qualified to take part in public affairs, find themselves and their families degraded to a caste, which by the silent but irresistible effect of an intelligence among equals of no better pretensions; and for no reason but a difference in name, (which may be applied with arbitrary injustice to the third and fourth generation) is permanently shut out from the public confidence. They must indeed be more or less than men, to remain without feelings of bitter resentment, and dispositions to seize every occasion of escape

from this ignominious durance. They cannot but regard themselves victims of a more galling dispensation than the Catholics in England or the Greeks in Turkey, in proportion as there will be less of pretence for any discrimination. First or last, they will be driven to organize themselves in their turn. And new indications of concerted movements intended on their part will furnish pretexts for a more vigorous exclusion and a more intolerable "dominatio plebis." But I have no inclination to trace consequences further. Let those who incline to do so, resort to history. If this system be pursued; and through the redeeming qualities of intelligence in the citizens-their public virtue, and any peculiar principle in our forms of Government, these consequences stop short of those which, from causes similar in character, but never so fearfully combined, have befallen other States, those who live after us will have abundant cause to claim the distinction of a chosen people.

H. G. OTIS.

NOTE TO LAST LETTER.

HAVING declared my opinion that Loans to Government during the war were not a subject deserving of praise, nor the refusal to loan, of censure; the following correspondence arrogates no credit for opinions held by me during the war, in relation to that subject. It leaves, however, all at liberty to judge how far those opinions are consistent with dispositions to go all lengths, which have been so kindly imputed to the members of the Hartford Convention. Nothing was concluded, at the meeting referred to in these letters. All were left free to act for themselves. I am bound in candor, however, to admit that until after the expectation of stopping the war had ceased by the rejection of terms of accommodation, I cherished the hope, and very probably expressed it in conversation, that the capitalists here would not take the loans. I add, as my opinion merely, that had it been premised in this quarter, that Government would instruct Ministers to treat for peace, on the terms afterwards agreed to, they could have commanded much of the disposable capital in this part of the country.

BOSTON, JULY 2, 1819.

DEAR SIR....You must doubtless remember that during the last war, a gentleman of high character, came hither from Philadelphia, bearing proposals from some opulent persons in that city to men of the same description in this, to be concerned in taking one of the loans proposed by the United States. That on this suggestion a meeting was had of some of our principal and most opulent citizens, at which the expediency of subscribing to this loan was submitted to their consideration. On that occasion I was of the number of those who recommended the measure, and professed my readiness to be concerned in it with my friends. I assumed that the reasons which might have induced the opposers of the war to withhold their aid in the first loan through a hope of stopping the progress of hostilities, had ceased:-That we were committed with the Government to the chances of a confirmed state of open war:-That the money would be had, however enormous the terms, and that if the debt should be redeemed, those who did not participate in the profit must still be charged with the burden of the excessive premium, and that if it should not be paid, the failure must be in consequence of a prostration of public credit that would be detrimental to

property of every description, and which of course the rich should endeavor to prevent. That an ultimate failure of the public credit was not likely to happen in a country whose resources were increasing like ours, and that the lenders of money might acquire some consideration with the Government of which a use favorable to a pacific policy might be made. I was however overruled by the opinion of a majority, and nothing was done. It would be gratifying to me to receive at your leisure ten lines expressive of your recollection of these facts, or any of them, and of any other circumstances explanatory of the part I then took in that discussion. I have no view to any specific use to be made of your answer in humiliating vindications of the course I pursued, or in idle pretensions to foresight and correctness of opinion. But it is possible I may avail myself of it to satisfy the curiosity of some who may take an interest in the humble but anxious part which I bore in the affairs of the times.

Respectfully, yours,

HON. G. CABOT.

H. G. OTIS.

BOSTON, JULY 3, 1819.

MY DEAR SIR....By your note of yesterday, I am desired to state my recollections of what passed, and especially of what part you took in a conversation at an early period of the war, held in this town, on the expediency of lending money to the Government of the United States. I remember that at the request of a gentleman from Philadelphia, a meeting of some of our wealthiest citizens was called at the time, to which you refer, and that the question proposed for their consideration was, whether the federalists here ought to become subscribers to a loan solicited by the Government of the United States. I well recollect that you was decidedly in favor of a subscription, and expressed your readiness to take a portion with your friends. In support of this proposition you observed, that all hopes of preventing or stopping hostilities had been long extinguished; that we were now at open war, and must all share in its consequences to our country; that the temporary failure of public credit would be a great calamity, and would load us with a heavy debt, which would be contracted at a ruinous discount, but must probably be discharged by a full payment of the nominal amount. You agreed that the resources of the nation being ample for its defence, must be considered as pledged for the attainment of that object at all times, and that if we did not choose to partake of the advantageous premiums on the loans, we must, at any rate, bear our part of the burden.

These are my general impressions of the subject of your inquiry-doubtless, there are many unimportant particulars, which, at this distance of time, I am unable to retrace; but as they cannot be of a different character, I shall be happy if these give you satisfaction,-being very truly, and with great respect, your assured friend and servant,

GEO. CABOT.

[Several of the subscribers to this series of Letters upon the Hartford Convention, have expressed their desire to the publisher to see Mr. Otis' Letter upon the Massachusetts Claim, printed in the same volume;-this was not contemplated in the prospectus, but he most readily and cheerfully accedes to the suggestion of his patrons.]

MASSACHUSETTS CLAIM.

SIR,

BEING well informed that very significant inquiries are occasionally made concerning the delay to bring before Congress the Massachusetts Claim, these last five years, I consider it due to my colleagues of the Senate and House during that period, as well as to myself, to offer you for publication a brief statement of facts. Upon taking my seat in the Senate in the winter of 1817-18, (after ascertaining that the Secretary of War felt himself bound by the former decision of his predecessor,) I lost no time in consulting with Mr. Ashmun, my brother Senator, and others friendly to the Claim, especially Mr. King, upon the most advisable mode of introducing the subject before Congress. They were all agreed upon the inexpediency of taking the first step in the Senate. It was not usual to originate applications of this nature in that body. The right of propounding revenue bills in the House, by a sort of tacit consent, had been extended to other bills requiring considerable new appropriations. The Claim would encounter much of popular prejudice, which could be allayed only by a thorough examination of its merits in the House. Success in the Senate might not be auspicious to its fate in the House, while the loss of the bill in the former branch could not fail to augment the obstacles in the latter. These opinions were supported by several distinguished gentlemen of the majority, who, admitting that their first impressions were adverse to the Claim, had the magnanimity to wish that it might be presented under the most propitious aspect, and receive the most dispassionate examination. It was thereupon determined at a meeting of the whole