crown, though unknown to the several boroughs, have been able to fupplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortune, who live in their neighbourhood.-I do not fay this upon idle fpeculation only-I live in a country where it is too well known, and I appeal to many gentlemen in the house, to more out of it (and who are fo for this very reafon) for the truth of my affertion. Sir, it is a fore which has been long eating into the most vital part of our conftitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom.-For if a minifter fhould ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs, if he fhould keep a register of them in his closet, and, by fending down his treafury-mandates, fhould procure a fpurious reprefentative of the people, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and justify the most contradictory measures of his administration, and even to vote every crude indigefted dream of their patron into a law; if the maintenance of his power should become the fole object of their attention, and they should be guilty of the most violent breach of Parliamentary truft, by giving the King a difcretionary liberty of taxing the people without limitation or control; the laft fatal compliment they can pay to the crown-if this fhould ever be the unhappy condition of this nation, the people indeed may complain; but the doors of that place where their complaints fhould be heard, will for ever be fhut against them! OUR disease, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I think that this motion is wifely intended to remove the first and principal disorder.-Give the people their ancient right of frequent new elections; that will reftore the decayed authority of parliaments, and will put our conftitution into a natural condition of working out her own cure. SIR, upon the whole, I am of opinion, that I cannot exprefs a greater zeal for his Majefty, for the liberties of the people, or the honour and dignity of this house, than by feconding the motion which the honourable gentleman has made you. CHAP. X. SIR ROBERT WALPOLE'S REPLY. THOUGH the queftion has been already fo fully op pofed, that there is no great occafion to say any thing farther against it, yet, I hope, the House will indulge me the liberty of giving some of those reasons, which induce me to be against the motion. In general I must take notice, that the nature of our conftitution seems to be very much miftaken by the gentlemen who have spoken in favour of this motion. It is certain, that ours is a mixed government, and the perfection of our conftitution confifts in this, that the monarchial, aristocratical, and democratical forms of government, are mixed and interwoven in ours, fo as to give us all the advantages of each, without fubjecting us to the dangers and inconveniences of either. The democratical form of government, which is the only one I have now occafion to take notice of, is liable to these inconveniences: That they are generally too tedious in their coming to any refolution, and feldom brisk and expeditious enough in carrying their resolutions into execution; that they are always wavering in their refolutions, and never steady in any of the measurea they refolve to pursue; and that they are often involved in factions, feditions, and infurrections, which expofes them to be made the tools, if not the prey of their neighbours: there fore in all the regulations we make, with refpect to our conftitution, we are to guard against running too much into that form of government which is properly called democratical: this was, in my opinion, the effect of the triennial law, and will again be the effect, if ever it fhould be reflored. THAT triennial elections would make our government too tedious in all their refolves, is evident; because, in fuch cafe, no prudent administration would ever resolve upon any measure of confequence, till they had felt not only the pulfe of the parliament, but the pulfe of the people; and the minifters of flate would always labour under this disadvantage, that as fecrets of state must not be immediately divulged, their enemies, (and enemies they will always have) would have a handle for expofing their meafures, and rendering them difagreeable to the people, and thereby carrying perhaps a new election against them, before they could have an opportunity of juftifying their meafures, by divulging thofe facts and circumftances, from whence the justice and the wisdom of their measures would clearly appear. THEN, Sir, it is by experience well known, that what is called the populace of every country, are apt to be too much elated with fuccefs, and too much dejected with every misfortune; this makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of ftate, and never long of the fame mind; and as this houfe is chosen by the free and unbiassed voice of the people in general, if this choice were fo often renewed, we might expect, that this house would be as wavering, and as unfteady as the people usually are; and it being impoffible to carry on the public affairs of the nation, without the concurrence of this houfe, the minifters would always be obliged to comply, and confequently, would be obliged to change their measures, as often as the people changed their minds. WITH feptennial Parliaments, Sir, we are not expofed to either of these minfortunes: because, if the minifters, after having felt the pulfe of the Parliament, which they can always foon do, refolve upon any measures they have generally time enough before the new elections come on, to give the people proper information, in order to fhew them the justice and the wisdom of the measures they have purfued; and if the people fhould at any time be too much elated, or too much dejected, or should without a cause change their minds, those at the helm of affairs have time to fet them right before a new election comes on. As to faction and fedition, Sir, I will grant, that in monarchical and aristocratical governments, it generally arifes from violence and oppreffion; but in democratical governments, it always arifes from the people's having too great a share in the government; for in all countries, and in all governments, there always will be many factious and unquiet fpirits, who can never be at reft either in power or out of power: When in power, they are never easy, unless every man fubmits entirely to their direction; and when out of power, they are always working and intriguing against those that are in, without any, regard to justice, or to the interest of their country: In popular governments fuch men have too much game, they have too many opportunities for working upon and corrupting the minds of the people, in order to give them a bad impreffion of, and to raise discontents against, those that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and these discontents often break out into feditions and infurrections. This, Sir, would, in my opinion be our misfortune, if our parliaments were either annual or triennial: By fuch frequent elections, there would be fo much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would destroy that that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our conftitution: in fhort, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical. Therefore, in order to preserve our constitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to preferve that law, which I really think has brought our conftitution to a more equal mixture, and confequently to greater perfection than it was ever in, before that law took place. As to bribery and corruption, Sir, if it were poffible to influence, by such base means, the majority of the electors of Great Britain, to choose such men as would probably give up their liberties; if it were poffible to influence by fuch means, a majority of the members of this house, to confent to the establishment of arbitrary power, I would readily allow, that the calculations made by the gentlemen of the other fide were just, and their inference true; but I am perfuaded that neither of these is poffible. As the members of this houfe generally are, and must always be gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country; is it poffible to suppose, that any of them could, by a penfion, or a poft, be influenced to confent to the overthrow of our conftitution; by which the enjoyment, not only of what he got, but of what he before had, would be rendered altogether precarious? I will allow, Sir, that with refpect to bribery, the price must be higher or lower, generally in proportion to the virtue of the man who is to be bribed; but it must likewise be granted, that the humour he happens to be in at the time, the spirit he happens to be endowed with, adds a great deal to his virtue. When no encroachments are made upon the rights of the people, when the people do not think themselves in any danger, there may be many of the electors, who by a bribe |