brought by that gentleman against the appellant, which is still pending. The deed therefore comes back to me with Mr. Scott's name remaining on it unerased, but with the addition of certain other debts, which turn the scale against the debtor, by showing that the Act of Parliament has not been complied with. I am then pressed by the appellant, in the absence of Mr. Scott, to try the question myself, and to strike out his debt in order to restore the balance. I cannot do so. On a question between the appellant and the Act of Parliament, the appellant's own representations must bind him. The debt having been entered by him as a debt, he cannot now get rid of it by inserting the qualification which he has added, otherwise it would be an easy way for debtors to bring themselves within the Act and to obtain a majority in number and value of their creditors, if they could get rid of the non-assenting creditors by putting the word "disputed" opposite their debts. I cannot listen to the argument. Here I have not only 7007., the amount of the debt put down, but I actually find that 7001. entered in the total of debts as cast up by the debtor himself and sworn to in his affidavit. If the question be tried, as it must be, upon the face of the documents handed in by the debtor himself, the debtor's statement must be taken prima facie against him, and the * 211 debt as stated taken into account in ascertaining whether or not there has been a compliance with the Act of Parliament. The addition made to the list by the report must be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Act of Parliament has been complied with. It had not been taken into account; and when taken into account, turns the scale against the debtor. I cannot qualify the statement of the debtor by giving effect to his allegation that Mr. Scott's debt is disputed; the debt must be taken as the debtor has stated it. * In that state I find the case; in that state I adjudicate upon it. I find that the deed does not comply with the Act of Parliament. His Lordship then dismissed the appeal, with costs of the present hearing, and ordered the remaining costs of the appeal to be paid out of the estate. [160] *Ex parte EDGAR BROOKS. In the Matter of EDGAR BROOKS. * 212 1864. May 25. June 8. Before the Lord Chancellor Lord WESTBURY. Where a debtor has executed a deed under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, § 192, any creditor, although denying the validity of the deed, is entitled to examine the bankrupt. But such creditor must submit to the jurisdiction in bankruptcy. THIS was an appeal from an order of the commissioner of the Birmingham District Court of Bankruptcy, by which he directed that the appellant, who had executed and registered under the 192d section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, a deed of composition with his creditors, should be committed for contempt for refusing to submit to examination at the summons of the respondent Joseph Wilson, a creditor who did not assent to the deed of composition. The appellant had stated in his affidavit, filed upon the registration of the deed, that amongst the creditors assenting to the deed was the Birmingham Banking Company; that their entire debt was 86027. 15s. 11d., and that they held security valued at 42001. The respondent took out a summons against the appellant in the District Court of Bankruptcy, for him to attend the Court and be examined touching his estate, with a view, as the respondent admitted, to disprove, by the examination of the debtor, the truth of the allegation as to the value of the security, and thus, by showing the invalidity of the deed by reason of its non-compliance with the statutory conditions as to the requisite majority of assenting creditors, to support certain proceedings at law then pending at his suit against the appellant. * Upon the return of the summons it was objected, on the * 213 part of the appellant, that the respondent, not having assented to the deed, had no right to examine the appellant. The commissioner overruled the objection, and upon the debtor persisting in his refusal to be sworn unless the creditor would execute the deed, made the order under appeal; suspending its execution, however, with a view to an appeal. VOL. III. 11 [161] Mr. Sargood, for the appellant, referred to Anonymous, (a) Ex parte Abbott, (b) Ex parte Lawrence, (c) Ex parte Collins, (d) before the Court of Bankruptcy, and admitted that if the immediate object of the proposed examination by the creditor had not been to show that the deed was invalid, but had been a purpose beneficial to the creditors claiming under the deed, it ought not to be checked, although the indirect consequence of the examination might be the destruction of the deed. But he contended that if, as avowedly here, the proposed examination was not for the purpose of benefiting the creditors under the deed, but was merely for the purpose of destroying the deed, it could not be permitted, since it would be at variance with the rule in bankruptcy to permit such an examination. The creditor here was, in fact, bound by the deed, and could not be in a better position than that of a creditor who had proved under a fiat; and a creditor who had proved under a fiat was not permitted to pursue an examination of the bankrupt having for its immediate object, not a result beneficial to the rest of the creditors, but the destruction of the fiat itself. *214 * He further referred to Ex parte Middleton, (e) and contended that neither the 136th nor the 197th sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, had any application to the present respondent's case. Mr. W. D. Griffith, for the respondent, referring to the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, § 197, Ex parte Bonsor, (g) and Malkin v. Adams, (h) — argued that a creditor who had proved under a bankruptcy might yet take proceedings for the purpose of superseding it; and that in the case of a deed like the present, if a similar procedure were not permitted, a majority might easily be made up by means of fictitious creditors. Judgment reserved. THE LORD CHANCELLOR. June 8. This is an appeal from an order of a learned commissioner, by which he directed the debtor, who had (a) 6 L. T. (N. S.) 166. (b) 6 L. T. (N. S.) 195. (c) 6 L. T. (N. S.) 559. (e) Supra, p. 201. executed a composition deed, to be committed in consequence of his refusal to answer certain questions put to him by a creditor who had not either executed the deed or assented to it in writing. The proposition on the part of the debtor was this, that the creditor was bound by the deed, and that, therefore, as the obvious purport of the examination was merely to destroy the deed, the Court ought not, according to the old rule of bankruptcy, to sanction an application to itself, the purpose of which was to destroy its own process and put an end to its own jurisdiction. And cases were cited on behalf of the debtor, and in particular * 215 the case of Ex parte Lawrence, (a) in which several learned commissioners had applied the old rule in bankruptcy to cases arising under deeds. I cannot but notice in the first place the mistake involved in these decisions of supposing that a creditor becomes better entitled to the interposition of the Court of Bankruptcy by having signed the deed. If the deed be one which complies with the statute, a creditor who has not signed is equally bound as a creditor who has signed; and a creditor by signing the deed does not disentitle himself to the right of putting questions for the purpose of trying the validity of the deed any more than a creditor is disentitled who has not signed or in writing assented to the deed at all. Either the creditor is bound or he is not bound, according as the deed, assuming it to be duly registered, does or does not comply with the statute. If, therefore, a creditor presents himself and addresses questions to the debtor for the purpose of trying the validity of the deed, he certainly does not become better entitled to such an examination by reason of his having executed the deed or in writing assented to it. He is neither better nor worse. But I think I shall better expound the statute if I hold that the old rule in bankruptcy of refusing to hear any person who had not proved does not furnish any rule of analogy on the foundation of which a creditor ought to be excluded who had not executed or assented in writing to the deed. Such a creditor is primâ facie bound by the registration * of the deed, and being so prima facie bound, he stands * 216 in just the same position for having the aid of the Court as a creditor who has proved in bankruptcy. (a) 6 L. T. (N. S.) 559. I regret that the statute did not in the first instance give to the Court of Bankruptcy exclusive jurisdiction over all persons claiming under or bound by these deeds. Creditors, whether they claim under a deed or are bound by a majority, are made to stand in the place of creditors who have proved in bankruptcy; and it must always be remembered that in the case of a trust-deed, where any examination is directed to try the validity of a deed, the result of the examination may, in the event of the invalidity of the deed being established, be to prove the necessity of the action and adjudication of that Court upon the deed, as the ground of the commission by the execution thereof of an act of bankruptcy on the part of the debtor. Such a case is not one to which the old rule in bankruptcy is applicable; for if the creditor under the old rule succeeded in showing that no case of bankruptcy existed, the whole thing failed: but in a great number of instances where a creditor shows that a deed does not comply with the statute, he shows at the same time (and that is frequently his object) that a case of bankruptcy does exist and no case of a deed. I think that all parties, whether they have executed the deed, whether they have assented to it in writing, or whether, not having executed and not having assented to it, they are bound by it, should have the greatest facilities of resorting to the Court of Bankruptcy for the purpose of ascertaining whether the deed does or does not comply with the statute. But then the creditor who denies that he is bound by the deed, and yet applies to the Court of Bankruptcy for leave to examine, must submit entirely to the jurisdiction of that Court; and therefore, if at the same time that he * 217 makes his application he insists, for example, upon holding the debtor in prison, or is retaining property for his own exclusive use, which is demanded or sought to be recovered under the deed, or is defending an action in which the trustee of the deed, or the debtor named therein, is plaintiff, the Court of Bankruptcy ought not, where there is a substantive proceeding to withdraw or to withhold property that is claimed under the deed from its operation, to aid the creditor so circumstanced in claiming additional facilities for examination. * On the other hand, if the creditor comes into the Court of Bankruptcy not being in that predicament, but bonâ fide asserting that the case ought to be one of bankruptcy and not of a deed, and that the deed is not valid or in conformity with the requirements of the |