§3 Speculative writers on politics have attached some importance to the question, whether government is natural, and whether man is by nature a political animal. It seems to be universally agreed that man is a social animal; and that his natural state, like that of the gregarious species of animals, is to live in societies.(") The question is, whether these societies are naturally placed under a civil government; and whether man is, by nature, not merely social, but also political.(12)

We shall, in another part of this treatise, have occasion to advert to the received antithesis between nature, and institution or law; and we shall attempt to ascertain the meaning which it is intended to bear. (13) Here we will only observe, that if by nature' is meant the sum of all human faculties, and of all the conditions of human existence, (') it cannot be said that man is by nature a political animal—since we know from undoubted experience that

(11) Man is a social animal, according to Seneca (De Clem. i. 3). Lactantius says that he is a social animal by nature, (Div. Inst. vi. 10), in which he follows Cicero (De Off. i. 44). Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies.'-Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society, p. 26. See also Lord Kames' History of Man, book ii. sketch 1: Filangieri, Scienza della Legis lazione, 1. i. c. 1. La nature de l'homme le porte à vivre en société. Quelle qu'en soit la cause, ce fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout où l'on a rencontré des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en hordes, en corps de nation. Peut-être est-ce afin d'unir leurs forces pour leur sûreté commune; peut-être afin de pourvoir plus aisément à leurs besoins; toujours est il vrai qu'il est dans la nature de l'homme de se réunir en société, comme font les abeilles et plusieurs espèces d'animaux; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces réunions d'hommes, en quelque partie du monde qu'ils habitent.'-Say, Cours d'Ec. Politique, tom. vi. p. 284; compare Comte, ib. tom. iv. p. 541.

(12) ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, Aristot. Pol. i. 2. πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός, Eth. Nic. ix. 9. Naturâ sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates. Facile intelligitur nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. . Quemadmodum igitur

membris utimur priusquam didicimus cujus ea utilitatis causâ habeamus, sic inter nos naturâ ad civilem communitatem conjuncti et consociati sumus.'-Cic. de Fin. iii. 19, 20; also, De Off. i. 4; De Rep. i. 25; De Fin. v. 23. Compare Grotius, De J. B. et P. Proleg. § 7-9. Puffendorf, ii. 2, §7; 3, § 16; vii. 1, § 2, 3. Conringius, Dissert. de Cive et Civitate, § 45-9; Opera, vol. iii. p. 734. Seneca de Benef. iv. 18.

(13) Below, ch. 18, § 6.

(14) Compare the remarks of Puffendorf, on a use of naturaliter in text of the Digest, v. 3, § 10.

large portions of mankind have existed, and do exist, without any regular political government. On the other hand, if by nature is meant that improved type which mankind approach as their reason is cultivated, and their social condition is raised, (1) it may be affirmed with truth that man is by nature a political animal.

The question respecting the natural existence of political society is, therefore, a merely verbal one, and depends upon the meaning which we affix to the word nature. But there is, never'theless, a real question involved in the proposition at issue. The antithesis which is here intended is not that between nature and institution, but that between man and the other animals. Those who speak of man being by nature a political animal mean, in fact, to contrast him with those gregarious species, as monkeys, dogs, horses, elephants, bees, &c., which are not political animals; and to affirm that his nature qualifies him alone among the Lanimal species for civil government.

Land

According to a passage of Ulpian, received in the Digest, and incorporated in the Institutes, there is a natural law which is common to men and animals. (16) The existence of any such law is, however, rejected by Grotius, Selden, Puffendorf, and other jurists of authority;(7) nor can it be admitted, if the word law is

(15) οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.—Aristot. ib.

(16) Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit; nam jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quæ in terrâ, quæ in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc descendit maris atque feminæ conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hine liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio; videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritiâ censeri.' (Dig. i. 1, § 1.) See also, Inst. i. 2, where the passage is repeated with only a verbal variation. Compare the argument of Cicero:- Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsæ diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur): deinde ut requirant atque appetant, ad quas se applicent, ejusdem generis animantes: idque faciunt cum desiderio, et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani; quanto id magis in homine fit naturâ,' &c.—De Amicit. c. 21.

(17) Grotius, i. 1. § 11. Selden, De Jure Nat. et Gent. juxt. Disc. Ebr. lib. i. c. 5. Puffendorf, ii. 3, § 2, 3. Austin, Prov. of Jurisprudence, p. 188. Savigny (System des Heut. Röm. Rechts, vol. i. p. 416) attempts to give a meaning to the definition.

Compare Cic. de Fin. iii. 20:-Et quomodo hominum inter homines

to receive any intelligible and consistent sense. Command and obedience, which are the essential elements of government, are peculiar to mankind as distinguished from all other animal species. Man is singular, not only in commanding the inferior animals, but in commanding his own species. Hence, men' alone form a political community. They alone, by means of civil government, are susceptible of civilization. (18)

The capacity for political government, and for its consequence —progressive improvement in a legally-constituted community-is the characteristic of mankind, and distinguishes the human from all other animal races. It has been laid down, by Aristotle and, others, that this difference is owing to the exclusive possession of reason and speech by man, and to his power of discriminating between justice and injustice.(19) Such a general explanation is correct, and points to the fundamental causes of the difference in question but as we are about to inquire into the methods of

:

juris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil juris esse cum bestiis. Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causâ, et deorum: eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ; ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine injuriâ.

(18)

Separat hoc nos

A grege mutorum; atque ideo venerabile soli
Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces,
Atque exercendis capiendisque artibus apti,
Sensum a cœlesti demissum traximus arce,

Cujus egent prona et terram spectantia. Mundi

Principio indulsit communis conditor illis

Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos
Affectus petere auxilium et præstare juberet,
Dispersos trahere in populum, migrare vetusto
De nemore, et proavis habitatas linquere silvas;
Edificare domos, laribus conjungere nostris
Tectum aliud, tutos vicino limite somnos
Ut collata daret fiducia; protegere armis
Lapsum, aut ingenti nutantem vulnere civem,
Communi dare signa tubâ, defendier isdem
Turribus, atque unâ portarum clave teneri.

Juvenal, xv. 142-158.

(19) See Aristot. Pol. i. 2. Animals, says Cicero, are unfitted for political society, as being rationis et orationis expertes.'-De Off. i. 16; compare c. 4: also, Puffendorf, ii. 1, § 5. On the difference between instinct and reason, see Dr. Holland's Medical Notes and Reflections, c. 34. Concerning the mental faculties of animals, see Gurlt, Lehrbuch der vergleichenden Physiologie der Haus-Säugethiere, (Berlin, 1837,) § 421-9.

VOL. I.

C

investigating the different departments of politics, it will be advisable to obtain, at the outset, as full and detailed a notion as we can of the peculiarities in man's nature which enable him alone, of all animals, to conceive and realize the idea of political government. This is one of the most important, as well as most interesting, problems of that portion of the science of man, which has been denominated Anthropology.(2)

§ 4 The theory of a graduated series of animated nature, beginning with those animals which approximate to vegetables, and ending in man, was first enounced by Aristotle.(") It was reproduced by Leibnitz in the last century, and afterwards embodied by Pope in his Essay on Man.(2) At a later period it was adopted by Buffon and Bonnet, and became the established doctrine of naturalists before Cuvier.(*) That a continuous series connectkingdom can be formed, in a rude

ing man with the vegetable

(20) According to Dr. Latham, (Natural History of the Varieties of Man, London, 1850), anthropology determines the relations of man to the other mammalia; ethnology, the relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other.'-p. 559.

Comme ce n'est qu'en comparant que nous pouvons juger; que nos connoissances roulent même entièrement sur les rapports que les choses ont avec celles qui leur ressemblent ou qui en diffèrent, et que s'il n'existoit point d'animaux, la nature de l'homme seroit encore plus incompréhensible; après avoir considéré l'homme en lui-même, ne devons nous pas nous servir de cette voie de comparaison; ne faut il pas examiner la nature des animaux, comparer leur organisation, étudier l'économie animale en général,' &c.-Buffon, Discours sur la Nature des Animaux, tom. iv. p. 3, ed. 4to, 1753.

(21) Hist. An. viii. 1.

(22) Far as creation's ample range extends,

The scale of sensual, mental powers ascends;
Mark how it mounts to man's imperial race,
From the green myriads in the peopled grass.

Ep. i. v. 207-41.

See Dr. Johnson's criticism on the theory of the scale of existence, in his review of Soame Jenyns' Free Enquiry; Works, vol. vi. p. 51-3.

(23) See Flourens, Buffon, p. 36-50; Cuvier, p. 261-71; and compare Comte, ib. tom. iv. p. 624.

manner, is easily seen; but Cuvier showed that, for scientific purposes, and with a view to precise arrangement, the single line must be divided and dissolved into parallel lines, exhibiting the succession of separate organs. However this gradation may be traced, human physiology is at the top of the scale, and the refinement of the human organs subsides, by a continuous degradation, into the ruder and simpler mechanism of the inferior animals.

The transition from the bodily organs of man to those of the higher mammalia is comparatively gentle and gradual, and from them the deterioration proceeds by a regular descent. "But with regard to mental faculties, there is a broad distinction between man and all species of animals. Some of the higher quadrupeds, indeed, show a very decided superiority in intelligence to the inferior orders; but even these are separated from man by a wide interval. There are certain capital points of intellectual superiority which are peculiar to man, and which cannot be said to exist, even in a rudimentary state, in the most perfectly organised of the other animals. The theory of a continuous chain from man to polypes fails altogether when it is applied to the intelligence. (4) This will appear more clearly when the characteristic marks of human intelligence are set forth in detail.

(24) Quelque ressemblance qu'il y ait entre le Hottentot et le singe, l'intervalle qui les sépare est immense; puisqu'à l'intérieur il est rempli par la pensée, et au dehors par la parole.'-Buffon, tom. xiv. p. 32; quoted by Flourens, p. 138.

For M. Comte's views respecting the intelligence of animals, see tom. iii. p. 769-88. In page 774 he says: Les naturalistes ont forcé les métaphysiciens à renoncer enfin au singulier expédient imaginé par Descartes, et à reconnaître, plus ou moins explicitement, que les animaux, du moins dans la partie supérieure de l'échelle zoologique, manifestent, en réalité, la plupart de nos facultés affectives et même intellectuelles, avec de simples différences de degré; ce que personne aujourd'hui n'oserait plus nier.' Compare page 785, where similar opinions as to the difference between the moral and intellectual nature of man and the higher mammalia being only a difference of degree, are expressed. It must, however, be remarked, that a difference of degree is sometimes quite as important as a difference of kind. In a question of degree, everything depends on the amount of difference. The difference between an arctic winter and a tropical summer is only a difference of degree. The difference between the intelligence of an infant and of an adult man, is only a difference of degree. In order to characterize the respective faculties of men and animals, it is necessary to describe the extent of the difference.