of man, nearly coincides with the other species, which we have noticed as a history of civilization. A history of civilization is an attempt to view mankind in general, or some group of na-' tions, as one progressive body or corporation, advancing by regular and successive steps; and to trace that progress either from the dawn of history up to the present time, or for some intermediate period. A historical survey of this sort aims at exhibiting a selection of the cardinal events and turns in human affairs, on which the progressive civilization of nations has chiefly depended; without giving a connected narrative of occurrences, it endeavours to trace a connected series of causes and effects, and is sometimes denominated the philosophy of history. (261)>]

We shall have occasion, in the concluding part of this treatise, (26) to examine the methods by which the progress of civilization is to be traced. Here we will only remark, that no ។ history of the movement of the entire human race can be written, without co-ordinating the histories of the several communities, and keeping them distinct from each other. There may be certain points at which the histories of several nations intersect; some of them may have certain institutions and states of society in common; but the history of the human race, even if we limit ourselves to the progressive portion of it, can never be reduced to a single line. Particular nations may be taken as representatives of the most advanced and civilized portions of mankind, as the Greeks and Romans in antiquity; but their history has much that is peculiar, and it must not be assumed that the political, social, religious, and intellectual changes which they underwent can be taken as types of the necessary development of civilization. It is impossible to eliminate the names of nations and individuals, to discard all reference to time and country, and to replace the living characters of history, by a set of abstract

(261) Wachsmuth, ib. p. 47. Compare the Introduction to Dr. Miller's work, entitled History philosophically illustrated (London, 1832), and the Introduction to F. v. Schlegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Engl. trans.; ed. Bohn. On philosophic history, see Volney, Leçons d'Histoire; Œuvres, p. 586.

(262) Below, ch. xxvii.

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entities, such as fetichism, polytheism, monotheism, feudalism, catholicism, and the like. Even assuming that a certain period of human society is characterized by a polytheistic tendency, it does not follow that the systems of religious belief developed /under the influence of this tendency will be identical. The Greek polytheism may differ essentially from the Egyptian, the Egyptian from the Assyrian, the Assyrian from the Hindu, and the Hindu from the Mexican; and the corresponding social phenomena may equally differ. History must never lose its character of a succession of facts, accredited by authentic evidence. When, however, it is spiritualized into this ethereal substance, it escapes all the ordinary tests of historical credibility. The facts are so attenuated, the statements are so remote from any actual reality, that they often produce neither assent nor dissent. (23) Inasmuch as the active forces are not men, either

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(263) M. Comte, after having rightly insisted, in his Cours de Philosophie Positive, upon the importance of the historical method of investigation for establishing a positive social science (see tom. iv. p. 450, 526), appears to me to have adopted a method which, however acute may be many of the remarks with which he illustrates it, is fundamentally defective, and can never lead to valuable results. According to M. Comte, history, for sociological purposes, ought to be written in a purely abstract form, as much as possible without proper names. The following passages will serve to explain his views :- Ainsi, quelque indispensable fonction que doive remplir l'histoire en sociologie, pour alimenter et pour diriger ses principales spéculations, on voit que son emploi y doit rester essentiellement abstrait: ce n'y saurait être, en quelque sorte, que de l'histoire sans noms d'hommes, ou même sans noms de peuples, si l'on ne devait éviter, avec soin, toute puérile affectation philosophique à se priver systématiquement de l'usage de dénominations qui peuvent beaucoup contribuer à éclairer l'exposition ou même à faciliter et consolider la pensée, surtout dans cette première elaboration de la science sociologique' (tom. v. p. 14). Il est donc sensible que la sociologie doit seulement emprunter, à l'incohérente compilation déjà improprement qualifiée d'histoire, les renseignemens susceptibles de mettre en évidence, d'après les principes de la théorie biologique de l'homme, les lois fondamentales de la sociabilité: ce qui exige presque toujours, à l'égard de chaque donnée ainsi obtenue, une préparation indispensable, et quelque fois fort délicate, afin de la faire passer de l'état concret à l'état abstrait, en la dépouillant des circonstances purement particulières et secondaires de climat, de localité, etc., sans y altérer cependant la partie vraiment essentielle et générale de l'observation." -Ib. p. 18.

For

In exemplifying this method of abstract history, without names of men and nations, and without any special circumstances of locality, M. Comte finds that he has mentioned the Greeks and the Romans by name. this departure from his own system, he apologizes as follows:- Envers les deux modes essentiels, l'un intellectuel, l'autre social, du polythéisme

singly or in bodies, but abstractions, it is impossible to try any proposition by a historical standard, until it has been translated out of this symbolical language into a dramatic form, in which real men bear a part."

This view of the subject is adopted by M. Guizot, in his lectures on the history of modern civilization, and, indeed, governs their arrangement and contents. He begins by laying it down, that there is a certain civilization common to the states of Western Europe, and that it consists of scattered elements, which must be sought in the history of the different countries. He devotes fourteen lectures, forming one volume of his work, to the leading causes of European civilization:(264) but, having completed this general survey, from the fall of the Roman empire to the French revolution, he declares that, as soon as the historian descends from the most general facts, the unity of his subject disappears; and that in order to trace the progress of civilization in detail, it is necessary for him to narrow the field of inquiry.

militaire, j'ai jugé convenable, pour plus de clarté, de me rapprocher davantage des formes de l'appréciation concrète. Mais il importe à notre but principal de reconnoître directement que je ne me suis ainsi nullement écarté, au fond, du caractère abstrait indispensable à une telle opération, suivant les explications préliminaires du chapitre précédent. Car, ces dénominations de Grec et Romain ne désignent point ici essentiellement des sociétés accidentelles et particulières; elles se rapportent surtout à des situations nécessaires et générales, qu'on ne pourrait qualifier abstraitement que par des locutions trop compliquées' (ib. p. 265). According to this explanation, the words Greek and Roman do not signify the nations so called: they are mere algebraic symbols, to denote certain abstract communities. See also p. 268, note, and p. 295.

(264) Concerning the existence of a common European civilization, see Guizot, Hist. Gen. de la Civilisation en Europe, leçon i. In the first lecture of his course, on the 'Histoire de la Civilisation en France,' he thus expresses himself:- Nous avons reconnu, l'été dernier, qu'il y avait une véritable unité dans la civilisation Européenne; mais cette unité n'éclate que dans les faits généraux, dans les grands résultats. Il faut s'élever au haut des montagnes pour faire disparaître les inégalités, les diversités du territoire, et découvrir l'aspect général, la physionomie essentielle et simple, de tout le pays. Quand on sort des faits généraux, quand on veut pénétrer dans les particularités, l'unité s'efface, les diversités se retrouvent, on se perd dans la variété des évènements, des causes, des effets; en sorte que, pour raconter l'histoire avec détail, et y conserver, cependant, quelque ensemble, il faut absolument en rétrécir le champ.' Compare his seventh lecture on European civilization, where he remarks, that his general sketch of the origin of the communes, or free towns, does not apply indifferently to the free towns of each country. Certain features are common to all, but the differences are wide and important.

For this reason he devotes the rest of his course, consisting of forty-nine lectures, distributed over five volumes, to the history of civilization in France exclusively.

c§ 25 It appears, from the preceding remarks, that the essence of political history is to be a register or record, including nothing false, and omitting nothing important with reference to its end. It is a collection of observed facts, arranged in a proper chronological series, so as to show their mutual sequence or dependence, and subjected to a proper process of selection, for the sake of rejecting everything trifling or irrelevant. In so far as a history is a collection of observed facts, true and relative to some common subject, it is analogous to a set of observations in astronomy, or any other physical science. There is, nevertheless, a material difference between the modes of exhibiting the results of observations in politics and in physics, to which it is necessary for us to advert.

In the physical sciences, observations are sometimes made without any theoretical view, and laid before the world in their naked state, as is often the case with subjects of natural history. Sometimes, however, they are connected with their scientific employment. The observer uses them himself as a ladder, by which he may climb to a scientific conclusion. He both collects the materials and builds the edifice. But the political historian is merely a collector and arranger of materials. He constructs no political theories himself out of the materials which his industry has accumulated, which his judgment has arranged, and which his sagacity has illustrated. This constant difference between the modes of dealing with observations in physics and in politics appears to rest on two grounds, which we will attempt to explain.

The first of these grounds consists in the great difficulty and complexity of the process by which political history is formed. That which in physics constitutes, in general, only one stage, in politics requires two. In physics, when the phenomena to be observed have been determined, the main difficulty consists in providing fit instruments or methods for observing them. When

this obstacle has been effectually overcome, the mere work of observing and registering the observations (though at first much intelligence may be needed) demands little more than steady attention and mechanical regularity. The observations, as they come from the hands of the observer, are ready for the use of the theorist. Astronomical and meteorological observations, consisting of numerical data, sometimes, indeed, require a further process of digestion; but even this, when the principle is once settled, consists merely of arithmetical operations. In general, therefore, it may be said that there is no intermediate workman between the original observer and the theorist in physics. Whenever, indeed, the experimental method is applied, such a division would be impossible; for the experimenter and theorist are necessarily the same person. In all experiments, as was pointed out in the last chapter, (265) the process is intelligent, and the general conclusion is drawn by the experimenter himself.

But in politics it is otherwise. The subject-matter of observation is so much more complex than in physics, that not only is it necessary to make a constant separation between the observer and the theorist, but in general, it is further necessary to interpose an intermediate person between these two parties; and to assign a distinct and a high office to the digester of the observed facts. This intermediate person is properly the historian. He stands between the primary observer on one side, and the theorist on the other. As the facts narrated by the historian occur over a wide surface, they cannot be observed by any one person. To supply the facts described in a volume of national history, the observations of large numbers of persons must contribute. Even to form the contents of a single newspaper, how many persons—some employed, and some communicating voluntarily-in various parts of the country, each subscribe their quota. In order to lay the foundation of a historical narrative, it is necessary to obtain the services of short-hand writers, and other reporters of public proceedings; keepers of

(265) Above, ch. vi. § 2.

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