sequi: lex legi non miscetur: eundum est qua ducimur. Jus gentium ista discrimina non agnoscit, ubi scilicet alia juris sui obtinendi spes non est.

XVII. Idem dicendum erit si qui promissum urget non contraxerit, sed damnum dederit. 9 Seneca ibidem: colonum suum non tenet, quamvis tabellis manentibus, qui segetem ejus proculcavit, qui succidit arbusta, non quia recepit quod pepigerat, sed quia ne reciperetur effecit. Mox alia addit exempla: pecus abegisti servum ejus occidisti. Deinde: licet me comparare inter se quantum profuerit mihi quisque, aut quantum nocuerit, et tum pronuntiare, utrum plus debeatur mihi, an debeam.

XVIII. Postremo et quod ex pœna debetur ei, quod promissum est, potest contribui, quod eodem loco late explicatur et beneficio gratia debetur, et injuriæ ultio: nec ego cap. 5. gratiam illi debeo, nec ille mihi pœnam: alter ab altero absolvimur: mox: comparatione facta inter se beneficii et injuriæ, videbo an etiam ultra mihi debeatur.

S

XIX. 1 Sed sicut si quid inter litigantes convenerit, ei

Cap. 4.

P Idem Seneca] Eodem libro, capitibus 6 et 7.

9 Seneca ibidem] Dicto cap. 4.

r Deinde] Dicto cap. 6.

• Comparatione facta] Eodem cap.6.

there explains, are limited by certain rules, which it is necessary to follow. We must go the way the law points. But the Law of Nations does not acknowledge those distinctions, that is, when there is no other hope of getting our own.

XVII. The same must be said, if he who urges our promise has not made a contract with us, but has inflicted a damage upon us. So Seneca, in the same place, The landowner is not to have the right of binding the farmer to him, even if the agreement be uncancelled, if he trample down his corn, if he cut down the plants; not because he has received what he agreed for, but because he has himself been the means of his not receiving it. And he adds other examples: You have driven off his cattle, you have killed his slave. And then: Let me compare what benefit any one has produced me, and what harm, and then pronounce whether more is owing to me or from me.

XVIII. Finally, that which is due as penalty may be balanced against that which has been promised, which is explained at length in the same place, thus: Benefit demands recompense, injury, satisfaction ; where both occur, I neither owe him recompense, nor he me satisfaction. We are quits with one another. Balancing the benefit and the injury, I shall see whether anything more is due to me.

XIX. 1 But, as in the case where any agreement has been made

quod promissum est opponi lite manente non poterit, aut actio de qua lis erat, aut litis damnæ et impense, ita nec manente bello compensari poterit aut id unde ortum est bellum, aut quidquid bellico gentium jure fieri solet. Negotii enim natura, ne nihil actum sit, ostendit convenisse sepositis belli controversiis: nam alioqui nulla esset pactio quæ non posset eludi: nec forte male huc aptem quod apud eundem, quem jam laudavi aliquoties, Senecam est: Nullam excusationem receperunt (majores) ut homines scirent fidem utique præstandam. Satius enim erat a paucis etiam justam excusationem non accipi, quam ab omnibus aliquam tentari.

2 Quæ ergo sunt quæ compensari cum eo quod promissum est poterunt? nimirum si quid alter, quamvis ex alio contractu, inter bellum inito, debet: si damnum dedit intra induciarum tempora: si legatos violavit, aut aliud quid fecit quod inter hostes jus gentium damnat.

3 Observandum tamen ut inter easdem personas fiat compensatio, ac ne jus tertii cujusquam lædatur: ita tamen ut

1 Apud eundem, quem jam laudavi aliquoties, Senecam est] De Benef. vII. 16.

between the two parties to a lawsuit, they cannot, during the suit, set against what was promised, either the original ground of action, or the loss and expense of the suit; so while the war goes on, we cannot bring into the balance, either the original ground of the war, or anything which has resulted from the exercise of the usual belligerent rights. For the nature of the business shews that the convention, in order that it may not be without any effect, must have been made setting aside the controversies belonging to the war itself. For otherwise there could be no convention which might not be eluded. this we may apply a passage of Seneca: [which however is not very closely to the purpose. W.]

To

2 What then are the matters, which may be balanced against that which was promised? This for instance; if the other, though from another contract, made during the war, owes us a debt; or if he have committed damage during a time of truce; or if he have violated the rights of ambassadors; or done anything else which the Law of Nations condemns as between enemies.

3 But it is to be observed, that compensation must take place between the same persons who are so bound to each other, and so that the right of a third party be not injured; but still, so that the goods of subjects are understood to be bound for what the state owes, as we have elsewhere said.

4 We must add this also; that it is the part of a generous mind

subditorum bona pro eo quod civitas debet jure gentium obligata intelligantur, ut alibi diximus.

Lib. iil. 11.

§ 2.

4 Addamus et hoc, generosi esse animi stare federibus etiam post aliquid injuriæ acceptum: quo nomine sapiens In- Philos. iii. 9. dus Iarchas laudabat regem, qui læsus a vicino federato, où παρέλυσε τοὺς ὅρκους, οὕτω βεβαίως όμωμοκέναι φήσας, ὡς μηδὲ ὁπότε ἠδικεῖτο λυπεῖν αὐτὸν, non discessit a jurata fide, aiens tam sancte se jurasse, ut alteri ne post acceptam quidem injuriam nociturus esset.

15, 16.

5 Quæ vero de fide hostibus data incidere solent quæstiones, ferme omnes solvi possunt, si adhibeantur regulæ supra traditæ, cum de vi, tum quorumvis promissorum, tum speciali Lib. I. 11, 13, jurisjurandi, federis ac sponsionum, et de regum jure ac obligatione, deque ambiguis interpretandis dissertavimus. Tamen ut et antedictorum usus sit manifestior, et si quid præterea controversi est discutiatur, specialium quæstionum frequentiores atque illustriores attingere non pigebit.

to stand to agreements, even after an injury has been received; on which grounds Iarchas, the wise Indian, praised a king who, having been injured by a neighbour who was under league to him, did not swerve from the faith which he had sworn, saying that he had sworn so solemnly that he could not hurt the other even after receiving the injury.

5 The questions which commonly occur with regard to keeping faith with enemies, may almost all be solved, by applying the rules given above, concerning the force, both of promises in general, and of oaths in particular, the effect of conventions and securities, the rights and obligations of kings, and the interpretation of ambiguities. But that the use of what has been said may be the more manifest, and that, if there be any remaining controversies, they may be discussed, we shall not hesitate to take the trouble of touching upon the more frequent and more celebrated of special questions.

CAPUT XX.

DE FIDE PUBLICA QUA BELLUM FINITUR, UBI DE PACIS PACTIONE, DE SORTE, DE CERTAMINE CONDICTO,

DE ARBITRIO, DEDITIONE, OBSIDIBUS,

I.

Quod jus in obsides.
An fugere obsidi liceat.
An obses in aliam cau-
sam recte retineatur.
Mortuo eo, pro quo
quis obses venit, obsidem
liberari.

LVII. Rege qui obsidem dedit
mortuo, an obses tenea-
tur?

LVIII. Obsides interdum principaliter obligari: et alterum ex alterius facto non teneri.

LIX. Pignorum obligatio qualis?

NTER hostes quæ conveniunt, fide aut expressa, aut
Taita constant.

Fides expressa aut publica est, aut privata. Publica aut summarum potestatum aut inferiorum.

CHAPTER XX. Of the public Faith by which Wars are terminated; and herein, of Treaties of Peace; of Lot; of Combat by Agreement; of Arbitration; of Surrender; of Hostages; and of Pledges. I. Conventions between enemies depend either on express engagements, or on tacit ones. An express engagement is either public or private. A public engagement is either one made by the supreme

21

[GROT. III.]