tantundem valet. Sic ergo in proposita quæstione non tenebitur quidem dimissus reddere se custodia: neque enim id conventum fuit, neque tacite actum intelligi patitur favor libertatis, neque debebit lucrifacere libertatem, sed ejus, quod præstare non potest, æstimationem præstabit. Hoc enim naL. natural. 5. turali simplicitati congruentius, quam quæ in actione de præ verb. 1. ult. scriptis verbis et de condictione ob causam dati causa non secuta ob caus. dati. Romani juris interpretes tradunt. § 1. de præs. D. de cond. Sed ejus quod præstare non potest r tuus fuit: quo nomine reprehendit Balionium Mariana libro xxx. (cap. 21.) Sed facti speciem paullo aliter narrat Paruta libro II. the part of the promiser; but that in onerous promises, the promiser is obliged to an equivalent. And therefore in the question proposed, the person liberated will not be bound to return himself into captivity; for that was not the agreement, and the favour which is to be shewn to liberty, does not allow us to suppose it tacitly understood; nor ought he to take his liberty, as a gain, without a consideration; but he must give the estimated value of the thing, which itself he cannot give. For this is more agreeable to the simplicity of nature, than the rules which the Roman jurists give, in speaking of an action on a promise made in formal terms; or a suit when a thing is given for a cause, and the cause does not follow. CAPUT XXII. DE FIDE MINORUM POTESTATUM IN BELLO. I. tur. INTE 5. D. de pact. NTER publicas conventiones 'Ulpianus et hanc speciem L. convent. posuit, quoties inter se duces belli quædam paciscunNos diximus post fidem datam a summis potestatibus, agendum et de ea, quam dant minores inter se, aut aliis: sive minores illi summis sint proximi, quales sunt duces excellenter dicti, de quibus illud Livii capiendum: nec ducem novimus, Lib. iv. 20. nisi cujus auspicio bellum geritur: sive longius remoti, quos sic distinguit Cæsar: aliæ sunt legati partes, aliæ Impera- comm. iii. 51. toris. Alter agere ad præscriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. 1 Vide celeberrimi et summi JCti Clar. NOODT eximium Librum De Pactis et Transactionibus, cap. 7. J. B. De Bell. Civ. CHAPTER XXII. Of the Faith of subordinate Powers in a War. I. Among Public Conventions, Ulpian places this class: When Generals make agreements. We have said that, after faith is pledged by the supreme powers, we must consider that which the subordinate powers pledge to one another or to others: whether those subordinate powers are those nearest to the supreme, as Generals properly so called, (with regard to whom we must understand the expression of Livy, We know no General except him who conducts the war;) or those farther removed, of whom Cesar thus speaks, A Brigadier has one duty, a General another; the former is to execute his orders; the latter to act freely with regard to the whole posture of affairs. Lib. ii. 11. § 12. II. Est autem in horum promissis duplex inspectio: nam aut hoc quæritur, an summam potestatem obligent, aut an se ipsos. Prior quæstio definienda est ex eo, quod alibi diximus, obligari nos et per eum quem voluntatis nostræ ministrum elegerimus, sive voluntas illa specialiter expressa est, sive ex ipsa præpositionis natura colligitur. Nam qui dat facultatem, dat quantum in se est quæ ad facultatem sunt necessaria, quod in materia morali intelligendum est morali modo. Duobus ergo modis potestates minores supremam suo facto obstringunt, faciendo id quod probabiliter ipsorum officio contineri censetur, aut etiam extra illud ex speciali præpositione nota publice, aut iis quorum res agitur. III. Sunt et alii modo, quibus potestas summa obligatur antecedente ministrorum facto, sed non ita, ut id factum causa sit proprie dicta, sed ut occasio sit obligationis: idque dupliciter, vel per consensum, vel per rem ipsam. Consensus apparet ratihabitione, non tantum expressa, sed et tacita, id est, ubi scivit summa potestas quod actum erat, et fieri passa est, quæ ad aliam causam referri probabiliter non possunt; quod Prior quæstio definienda est ex eo, quod alibi diximus] Vide Camdenum in anno clɔ lɔ xciv. in pronuntiato Comitis Mirandæ in causa Haukinsi. (Pag. 630.) II. The promises of Officers of this kind give rise to two kinds of considerations: Whether they bind the supreme authority; and whether they bind themselves. The former question is to be decided by what we have said; that we are bound by his acts whom we have selected as the minister of our will, whether that will be specially expressed, or be collected from the nature of the command committed to him. For he who gives the means of acting, gives, as far as depends on him, the means which are necessary to such action: which, in moral matters, is to be understood in a moral manner. Therefore there are two ways in which subordinate authorities bind the supreme authority by their acts: either by doing that which, on probable grounds is conceived to be included in their office; or beyond that, committed to them by some special assignment of authority, known to those whose interests are dealt with. III. There are also other ways in which the supreme authority is bound, in virtue of an antecedent act of its ministers, but so that that act is not, properly speaking, the cause of the obligation, but the occasion; and that, in two ways; either by consent of the superior, or by the thing itself. Consent appears by sanction of the act; not express only, but tacit also; that is, when the supreme authority knew Per rem hacte- Lib. ii. 4. § 5. et 15. § 17. ipsum quomodo procedat, alibi tractavimus. nus obligantur, ne locupletiores fiant aliena jactura, id est, ut aut contractum præstent ex quo commodum volunt consequi, aut de commodo discedant: de qua æquitate itidem a nobis alibi dictum est. Et hactenus nec ultra recipi potest, quod Lib. i. 10. dicitur valere, si quid utiliter gestum est. Contra vero ab injustitia excusari non possunt, qui, cum pacta improbent, tamen retinent quod sine pactis non haberent: ut cum senatus Romanus, narrante Valerio, factum Cn. Domitii neque pro- Lib. ix. 6. bare potuit, neque rescindere voluit: qualia multa in historiis occurrunt. § 2. n. 3. § 12. et 13. IV. 1 Illud quoque ex supra a nobis dictis repetendum Lib. ii. 11. est, obligari eum qui præposuit, etiam si præpositus fecit contra mandata arcana, intra limites tamen publicæ functionis. Hanc æquitatem recte secutus est prætor Romanus in institoria actione: neque enim omne, quod cum institore geritur, obligat eum, qui præposuit, sed ita, si ejus rei gratia cui præpositus fuerit contractum est: de quo autem palam proscriptum fuit, ne cum eo contrahatur, is præpositi loco non habe what was done, and allowed it to be done; and in this case, if no other reason [besides consent] can be probably assigned, we have clsewhere stated what course the matter must take. The superior authority are obliged by the thing itself to this extent; that they are not to be made better off by the loss of other persons; that is, that they are cither to fulfil the contract by which they wish to obtain an advantage, or are to give up the advantage; a case of equity which we havo elsewhere discussed. And so far, and no further, acts which are performed so as to bring utility to us, are to be said to be valid. On the other hand, they cannot be excused from the charge of injustice, who, while they condemn the compact, retain that which without the compact they would not have: as when the Roman Senate neither could approve the act of Cn. Domitius, nor would rescind it: of which kind of occurrence we have many in history. IV. 1 We must also repeat what we have said before, that he who placed a person in a command, is bound, even though the person so placed acts against secret orders; at least, within the limits of his public function. This rule of equity was rightly followed by the Roman Prætor, in the action against an Agent; for it is not everything done by the Agent which obliges the Principal, but such things only as are.contracted in the matter for which his agency was employed; but he concerning whom public notice was given, that contracts with him would not be held good by the Principal, does not stand in the placo 25 [GROT. III.] L. cuicum tamen, 11 acted st 5. § non 11. § de quo 2. et § proscrib. 3. et § pro script. 4. cod. tit. bitur: quod si proscriptum quidem sit, sed non pateat, tenetur qui præposuit: conditio quoque præpositionis servanda est: nam si quis sub certa lege vel interventu cujusdam personæ contrahi voluit, æquissimum erit id servari, in quo præpositus est. 2 Cui consequens est, ut alii reges aut populi magis, alii minus ex ducum suorum contractibus teneri possint, si satis notæ sint ipsorum leges atque instituta. De his si non constat, sequendum est quod conjectura dictat, ut concessum intelligatur id, sine quo satis commode, quæ officii sunt, expediri non possunt. 3 Mandati fines si excesserit minor potestas, tenebitur ia si quod promisit præstare non potest, ad æstimationem : nisi lex aliqua satis cognita id quoque impediat. Quod si dolus accesserit, id est, si præ se tulerit jus majus quam habebat, jam tenebitur et de damno culpa dato, imo et ex crimine ad pœnam crimini respondentem. Ex priore causa bona obligantur, et si ea deficiant operæ, aut libertas corporis: ex posteriore quoque persona, aut bona, aut utrumque, pro de of the Principal. But if notice were given, and were not publicly known, the Principal is bound. Also the condition of the agency is to be observed; for if the Principal directed the contract to be made on certain rules, or by the intervention of a certain person, it is just that the contract should be valid on these conditions. 2 From which it follows, that some kings and peoples may be more, and others less bound, by the contracts of their generals, if their laws and rules are sufficiently known. If these are not commonly known, the interpretation must be followed which conjecture dictates; in such a way that that is understood to be conceded without which the functions which belong to a person's duty cannot be conveniently carried out. 3 If a subordinate authority has exceeded the bounds of his commission, he will be bound, if he cannot perform what it has promised, to an estimated equivalent: except some law sufficiently known prevent that also. But if deceit be added, that is, if he pretended to an authority greater than he had, he will then be bound, both for the damage done by his fault, and as a criminal, to the penalty corresponding to his guilt. On the first ground, his goods are liable, and if they are insufficient, his labour, or his personal liberty: on the second ground, his person also is liable, or his goods, or both, according to the quantity of the transgression. What we have said of deccit, will hold, even if the person so acting made an attestation that he did not intend himself to bear the obligation; because the debt due for |