De Offic. i. 13. I. CICER X. An privati cogendi sint a suis potestatibus implere quod promiserant. XI. Qualis interpretatio in hujusmodi pactis adhibenda. XII. Quomodo sumendo voces vitæ, vestium, adventus auxilii. XIII. Rediisse ad hostem quis dicendus: XIV. Justa auxilia quæ, in deditione, sub conditione fac ta. XV. Quæ ad executionem pertinent, conditionem non fa cere. XVI. De talium pactorum obsidibus. ICERONIS est illud satis tritum: etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserint, est in eo ipso fides conservanda: singuli, milites puta aut pagani: nihil enim ad fidem refert. Mirum est inventos esse juris CHAPTER XXIII. Of Private Faith in War. I. The dictum of Cicero is sufficiently well known;—Even if individuals under the pressure of the time have promised anything to the enemy, faith also is to be observed in that: individuals meaning either solders or civilians: for it makes no difference which they be, as to the obligation of good faith. It is strange that there should have been found masters of law who taught that pacts made publicly with enemies, bind us to good faith; but that those which are made by private persons, do not. For since private persons have private rights which they can subject to obligation, and since enemies are capable of acquiring rights, what can there be to impede the obligation? Add, that except we establish this rule, there is given occasion of bloodshed, and impediment to liberty; for if the faith of private persons be removed, the former can often not be prevented, nor the latter obtained by prisoners. II. Indeed, not only is our word binding when given to an enemy convent. D. Zasi. in apol. magistros, qui docerent, pacta publice cum hostibus inita fidem Bart. in 7. adstringere; at quæ a privatis fierent, non item. Nam, cum de pactis. privati jura privata habeant quæ obligare possunt, et hostes cont. Eckium. capaces sint acquirendi juris, quid esse potest quod obligatio- Hoc libro, nem impediat? adde quod nisi id statuatur, datur cædibus c. 19. § 2. occasio, libertati impedimentum : nam et illæ caveri sæpe, et hæc obtineri a captivis, fide privatorum sublata, non poterit. iii. II. Imo non hosti tantum illi, quem jus gentium agnoscit, sed et latroni et piratæ data privatim fides obligat, perinde ut de fide publica supra diximus. Id interest, quod si metus supra, ii. 11. injustus ab altero incussus impulerit ad promittendum, is quiet i 19. promisit petere restitutionem, aut, si alter nolit, sibi eam præstare potest. Quod in metu procedente ex bello publico juris oldr. cons. 7. gentium locum non habet. Quod si et jusjurandum accesserit, matrim. F.11. jam omnino quod promissum est præstandum erit ab eo qui promisit, si perjurii crimen effugere volet. Sed tale perjurium si in hostem publicum commissum sit, puniri ab hominibus solet: si in latrones aut piratas, dissimulari odio eorum, quorum commodum agitur. III. In hac quoque privata fide minorem non excipiemus, qui ejus status est, ut actum intelligat. Nam quæ minoribus consulunt beneficia, ex jure sunt civili. Nos de jure gentium querimus. Covar. de c. 3. § 4. n. 21. IV. Et de errore alibi diximus, ita jus dare a contractu Lib. ii. 11. § 6. whom the Law of Nations acknowledges as such, but even to a robber or a pirate; as we have said above, in speaking of public faith. There is this difference, that if an unjust fear, impressed by another, has been the force impelling to the promise, he who made the promise may seek restitution; or if the other will not give it, may take it by his own power. This does not hold in the case of fear proceeding from a war public according to the Law of Nations. But if an oath be added, he who promised must by all means perform what he has promised, if he wishes to escape the crime of perjury. Yet such a perjury, if committed towards an enemy, is commonly punished by men; if it be committed against robbers or pirates, it is commonly overlooked, in consequence of the hatred borne to such persons. III. In this case of private faith we do not except a Minor, who is in such a condition that he understands the act. For the allowances which are made to minors are made by the Civil Law. And we are now considering the results of the Law of Nations. IV. With regard to Error, we have elsewhere said that there is a right of receding from a contract, if that which was by error given in recedendi, si id, quod per errorem creditum fuit, in mente agentis vim habuerit conditionis. V. 1 At, quo usque se extendat privatorum in paciscendo potestas, difficilior inspectio est. Quod publicum est, a privato alienari non posse satis constat: nam si ne ducibus Cap. xxii. §7. quidem belli id permissum est, ut modo probavimus, multo minus privatis. Sed de ipsorum actionibus ac rebus quæri potest, quia videntur hæc quoque concedi hostibus non posse sine aliquo damno partis: unde videri possunt talia pacta illicita cum civibus ob jus supereminens civitatis, tum conductis militibus ob fidem sacramento datam. 2 Sed sciendum est, ea pacta, quæ malum majus aut certius evitant, magis utilia quam damnosa etiam publico censeri debere, quia minus malum induit rationem boni: Xpη Twv κακῶν ἐπιλέγεσθαι τὰ μετριώτερα, ut ait quidam apud Punic. p. 55. Appianum. Neque vero fides sola, qua quis potestatem ipsam sui et suarum rerum non abdicat, neque utilitas publica sine legis auctoritate id efficere possunt, ut quod factum est, etiamsi contra officium factum esse detur, irritum sit et effectu juris omni careat. 3 Lex quidem posset adimere subditis aut perpetuis, aut trust have, in the mind of him who entrusted it, the force of a condition. V. 1 How far the power of private persons, to make agreements, extends, is a more difficult question. That what is public property cannot be alienated by a private person, is sufficiently plain: for if that was not even permitted to generals, as we have proved just now, much less is it to private persons. But it may be questioned concerning their own actions and property; because it may seem that these also cannot be conceded to the enemy without some damage of the party: whence it may seem that such pacts with the enemy are unlawful for citizens, on account of the eminent jurisdiction of the state; and for regular soldiers, on account of their military oath. 2 But it is to be considered that those pacts which are made in order to avoid a greater or certain evil, ought to be reckoned more useful than hurtful to the public also; because the lesser evil assumes the nature of a good. Nor does fidelity to the state or his superior; since by this the person does not abdicate his power over himself and his property; nor does the public utility alone, without the authority of law; produce such an effect, that what is done, even if it be done against duty, shall be void and destitute of jural effect. 3 Law indeed may take from subjects, either perpetual or tem temporariis hanc potestatem: sed neque lex hoc semper facit; parcit enim civibus: neque semper facere potest: nam leges humanæ, ut alibi diximus, vim obligandi tum demum habent, si latæ sint ad humanum modum, non si onus injungant, quod a ratione et natura plane abhorreat. Et ideo leges et præcepta specialia, quæ tale quid aperte præ se ferunt, pro legibus haberi non debent; generales autem leges interpretatione benigna ita accipiendae sunt, ut casus summæ necessitatis excludant. 4 Quod si actus, qui lege aut præcepto interdictus erat, et valere vetitus, interdici æquo jure potuit, jam irritus erit actus privati, sed puniri tamen idem poterit, ideo quod promisit id, quod sui juris non erat, maxime si juratus id fecerit. VI. Promissio captivi de redeundo in carcerem merito toleratur: neque enim deteriorem reddit captivi conditionem. Non ergo, ut quidam existimant, gloriose tantum fecit M. Attilius Regulus, sed et quod debebat: Regulus, inquit Cicero, Offic. iii. 29. non debuit conditiones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles perturbare perjurio. Nec obstat illud: Atqui sciebat, quæ sibi barbarus porary, their power: but the law does not always do this; for it is tender of the interests of citizens. For human laws, as we have elsewhere said, have then, and then only, a binding force, if they are made in a humane manner, not if they impose burthens which are repugnant to reason and nature. And therefore special laws and precepts which have, upon the face of them, anything of this kind, are not to be held as laws and general laws are to be interpreted indulgently, so as to exclude cases of extreme necessity. 4 If an act, which was interdicted by a law or precept, and deprived of its validity by prohibition, could be interdicted with reasonable right, the act of the private person will be void; but at the same time he is liable to punishment for having promised what was not in his power, and especially if he did it under oath. VI. The promise of a prisoner to return into captivity is rightly allowed: for it does not render the condition of the prisoner worse than it was. And therefore Regulus, in doing what he did, acted not gloriously only, as some think, but also as he ought. Regulus, says Cicero, ought not to disturb the conditions and covenants belonging to the laws of war, by an act of perjury. Nor is it a sound objection, that, as Horace says, he knew the tortures which awaited him: for when he gave the promise he knew how likely this was. And so with regard Horat. iii. Nam et hoc fieri posse jam scierat, cum promitteret. Sic et de decem captivis, ut quidem ex antiquis scriptoribus rem narLib. vii. 18. rat Gellius, octo postliminium justum non esse sibi responderunt, quoniam dejurio vincti forent. Lib. i. 103. Lib. i. 78. VII. 1 Solent et promittere quidam ne in certum locum redeant, ne adversus eum, qui ipsos in potestate habet, militent. Prioris exemplum apud Thucydidem, ubi sic Ithomenses promittunt Lacedæmoniis, exituros se Peloponneso, nec unquam redituros. Posterius nunc frequens est. Vetus exemplum est apud Polybium, ubi dimittuntur ab Amilcare Numidæ sub lege, μηδένα φέρειν ὅπλον πολέμιον κατ' avtŵv ne adversus Carthaginienses eorum quisquam arma Goth. iii. 36. hostilia ferret. Simile pactum habet in Gothicis Procopius. 2 Hoc pactum quidam irritum pronuntiant, quia sit contra officium, quod patriæ debeatur. At non, quicquid contra officium est, statim et irritum est, ut et alibi et supra diximus. Deinde vero ne contra officium quidem, libertatem sibi parere id promittendo, quod jam est in hostis manu. Nihilo enim • Dejurio vincti] Id est, capitis minores, ut Horatius de Regulo loquitur. (Dict. III. Od. v.) Procopius] Gotth. 11. de Herulis. (Cap. 14.) [Hoc exemplum diversum est ab eo, quod in contextu indicatur. In loco præcedenti POLYBII nullum est pactum, sed comminatio tantum Hamil to the ten prisoners, as Gellius tells the story out of old authors; Eight said that they had no right to postliminium, for they had by their oaths lost the character of citizens. VII. 1 Also prisoners often promise not to return to a certain place, or not to bear arms against him who has them in his power. We have an example of the former case in Thucydides; when the Ithomians promise the Lacedæmonians that they will quit Peloponnesus, and never return. The latter kind of engagement is now common. We have an old example in Polybius, when the Numidians are dismissed by Amilcar, on condition of never bearing arms against the Carthaginians. Procopius in his Gothic history has a similar pact. 2 Some moralists pronounce this pact void, because it is against the duty which a person owes to his country. But what is against duty, is not necessarily and of course void; as we have already explained. And in the next place, it is not against duty to obtain one's liberty by promising that which is already in the enemy's power. For the cause of the country is not worsened by such an act; for he who is a captive has ceased to be of any value to that cause. VIII. Also some promise not to make their escape. They are bound by this promise, even though they were under restraint when |