c. 20. πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους non debere regem apud subditos aliud quam verum eloqui. Mamertinus de Juliano: mira est in Pang. Jul. principe nostro mentis linguæque concordia. Non modo humilis et parvi animi, sed et servile vitium scit esse mendacium: et vere cum mendaces homines aut inopia aut timor faciat, magnitudinem fortunæ suæ imperator qui mentitur ignorat. Laudatur Plutarcho Aristidis puos idpupérŋ ev Pag. 319 D. ἤθει βεβαίῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἀτενής, ψεῦδος δ ̓ οὐδ ̓ ἐν παιδιᾶς τινι τρόπῳ προσιεμένη ingenium morum constantia præditum, et justi tenax, mendacii etiam in joco fugiens. De Epaminonda Probus: adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco Corn. Nep. quidem mentiretur. εν c. 3. 2 Quod profecto Christianis eo magis observandum est, 9quia ipsis non simplicitas tantum imperata est Matth. x. 16, sed et vaniloquentia interdicta Matth. xii. 36, et is in exemplum propositus, in cujus ore dolus inventus non est. Lactantius: 1 Pet. ii. 22. Itaque viator ille verus ac justus non dicet illud Lu- Inst. Div. vi. cilianum: Homini amico ac familiari non est mentiri meum. Sed etiam inimico atque ignoto existimabit non esse mentiri suum: nec aliquando committet, ut lingua interpres animi a sensu et cogitatione discordet. Talis est in Philoctete Schoclis Neoptolemus ὑπερβάλλων ἁπλότητι καὶ εὐγενείᾳ, eos illiberales servilisque animi vocare solent. [Locus Plutarchi exstat in Lib. De Educ. Liber. pag. 11 c. Edit. Wechel. Tom. 11. J. B.] 9 Nihil heic poscit Religio Christiana ultra id, quod Lege Naturæ sancitur. Diximus plura in Notis nostris Gallicis. J. B. loftiness of mind, and sometimes from a confidence in the strength of the speaker. In Elian we have a saying of Pythagoras, that men approach to the gods principally by two things; by always speaking the truth, and by doing good to others; and in Jamblichus veracity is called the leader to all divine and human good things. So Aristotle says that the magnanimous man loves to speak truly and freely; Plutarch, that to lie is slavish. So Arrian of Ptolemy and of Alexander; Mamertinus of Julian; so Plutarch of Aristides, and Probus of Epaminondas, that they would not lie even in jest. 2 And this is still more to be observed by Christians, to whom not only simplicity is commanded, Matt. x. 16, but also vain speaking interdicted, Matt. xii. 36; and he proposed as an example, in whose mouth was found no guile. So Lactantius says that we must not be content with telling truth to our friends, but also to strangers and enemics. So Neoptolemus is described in Sophocles, 18. £52 c. Orat. lii. p. generosa simplicitate excellens, ut recte notavit Dion Prusæensis, qui Ulyssi ad dolos hortanti sic respondet. (Philoctet vers. 85, et seqq.): Plut. Alex. p. 683 D. Lib. xiii. 1. Ego audiens quæ doleo, Laërta sate, At sum paratus vi mera, non fraudibus Euripides Rheso (vers. 510, 511): Generosus animus hostibus furtim necem 3 Sic Alexander furari negabat se velle victoriam. Et Achæos abhorruisse ab omni in hostes fraude narrat Polybius, ideo quod eam demum firmam censerent victoriam, quæ, ut In VI. Cons. Claudiani verbis sensum ejus exprimam, Hon. v. 248. Var. Hist. xii. 33. Confessos animo quoque subjugat hostes. Tales Romani ferme ad usque belli Punici secundi finem. #lianus : ἴσασι Ρωμαῖοι ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὐ μὲν διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιβουλῆς καταγωνίσασθαι τοὺς ἐχθρούς· Romanis propria est virtus, non per astus et vafritiem quæsita victoria. Nec olim genitor, ut prohibent, Ille non inclusus equo Minervæ Troas et lætam Priami choreis Sed palam captis gravis. Et quæ sequuntur: ubi Scholiastes dicit Achillem nihil fraude, sed semper palam virtutis fiducia dimicasse. Nota illud excellent in simplicity and noblemindedness; as Dio Prusæensis notes. See his answer to Ulysses in the Philoctetes, and Euripides in the Rhesus. 3 So Alexander said that he would not steal a victory. And Polybius relates that the Achæans abhorred all fraud towards enemies; thinking victory then only firm when, as Claudian says, it subjugates the minds of the enemy. Such were the Romans till the end of the second Punic war. It is their virtue, Elian says, not to seek victory by art and cunning. And accordingly when Perseus was deceived with the hope of peace, the older senators said that they did not recognize the arts of Rome; that their ancestors had never in war boasted of cunning instead of courage; not of the tricks of the Carthaginians, not of the subtlety of the Greeks, among whom it was more glorious to deceive an enemy than to overcome him by force. And then they added that sometimes, for the 47.]] Unde cum Perseus Macedonum rex deceptus esset spe pacis, [[Liv. xlii. negabant veteres senatorum se agnoscere Romanas artes: majores nunquam ut astu magis quam virtute gloriarentur bella gessisse non versutiis Punicis, non calliditate Græca, apud quos fallere hostem quam vi superare gloriosius foret. Tum illud addebant: interdum in præsens tempus plus profici dolo quam virtute, sed ejus demum animum in perpetuum vinci, cui confessio expressa esset, se neque arte, neque casu, sed collatis cominus viribus justo ac pio bello esse superatum. Etiam serius apud Tacitum legimus: non Ann. ii. 88. fraude, neque occulte, sed palam et armatum populum Romanum hostes suos ulcisci. Tales etiam Tibareni, qui prælii Schol. ad ii. quoque locum et tempus condicebant. Quod et de Græcis 1012 sui temporis apud Herodotum 'prodit Mardonius. XXI. Ad modum agendi et illud pertinet, quod quicquid alicui facere non licet, ad id eum impellere aut sollicitare non liceat. Pro exemplo sint hæc: regem suum occidere subdito non licet, nec oppida sine consilio publico dedere, nec spoliare cives. Ad hæc ergo subditum, qui talis maneat, permovere non licet. Semper enim qui alteri peccandi causam dat, peccat et ipse. Nec est quod regerat quisquam, ipsi qui virtutis fiducia, quod optime convenit cum iis quæ nos hujus paragraphi initio in textu diximus. 1 Locus est Lib. VII. cap. 9. Sed ubi id reperit Auctor noster, quod verba Græca, recte expensa, non præ se fe runt. J. B. a Quidquid alicui facere non licet, ad id eum impellere aut sollicitare non liceat] Ita docet et Maimonides in .10 $ .5 .cap הלכות תובל Apoll. Rhod. present moment, success might be obtained by deceit more than by XXI. As to what concerns the mode of acting, this is to be noted; that what it is not lawful for another to do, it is not lawful for us to impel or solicit him to do. We may take such examples as these: it is not lawful for a subject to kill his king, nor to give up towns without public authority, nor to despoil his fellowcitizens. Therefore it is not lawful to move a citizen, continuing in that character, to do such things. For in all cases, he who gives another cause to sin, does himself sin. Nor is it enough to reply talem hominem ad facinus impellit, actum talem, puta hostis interfectionem, esse licitum. Licet enim id ei facere, sed non eo modo. Bene Augustinus: nihil interest utrum ipse scelus Cath. c. 57. admittas, an alium propter te admittere velis. Lib. ii. De XXII. Aliud est si quis opera sponte nec suo impulsu peccantis ad rem sibi licitam utatur: quod iniquum non esse "Dei ipsius exemplo alibi probavimus. Transfugam jure L. 51. D de belli recipimus, inquit Celsus, id est, contra jus belli non est, ut eum admittamus, qui deserta hostium parte nostram eligit. acq. rerum dom. b Dei ipsius exemplo] Libro 11. cap. xxvi. § 5. c Contra jus belli non est, ut eum admittamus qui deserta hostium parte nostram eligit] Neque reddendi tales, nisi pace convenerit: ut pace cum Philippo, Ætolis, Antiocho. Polybius in Excerptis Legationum IX. XXVIII. XXXV. Menander protector idem nos docet. (Pag. 118. Edit. Hasch. in conditionibus Fœderis inter Justinianum et Chosroën. J. B.) that to him who impels such a man to such a deed, say to kill an enemy, the deed is lawful. It is lawful, but not in that manner. Augustine says well, It makes no difference whether you yourself commit a wickedness, or make another man commit it for you.. XXII. The case is different, if any one use the help of a person who does wrong of his own accord, and not at his impulse; which we have proved elsewhere, by the example of God himself, not to be unjust. We receive a deserter by the laws of war, says Celsus; that is, it is not against the laws of war to receive him who leaves the enemy and comes over to us. CAPUT II. QUOMODO JURE GENTIUM BONA SUBDITORUM PRO I. 1 T proprie jus non dare aut VI. VII. Vitam non obligari. materia est juris civilis et VENIAMUS ad ea quæ ex jure descendunt gentium. Ea partim ad quodvis bellum spectant, partim ad certam belli speciem. A generalibus auspicemur. Mero naturæ jure ex facto alieno nemo tenetur, nisi qui bonorum successor est: aut enim cum oneribus bona transirent simul cum dominiis rerum introductum est. Imperator Zeno æqui- L. un. C. ut tati naturali contrarium dicit ut pro alienis debitis alii molestentur. Hinc tituli in jure Romano, ne uxor pro marito, ne maritus pro uxore, ne filius pro patre, ne pater vel mater pro filio conveniantur. a Ut enim cum oneribus bona transirent simul cum dominiis rerum introductum est] Vide supra Lib. 11. c. 21. § 19. CHAPTER II. Adde c. in literis 5. de raptoribus c. tua How by the Law of Nations the goods of Subjects are liable for the debt of the Rulers; and herein, of Reprisals. I. 1 Let us come to the results which in war flow from the Law of Nations. These belong partly to any war, partly, to certain kinds of war. We begin with the general case. By the mere Law of Nature, no one is bound by the act of another, except he who is the successor to his property: for the rule that property passes with its burthens, was introduced when property was introduced. The emperor Zeno says that it is contrary to natural equity that one person should be molested for the debts of another. Hence the Roman Law provides that the wife is not responsible for the husband, the husband for the wife, the son for the father, the father or mother for the son. null. ex vit. Tot. tit. C. mar. et ne ne uxor pro fil. pro pat. |