Phil 5135.1 HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY 1875, March 22. LONDON: PRINTED BY CHARLES WOOD, young 32 PREFACE ΤΟ THE FIRST EDITION. It has been frequently objected to metaphysical speculations, that they subserve no useful purpose; and it must be allowed, that there are many inquiries in this department of intellectual exertion, which lead, in appearance, and even in reality, to no practical result. This is however a defect inherent in every pursuit, and can be brought as no specific objection against the philosophy of mind. How many substances are analyzed by the chemist, which can never be rendered useful; how many plants are minutely described by the naturalist, which might have remained in obscurity without the least possible detriment to the world; and how many events are narrated by the historian, from which no beneficial inference can be drawn! It seems to be a necessary condition of human science, that we should learn many useless things, in order to become acquainted with those which are of service; and as it is impossible, antecedently to experience, to know the value of our acquisitions, the only way in which mankind can secure all the advantages of knowledge is to prosecute their inquiries in every possible direction. There can be no greater impediment to the progress of science than a perpetual and anxious reference at every step to palpable utility. Assured that the general result will be beneficial, it is not wise to be too solicitous as to the immediate value of every individual effort. Besides, there is a certain completeness to be attained in every science, for which we are obliged to acquire many particulars not otherwise of any worth. worth. Nor is it to be forgotten, that trivial and apparently useless acquisitions are often the necessary preparatives to important discoveries. The labours of the antiquary, the verbal critic, the collator of mouldering manuscripts, the describer of microscopic objects (labours which may appear to many out of all proportion to the value of the result), may be pre |