failure to do so might, at least, cause delay in bringing on a settlement and hearing. § 449. Extension of time-By stipulation. Reasonable extensions of time by stipulations between counsel, for preparing and serving statements and bills, without the sanction, concurrence or act of the court, have often been recognized as binding and effectual for that purpose and never questioned. And they may extend the time beyond that allowed by the statute and that which it is within the power of the court to add thereto by order. This was decided in Simpson v. Budd,200 a proceeding for a writ of mandate against the superior court, where the court said: "We are of the opinion that the party may, within the time allowed by the law to give notice of intention to move for a new trial, stipulate that the time for giving such notice may be extended, and that such stipulation has effect without any order of the court ratifying the same. The question in such cases is one which most immediately concerns the parties to the action, and attorneys may be safely intrusted to look after the rights of their respective clients in such matters. The court here only mentions the notice of intention, but the stipulation. under consideration was for thirty days from its date within which to prepare, serve, and file a bill of exceptions, notice of motion for a new trial, and statement on motion for a new trial. This stipulation was not filed with the clerk of the court until April 15, 1891, nor was there any order of the court, or of the judge thereof, extending the time within which the act named in the stipulation might be done. The notice of motion for new trial was filed and served within the time given by the stipulation; and within ten days thereafter, to wit, on February 14, 1891, the petitioners prepared and served a proposed bill of exceptions, and the defendants in that action prepared amendments thereto, and the same afterward came before the respondent for settlement. No objection was made by the attorneys for the defendants to the settlement of the bill of exceptions, for the reason that the notice of motion was not given in time, but objection was made to such action upon 260 91 Cal. 488, 491, 27 Pac. 758. the ground that the copy of said notice served upon them was not signed by the attorneys for petitioners. The respondent refused to settle the bill of exceptions upon the ground that the notice of intention to move for a new trial was not served and filed in time, and that the proposed bill of exceptions was not prepared and presented in time. The court had no doubt of the power of counsel thus to extend the time beyond the statutory period, without filing the stipulation. § 450. Extension of time-By order of court. There are three distinct steps recognized by the Practice Act in a proceeding to obtain a new trial, for the taking of each of which, except the last, a particular period of time is allowed; First. A notice of intention to move for a new trial; secondly. Serving statement Serving statement or affidavits, or both; thirdly. The motion for a new trial. An order extending the time for taking either of these steps should express with precision the object to be attained.201 The full measure of the court's power to extend the time for taking either of the first two steps is the statutes giving such power. The statutes of Montana on the subject may be taken as representative of those of California, and other code states. They provide262 that when a motion for new trial is made on a bill of exceptions, the party shall have the same time after service of the notice of intention to move for a new trial to serve such bill as is 261 See Jenkins v. Frink, 27 Cal. 337. While the Practice Act of 1851 was in force, the court made the following order-the day after the rendition of judgment: “It is ordered that all proceedings under the judgment recovered by plaintiff against defendants be and they are hereby stayed and superseded until the fifth day of May next, in order that counsel may present and prepare his statement on motion for new trial." Held, that this order did not extend the statutory time within which to file a statement: Bear River etc. Min. Co. v. Boles, 24 Cal. 354. 262 Mont. Code Civ. Proc., § 1173. Similar provision is made in probably all the code states. In Washington it seems that the time limited by statute cannot be extended by the judge except upon notice and for good cause shown or upon stipulation: Wollin v. Smith, 27 Wash. 349, 67 Pac. 561; McQuesten v. Morrill, 12 Wash. 335, 41 l'ac. 56. provided after entry of judgment263—that is, ten days-and ten days after service of such notice to serve a statement of the case, and in either case the judge may extend the time for thirty days in addition to the statutory time. Under these statutes, it was held that where a judgment was entered on June 9th, notice of intention to move for new trial was served on the 16th, and on the 25th the judge extended the time to serve the bill of exceptions to July 26th, the service of the bill on July 24th was in time, and that it might be used on appeal from the judgment.264 The order made in that case was void for the excess, but valid within the time named in the statute for which he might grant an extension. It was held that an order allowing a party a given number of days within which to file a statement on motion for new trial must be construed as giving the number of days from the date of the order.265 But it was held with reference to an order which "extended" the time to give notice of a motion for a new trial thirty days that it should be construed to extend the time thirty days beyond the time given by the statute.260 And as such orders are liberally construed under the codes, such an order as that made in Jenkins v. Frink 267 would probably now be construed to give the number of days in addition to those already given by law, as to which there would be no purpose or necessity for procuring an order. It is an easy matter, however, to so prepare such orders as to leave no room for doubt. When the time has been extended by stipulation, the power of the court to extend the time is simply held in abeyance dur 263 Mont. Code Civ. Proc., § 1155. 264 Whalen v. Harrison, 26 Mont. 316, 67 Pac. 934. To same effect, Doyle v. Gove, 13 Mont. 471, 34 Pac. 846; S. C., 36 Pac. 762; Cottle v. Leitch, 43 Cal. 320. As to extension of time for settlement of bill of exceptions, see Moe v. Railway Co., 2 N. Dak. 282, 50 N. W. 715; Miller v. Way, 3 S. Dak. 627, 54 N. W. 814. 205 Jenkins v. Frink, 27 Cal. 337. 266 Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 541, 2 Pac. 418. An order extending the time within which to prepare a statement on motion for a new trial carries with it the same extension of time to serve the statement: Bryant v. Sternfeld, 89 Cal. 611, 26 Pac. 1091. 267 27 Cal. 337. ing the period covered by the stipulation; and where the time for the preparation of a statement on motion for a new trial has been extended by stipulation between the parties, the court has power to grant a further extension, not exceeding thirty days, if the application therefor be made before the time as extended by stipulation has expired.268 The same liberality of construction prevails in determining the date to which such orders run. It was held that, if the time for filing a statement on motion for a new trial, or for doing any act of court practice, is extended "to" a certain date, the date named is included within the period prescribed.200 It would appear that in Muir v. Galloway,270 the judge had attempted to extend the time eleven days by the last order, and thirty-one days by the three orders; but the court held otherwise. As the intervention of Sundays and other holidays is liable to present the same question again, it may be worth while to state the case in some detail. October 20, 1880, the verdict was rendered. Notice of intention to move for new trial was filed and served by defendants October 29th. November 8th defendants obtained from the judge of the court below an order granting ten days from date in which to prepare and serve their proposed statement on motion for new trial. On November 18th, another extension of ten days was granted by the judge. November 28, 1880, was Sunday; November 27th, the judge made an order allowing defendants 263 Curtis v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 70 Cal. 390, 11 Pac. 652. 269 Penn. Placer Min. Co. v. Schreiner, 1 Mont. 121; State v. Benson, 21 Wash. 365, 58 Pac. 217. Under an order made in term, setting a motion for a new trial for hearing on a day named in vacation, "or such other time as the court may hereafter fix," and directing that it "be heard at chambers, and that movants have until the hearing to make out and perfect their brief of evidence, and file the same without prejudice, and that at the said hearing all things may be done, to all intents and purposes, as if the said case was heard and determined at and during the present term of the court," the movants had, until the hearing actually took place, the right to present a brief of evidence and have the same approved and filed: Hightower v. Brazeal, 101 Ga. 371, 29 S. E. 18. See, also, Brunswick Light etc. Co. v. Gale, 91 Ga. 813, 18 S. E. 11. 270 61 Cal. 498. ten days further time from November 29th, within which to prepare and serve their proposed statement. The proposed statement was on December 9, 1880, served on plaintiff's attorney without waiver by him as to time of service. It was held (1) that the orders of the judge did not extend time for preparing and serving the statement more than thirty days; (2) that the last day of the period of extension fixed by one of the orders being Sunday, it was not to be computed as any portion of the time granted by the order, but was a supplement was served in time. The soundness of this decision mentary day superadded by law; (3) that the proposed statemay well be doubted in view of the criticism of it in a later case, in which, however, the court did not pass upon the point.271 It is well settled, however, that an order extending time is of no force after the lapse of time fixed by law or previous extensions granted by the court,272 and this holds good even though had the application been made earlier the court still had power to have given a further extension.273 271 Reay v. Butler, 99 Cal. 477, 480, 33 Pac. 1134. 272 Bunnel v. Stockton (City of), 83 Cal. 319, 23 Pac. 301; Wheeler v. Karnes, 125 Cal. 51, 57 Pac. 893; Cameron v. Arcata etc. R. R. Co., 129 Cal. 279, 61 Pac. 955; Freese v. Freese, 134 Cal. 48, 66 Pac. 43; Doyle v. Gore, 13 Mont. 471, 34 Pac. 846. 273 Freese v. Freese, 134 Cal. 48, 66 Pac. 43; Clark v. Crane, 57 Cal. 629. Under the Washington code a motion for an extension of time to file a statement of facts, need not be made within the thirty days next succeeding the entry of judgment: Crowley v. McDonough (Wash.), 70 Pac. 261; Ballinger's Ann. Codes & Stats., § 5062, "it is also essential that any order extending the time shall be made before the party seeking such extension is in default. If he permits the time within which he may act to elapse without acting, any subsequent order giving him time to act will not avail to revive his right to do the act'; Freese v. Freese, supra. In Bunnel v. Stockton, 83 Cal. 319, 320, 23 Pac. 301, the court said: "The motion for a new trial was properly denied, for the reason that no statement of the case was filed in time. The code requires that the statement be served within ten days after the service of notice of intention to move for a new trial: Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. 3. The moving party must prepare and serve his statement within the time allowed by law for that purpose, or it cannot be settled, or if settled cannot be considered either at the hearing of the motion or on appeal to this court: Quivey v. Gambert, 32 Cal. 304, 309; Chase v. Evoy, 58 |