THE FRIEND. No. 22, THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1810. Orders for discontinuanée received henceforward, cannot be complied with till the sixth Number from the receipt of the Letter: and all such orders, whether con taining money or not, will, it is requested, be addressed directly to Mr. Brown, Printer, Penrith. These Subscribers who have not remitted the same for the first twenty Numbers, are solicited to pay the same either to Mr. G. Ward, Bookseller, Skinner-Street, or to the Postmaster of the town at or near which they reside; to be repaid by the Post-master at Kendal, or inclosed in a letter (post paid) to Mr. Coleridge, Grasmere, Kendal; or (if containing orders) to Mr. Brown, Penrith. A more regular and uniform plan of Receipt will be formed and made known six weeks before the next payment. ARMATT REFERAM VIRÉS? PLUS EGIT INERMIS. GLAUDIAN. My preceding Number, in strict correspondence with its Title, presented merely Sketches and Fragments of the Life and Character of Sir ALEXANDER BALL. The chief causes that withheld me from attempting a regular Bio graphy, were the consciousness of a constitutional inability in myself to retain Names and Dates, joined with a diffidence in the accuracy of my recollection respecting facts and events, which, at the time I heard them narrated, had not particularly interested me; or (to speak more correctly) which had faded in my memory in consequence of the vivid impression left by other facts, that appeared to me more illustrative of the Narrator's character, or bearing a closer reference to scenes and circumstances, in which I had been myself personally present. I resembled a Man who having dug up in separate pieces the greater and more important part of a Mammoth Skeleton, yet through ignorance of all its' anatomy, and having besides forgotten or confused the arrangement, in which the fragments were originally presented to him, becomes incapable of repré senting a just and coherent figure of the whole animal. Where these causes did not act, prudential reasons, and motives of personal delicacy, supplied their place. My Readers therefore will kindly consider what I have hitherto related, in the light of a mere introduction to that part of my subject, of which I am more compleatly master; and which besides, if not more important in itself, yet possesses in a greater degree that species of interest, that connection with general Principles, by which (as far as the public taste will permit) I would wish that every Number of THE FRIEND should be more or less marked: I proceed therefore to the conduct and character of Sir Alexander Ball, as the Conqueror, Governor, and Legislator of Malta... Insula parva situ sed rebus maxima gestis, VINCENZO LITTARA. For the perfect comprehension of Sir Alexander Ball's views and objects, and in order justly to estimate the nature and extent of his services, as a Man and as a Statesman, relatively both to Malta and to Great Britain, it will be useful to prefix a few remarks on the original grounds of the present war; in what, sense Malta is to be considered as the cause of it; and lastly, in what the real importance of the Island consists, I shall do this the more gladly, first, because there are many erroneous opinions on this point, still current, and which, if they are suffered to remain unconfuted, may act to the prejudice of our national interests; secondly, because the facts and arguments, by which they are to be confuted, apply closely to the present assertions and general temper of a clamourous and, it is to be feared, encreasing party among us, and will, I hope, throw some additional light on those Principles, by which alone the War can be prosecuted with effect, or a Peace concluded with safety and honor; and lastly, because the considerations I am about to submit to the Reader, were written by me during my residence at Malta-were written at the instance of Sir Alexander Ball, and after many conversations with him on the subject, and when written, An Island small in size but great by illustrious exploits, the joint neighbour of Africa, Europe, and Asia, 'the hospitable entertainer of St. Paul, and the delightful nurse of the Nobles of the white Cross. were read and approved of by him, and must therefore be deemed as a part of his own opinions, and as such not merely preparatory to, but a natural part of, the plan which I first proposed to myself. Little prospective wisdom can that man obtain, who hurrying onward with the current, or rather torrent, of Events, feels no interest in their importance, except as far as his curiosity is excited by their novelty; and to whom all reflection and retrospect are wearisome. If ever there were a time when the formation of just public Principles becomes a duty of private Morality; when the principles of Morality in general ought to be made bear on our public suffrages, and to effect every great national determination; when, in short, his COUNTRY should have a place by every Englishman's Fireside; and when the feelings and truths, which give dignity to the Fire-side and tranquillity to the Death-bed, ought to be present and influencive in the Cabinet and the' Senate that time is now with us. Never can Englishmen too often be warned, that where Ambition admits no boundary but that of its' own power, and all the Vices are allied and systematized against us; there can be no hope of successful resistance, but in an equal union of all the Virtues of the human character: and that this is not possible without a clear insight into those Principles, which measure and reconcile their different claims of different vir tues, and allot to each its' time, its' place, its' function, and its' degree. If the present Empire of France be rightly considered as one bad great Man wielding the strength and weaponry of millions, in all just proportion the Kingdom, that is to resist him, and which must perish if it does not resist him adequately, ought to be (as Milton with his accustomed grandeur hath expressed it)" but as one vast Personage, one mighty growth and stature of an honest Man, as big and compact in virtue as in body." Scarcely can that be too often enforced, the practice of which is both necessary and inexhaustible: and the principle of Evil fights his battles cheap, if he may still use the same Sword, and good Men not employ the same. Buckler. In a rich commercial State, a War seldom fails to become unpopular by length of continuance. The last War, which towards its' close, had become just and necessary, perhaps beyond any former example, had yet causes of unpopularity peculiar to itself. Exhaustion is the natural consequence of excessive stimulation, in the feelings of Nations equally, as in those of Individuals. Wearied out by overwhelming Novelties; stunned, as it were, by a series of strange explosions; sick too of hope long delayed; and uncertain as to the real object and motive of the War, from the rapid change and general failure of its' ostensible objects and motives; the public mind, for many months preceding the signing of the Preliminaries, had lost all its' tone and elasticity. The consciousness of mutual errors and mutual disappointments, disposed the great majority of all Parties to a spirit of diffidence and toleration, which, amiable as it may be in Individuals, yet in a Nation, and above all in an opulent and luxurious Nation, is always too nearly akin to apathy and selfish indulgence. Au unmanly impatience for Peace became only not universal. After as long a resistance as the nature of our Constitution and national Character permitted or even endured, the Government applied at length the only remedy adequate to the greatness of the Evil, a remedy which the magnitude of the Evil justified, and which nothing but an Evil of that magnitude could justify. At a high price they purchased for us the name of Peace, at a time when the views of France became daily more and more incompatible with our vital interests. Considering the Peace as a mere Truce of experiment, wise and temperate Men regarded with complacency the Treaty of Amiens, for the very reasons that would have ensured the condemnation of any other Treaty under any other circumstances. Its' palpable deficiencies were its' antidote or rather they formed its' very essence, and declared at first sight, what alone it was or was meant to be. Any attempt at that time and in this Treaty, to have secured Italy, Holland and the German Empire, would have been in the literal sense of the word, preposterous. The Nation would have withdrawn all faith in the pacific intentions of the Ministers, if the negociation had been broken off on a plea of this kind: for it had taken for granted the extreme desirableness, nay the necessity of a Peace, and, this once admitted, there would, no doubt, have been an absurdity in continuing the War for objects, which the War furnished no means of realizing. If the First Consul had entered into stipulations with us respecting the Continent, they would have been observed only as long as his interest from other causes might have dictated; they would have been signed with as much sincerity and observed with as much good faith, as the article actually inserted in the Treaty of Amiens, respecting the integrity of the Turkish Empire. This article indeed was wisely insisted on by us, because it affected both our national honour, and the interests of our Indian empire immediately; and still more, perhaps, because this of all others was the most likely to furnish an early proof of the First Consul's real dispositions. But deeply interested in the fate of the Continent, as we are thought to be, it would nevertheless have been most idle to have abandoned a Peace, supposing it at all desirable, on the ground that the French Government had refused that, which would have been of no value had it been granted. Indeed there results one serious disadvantage from insisting on the rights and interests of Austria, the Empire, Switzerland, &c. in a Treaty between England and France: and, as it should seem, no advantage to counterbalance it. For so, any attack on those rights instantly pledges our character and national dignity to commence a War, however inexpedient it might happen to be, and however hopeless while if a War were expedient, any Attack on these Countries by France furnishes a justifiable cause of war in its' essential nature, and independently of all positive Treaty. Seen in this light, the Defects of the Treaty of Amiens will become it's real Merits. If the Government of France made Peace in the spirit of Peace, then a friendly Intercourse and the humanizing Influences of Commerce and reciprocal Hospitality, would gradually bring about in both Countries the dispositions necessary for the calm discussion and sincere conclusion of a genuine, efficient, and comprehensive Treaty. If the contrary proved the fact, the Treaty of Amiens contained in itself the principles of it's own Dissolution. It was what it ought to be. If the First Consul had both meant and dealt fairly by us, the Treaty would have led to a true Settlement; but he acting, as all prudent men expected that he would act, it supplied just reasons for the commencement of war-and at it's decease left us, as a legacy, Blessings that assuredly far outweighed our Losses by the Peace. It left us popular Enthusiasm, national Unanimity, and simplicity of Object: and removed one inconvenience, which cleaved to the last War, by attaching to the right objects, and enlisting under their proper Banners, the scorn aud hatred of Slavery, tlie |