Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland

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Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder
Oxford University Press, May 2, 1991 - Political Science - 320 pages
Fearing the loss of Korea and Vietnam would touch off a chain reaction of other countries turning communist, the United States fought two major wars in the hinterlands of Asia. What accounts for such exaggerated alarm, and what were its consequences? Is a fear of the domino effect permanently rooted in the American strategic psyche, or has the United States now adopted a less alarmist approach? The essays in this book address these questions by examining domino thinking in United States and Soviet Cold War strategy, and in earlier historic settings. Combining theory and history in analyzing issues relevant to current public policy, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the extent to which domino fears were a rational response, a psychological reaction, or a tactic in domestic politics.
 

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Contents

1 Introduction
3
2 Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior
20
Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition
51
Myth or Reality?
85
The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle
112
Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains?
145
7 Soviet Perceptions of American Foreign Policy After Afghanistan
190
Changing Strategic and Regional Images
220
9 Russian and Soviet Strategic Behavior in Asia
250
10 Conclusion
276
Index
291
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