Syllabus. ing stockholders, was involved, and, by the simplest rules of construction, the language used must be held to apply to the case in hand, and not to an essentially different case. Our conclusion is that in the case at bar Poston cannot be held so long as the full liability of the existing stockholders has not been exhausted. To avoid possible misunderstanding it may be added that this controversy, having arisen before the recent amendment to the constitution of the state, which abolishes the double liability of stockholders, is not affected by that amendment. Judgment of the circuit court reversed and cause remanded. Reversed. SHAUCK, C. J., PRICE, CREW, SUMMERS and DAVIS, JJ., concur. PITTINGER 7. THE CITY OF WELLSVILLE. No municipal debt shall be incurred-Unless appropriations made by council therefor-And money in the treasury-Section 45, Municipal Code-Board of Public Service can not employ janitor, when. The policy of our statutes respecting municipal corporations is that no debt shall be incurred for the ordinary expenses of the corporation unless an appropriation to meet it has been made by the city council, and the city auditor or clerk has certified to the city council that the money is in the treasury; and in the absence of such certificate, as required by Section 45 of the Municipal Code, the board of public service is without authority to employ a janitor for the city building, and a person so employed can not recover from the city for his services. (No. 9649-Decided February 5, 1907.) Argument for Plaintiff in Error. ERROR to the Circuit Court of Columbiana County. On May 21, 1903, the plaintiff in error was employed by the month by the board of public service of the City of Wellsville as janitor of the city building of that city, and he rendered such services until July 1, 1903. Not receiving payment he sued the city and recovered judgment in the justice's court. The city appealed the case to the court of common pleas, where a general demurrer to the plaintiff's amended petition was sustained and his petition was dismissed. On error the judgment was affirmed by the circuit. court and error is prosecuted in this court. In addition to the foregoing facts it appears from the second amended petition that a large part of the city building is leased or let to the United States for a postoffice and to private persons for various purposes, and that the hall in the building is let for entertainments, and that the revenue from the building is paid into the city treasury and exceeds the wages of plaintiff as janitor. It further appears that the council of the city did not authorize the board of public service to employ a janitor and had not appropriated any money for that purpose, and that the city auditor had not certified that there was money in the treasury to pay for such services. Messrs. Smith & Lones, for plaintiff in error. The directors of public service have the power and it is their duty to appoint or employ a janitor of the city building without being first authorized or directed by council to do so. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. This is shown clearly by Sections 139, 141 and 145 of the Municipal Code, Vol. 96, Ohio Laws. Section 143 provides that the directors can not make any contract over $500, except for a person employed in the department, unless first authorized by council. But they have power without such authority to make employment contracts or any contract for less than $500 without being first authorized by council. The directors of public service may employ persons in their department without the auditor making the certificate mentioned in Section 45 of the Municipal Code that the money to pay for the same is in the treasury to the credit of the proper fund. When Section 45 is read in connection with Sections 143 and 145 it is clear that the provisions of Section 45 do not apply to such employments. It is averred that it was necessary to employ plaintiff in order for the city to carry out its contracts with its tenants. This being the case, his employment was an indebtedness incurred by the city by its leases; it bound itself in these leases to incur this expenditure, and the employment of plaintiff was not incurring any new liability, but was a liability caused by the rental contracts, and really was a carrying out and performing those rental contracts under which the liability to employ and pay a janitor was incurred. The construction of these sections as claimed by the defendant would cause more evil than it could remedy, and would not be in harmony with the general rules for the interpretation of statutes. Bishop's Written Laws, Section 92; Lessee of Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 469. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. It is our claim that by the very terms of Section 45 it does not apply to contracts for employment of persons necessary to be employed to execute the powers and duties of the directors of public service. But if this section was as general in its nature and as free of expressed exceptions as was the Burns law, Section 2702, Revised Statutes, it would still not apply to the employment of officers and workmen whose services are necessary to carry out the essential powers of the corporation or to preserve the property of the corporation. The fact that there had been no ordinance passed appropriating the money among the different objects for which the corporation has to provide is no defense. In regard to the claim that the plaintiff can not receive pay for the services he has rendered on account of the money not having been appropriated among the several objects for which the corporation has to provide as required by Section 43, we answer that at the time plaintiff was employed the time had not yet come when such appropriations could legally be made; and in this emergency must all the powers of the municipality be suspended. If it had been the intention of this section. that no contract should be valid unless within the appropriation, it would have been so provided in Section 43 as it is in Section 45. It is merely a direction to the officers not to expend or pay any money not covered by these semi-annual appropriations. It was not meant as a limitation on the power to contract, but as a direction to the officers to Argument for Plaintiff in Error. keep the expenditures within the appropriation. United States v. Kirby, 74 U. S., 482. We think the same common sense will sanction the action of the board of public service in employing a man to carry out the contracts of the city with its tenants, and thus avoid damages, and to preserve and care for the building and keep it fit to be occupied, especially when, by the peculiar situation caused by the law, no appropriation had been or could be made, and by reason thereof the auditor could not make the proper certificate, even though the money was actually in the treasury. These statutes under consideration do not apply to the necessary running expenses of the corporation. It was frequently so held by the circuit and common pleas courts of Ohio under Section 2702, Revised Statutes. Lima Gas Light Co. v. City of Lima, 4 C. C. R., 22; City of Findlay v. Parker 17 C. C. R., 294; City of Columbus v. Bohl et al., 13 Ohio Dec., 569; State, ex rel., v. City of Massillon, 24 C. C. R., 249; City of Cincinnati v. Honnigfort et al., 32 Bull., 32; Smith v. Inhabitants of Dedham, 144 Mass., 177; Grant v. City of Davenport et al., 36 Ia., 396; Reynolds v. City of Waterville, 92 Me., 292; Wade et al. v. Oakmont Borough et al., 165 Pa. St., 479; City of Valparaiso et al. v. Gardner, 97 Ind., I. Where the general provisions of a statute conflict with the more specific provisions of another, or are incompatible with its provisions, the latter is to be read as an exception to the former. City of Cincinnati v. Holmes, Admr., et al., 56 Ohio St., 104; State, ex rel., v. McGregor, 44 Ohio |