"is equally so on the other. The defendant might have per"formed the contract within a year, and it is therefore not "within the statute." The statute law in most, or all of our States, interferes with contracts in one other way, by providing that agreements made on Sunday shall be void, whether they are in writing or Nevertheless, an agreement signed on Sunday, but ratified on some other day, will often be held to be valid, the question of its validity depending on the wording of the statute, and various other circumstances. not. Sunday Contracts. Catlett vs. Tr. M. E. Ch., 62 Ind. 365. Perkins vs. Fraudulent Contract not Binding. Martine vs. Nelson, 51 Ill. 422. IT CHAPTER XX. MISREPRESENTATION OR MISTAKE. is a very common, but erroneous notion that if a man has once been inveigled into signing a contract, he cannot escape from it, even though he should find out afterward that he had been grossly deceived in regard to it. Although the law presumes that men will use ordinary caution in their business transactions, and will do nothing to relieve those who fail to do so, it fully recognizes the fact that no prudence can always protect a man against fraud, and it may be relied upon to prevent, so far as legal principles will permit, the person guilty of the fraud from gaining any advantage from it. Even where, instead of fraud, there has been only a mistake, it will generally be found that, if the mistake is clearly established, and it was not one which might have been avoided with ordinary care, the law will rectify the error, or relieve innocent parties from the consequences of it, provided this can be done without injustice to other parties, who are equally innocent, and more careful. In an Illinois case, a man brought plans and specifications to a painter, and asked him for an estimate. The painter was too busy to examine and take measurements from the plans, and the owner explained them to him. Upon these explanations the painter made a bid, which was accepted, and he sent his men to the building to begin the work. He then left town for three weeks. On his return, he found that the work was not as explained by the owner, and that some extra work had been added, the value of all that had been done being $900, instead of $350, the contract price. The owner refusing to pay more than the contract price, the painter brought suit, and it was decided that the contract was invalid, by reason of the misrepresentations made as to the amount of work; and that he was entitled to recover the actual value of the work done. Moreover, in reply to the claim that the painter ought, if the work to be done proved not to be as represented, to have notified the owner before going on with it, and thereby involving the owner in a much larger expense than he had contemplated, the court decided that, having been absent from the town, he was excused from the obligation to give such notice. It should be observed, however, that in most cases a court would insist on the necessity for giving a notice of the kind, and that the painter, if he had not happened to have so good a reason for not giving it, would have found it hard, after doing the work, to collect $900 for a job which he knew that the owner thought he was to have done for $350. This principle has been expressly laid down by the courts. In two cases it has been held that, if a contract has been made for work to be done at a stipulated price, and it is discovered before the work is commenced that a misrepresentation has been made in respect to its value, the party engaging to do the work may repudiate the contract; and if he does not do so, but goes on and performs it, he can afterwards demand no more than the contract price. It has, moreover, been decided in California that where mistake or misrepresentation in regard to the subject-matter of a contract affects only certain stipulations of a contract, as, for example, where the conditions which would affect the time of completion have been erroneously stated, only those stipulations of the contract which are affected by the error are invalidated, and the others remain in full force. In a somewhat similar case in England, a contract was Martine vs. 51 Ill. 422. Contractor Should Give Notice on Discovering Mistake. Saratoga, etc. vs. Row, 24 Wend. 74. Lloyd "s. Brewster, 4 Paige 537. Verzan vs. McGregor, 23 Cal. 339. Pattison vs. Luckley, 10 L. R. Ex. 330. Contract may not be Entirely Vitiated by Fraud. made for building a house. After the contract was signed, it was placed in custody of the architect, who then surreptitiously made, or allowed to be made, a material alteration in it, the alteration being in the provision with regard to extras. Some extra work was done, but payment for it was refused, on the ground that the contractor had not complied with the provisions of the contract relating to such work, such compliance being, by the contract, a condition precedent to the right to recover payment. The contractor then sued for payment for the extra work on quantum meruit, on the ground that the contract was void on account of the alteration, or, at least, that the defendant could not avail himself of it. On trial, it was held that the contract, although altered, was still binding on the plaintiff, or, at least, might be looked at to see what the terms were, and that the plaintiff could not recover on quantum meruit. A CHAPTER XXI. THE RIGHTS OF THE LOWEST BIDDER. GREAT deal of unhappiness often arises, after the award of contracts for public work, from a misapprehension, on the part of contractors, of the rights of the lowest bidder. It is very commonly supposed that the person who offers to do the work submitted for estimate for the lowest price is entitled to have it awarded to him, unless distinct notice has been given, in the invitation to bidders, that the lowest tender will not necessarily be accepted. This notion is an erroneous one. In some cases the laws of a State, or the regulations of a private or public corporation, provide that bids shall be invited for all work for the State or corporation exceeding a certain sum in value, and that the work shall be awarded to the lowest bidder; and, where this is the case, the officials in charge of the matter have no discretion; but where no such law or regulation exists, the lowest bidder has no claim to be preferred, and no notice need be given that his bid will not necessarily be accepted. In many cases, where the law or regulation on the subject, instead of saying simply that the work shall be given to the lowest bidder, provides that it shall be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder," the discretion which the law allows the officials in judging of responsibility is so extensive that here also the lowest bidder has practically no claim to the work which he can enforce, if the officials have in good faith decided that The Lowest Bidder not Necessarily Entitled to Contract. People vs. Croton Bd, 9 Barb. 259. Topping rs. Swords. 1 E. D. Smith, 109. Starkey vs. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203. The "Lowest Responsible Bidder." |