With regard to Great Britain, the question is not, whether she shall secure to herself an immense advantage, or neglect so to secure it; but, whether she shall take it to herself, or give it to her unrelenting foe,-her foe, already so powerful, and so sure instantly to turn against her those potent means of which her negligence has allowed him to avail himself.

Bonaparte, by seizing the Spanish monarchy, has now brought the matter of deliberation to this narrow point,-Whether the colonies shall remain, as before, attached to that monarchy,-in other words, shall become his property;-or whether those colonies shall be enabled, under the protection of Great Britain, to constitute themselves a free and independent nation.

We do not suppose it will be objected, that we could, as another expedient, make a conquest of South America for ourselves; for we do not believe there is an individual in the country who thinks it would be advantageous to us as a conquest, or that the business of defence is not at present enough for us, without that of conquest, even if it could be supposed, which nobody we apprehend is now credulous enough to suppose, that it would be an easy conquest. We mention this idea, therefore, only for the purpose of setting it aside.

There is another idea, however, which deserves the most, profound and most respectful attention. If the King of Spain, or rather the late King of Spain, is stripped of his dominions in Europe, ought not his dominions in America to be preserved for him? With regard to this point, it is an unlucky circumstance to begin with,-that this ex-monarch is in the hands of Bonaparte. However, we are by no means convinced, that this is a difficulty which would be absolutely unsurmountable; and our answer is, that, provided care is taken to secure liberty, by diminishing sufficiently the power left in the hands of the King, and placing a sufficient share in the hands of the people, we know of nothing so desirable as the establishment of a mixed monarchy for the government of South America. The nation itself, however, there is reason to believe, would prefer a constitution resembling that of their neighbours in the United States; and if this preference should be very general and very decided, we hope there are no such bigoted partizans of royalty among us, as to think that we should take up arms to force them to resign it; and thus foment a civil war in South America, (the inevitable effect of which would be, to throw the country into the arms of France), merely to prevent a great and remote nation from choosing their own form of government. If, however, the people could be brought to submit to it, few things would afford us more satisfaction, than that a throne should be erected in South America, first for the aged ex-monarch of Spain, and

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andthe n for his son; for we can see no reason for respecting the feelings of the latter exclusively, and abetting all the revolutionary practices which have been used to dethrone the former.

At all events, however, it is our decided opinion, that Great Bri tain is called upon, by the most imperious considerations of selfpreservation, utterly to reject and oppose any proposition which may be made by Bonaparte--and we are by no means sure that it will not be made-for the crection of such a kingdom, either for Charles, or for Ferdinand. If such an arrangement were once to be adopted, who, we would ask, would be the persons who would accompany Charles and Ferdinand to South America, and have the principal influence in their government?-Persons who leave behind, their immense estates and dignities in Spain,and that Spain in the hands of Bonaparte. But, is there any thing more that a skilful intriguer would require to effect his purpose? Let him but affect the generosity of preserving to these men their estates and dignities in Spain; and is it not visible to every man, what influence he has it in his power to acquire immediately over them? Let him persuade them (and he is a great master in such arts) that he is not their enemy; that there ought to be no hostility, but rather a cordial union, between the empire of New Spain, and the empire of Old; that there is no incompatibility between their holding their antient and beloved patrimonies and dignities in Old Spain, while they faithfully served their master in the New; that it is for the interest of both countries they should be united, as it were, into one-and no way so effectual as an intercommunity of properties and dignities;-let him, by these means, teach the great men who would follow the monarchs, to fix their hopes and affections upon their antient condition and property in Spain, and in these silken and golden cords he would hold them bound as fast as by chains of adamant. Then would the affairs of South America be governed entirely at the nod of Bonaparte; and it would be easy for him, under ready pretexts, to introduce into that country his troops, till the time at last should arrive when he could declare it his own,

In endeavouring to form any opinion upon the nature of the change which should be attempted in these fine countries, the first thing to be taken into the account is the disposition of the people. On this point we have already produced pretty decisive evidence: but it may be proper to bring together a few additional circumstances, which seem to us to place that matter in the clearest point of view. Depons, of whose work on Caraccas and the contiguous provinces, the reader will find a very full account at p. 378. Vol. VIII. of this Journal, gives a history of an insurrection against the government, which he is

extremely

extremely anxious to represent as nothing serious;-an anxiety which follows as a matter of course, from the strong disposition to flatter the Spanish government with which he evidently set out in. Yet, even he lets many expressions escape him, which indicate the strong feeling he had of the spirit of disunion which existed between the population of South America and the government of Spain. Malgré tous ces points d'appui,' says he, (p. 223. Vol. I.) de la souveraineté Espagnole dans les Indes Örientales, elle fut, en 1797, sur le point d'eprouver une secousse dangereuse dans la province de Venezuela.' A little further on, p. 229. he says, Tous les interrogatoires què subirent les accusés, toutes les depositions des temoins prouverent que le sou-' levement avoit pour objet de detruire le gouvernement actuel, et de le remplacer par un gouvernement republicain; de ne plus reconnoître la souveraineté de l'Espagne, et de proclamer l'independAt the bottom of the same page he adds, Si cet affreux projet n'eût avorté, c'en etoit fait des possessions Espagnoles.'

ence.'

The evidence to the same purpose of our own officers upon the business of Buenos Ayres, is clear and unvarying. In a letter from Sir Samuel Achmuty to Mr Windham, dated Monte Video, March 6th 1808, he says, The seizure of the viceroy by the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, an event certainly very important in itself, first gave me an insight into the views of many of the leading men, and convinced me that, however inimical they were to us, they were still more so to their present government.' > * In the same despatch he says again, To the reports of this capture' (of the viceroy) were added others still more important,' &c. It was added, that the royal court of Audienza was abolished, the King's authority set aside, and the Spanish colours no longer hoisted. These reports were circulated with avidity; and I soon found that they were acceptable to the principal part of the inhabitants. The persons who before appeared hostile and inveterate, now pressed me to advance a corps to Buenos Ayres; and assured me, if I would acknowledge their independence, and promise them the protection of the English government, the place would submit to me. Still further, in the same despatch Sir Samuel says, The party now in power are mostly natives of Spain, in the principal offices of church and state, and devoted to the Spanish government. It has been their policy, to inflame the minds of the lower order against the English, by every species of exaggeration, and falsehood, and to lead them to such acts of atrocity as may preclude the possibility of any communication with us. The second party consists of naU 3

* See Trial of General Whitelocke, Appendix, p. 51.

tives

tives of the country, with some Spaniards that are settled in it. The oppression of the mother country, has made them most anxious to shake off the Spanish yoke. They aim at following the steps of the North Americans, and erecting an independent state. If we would promise them independence, they would instantly revolt against the government, and join us with the great mass of the inhabitants. But though nothing less than independence will perfectly satisfy them, they would prefer our government, either to their present anarchy, or to the Spanish yoke, provided we would promise not to give up the country to Spain at a peace. But until such a promise is made, we must expect to find them open or secrct enemies." Even in a copy of the instructions of government to General Crawford, it is said, 'The ruling consideration which long restrained his Majesty from invading any part of the enemy's territory in South America, was the danger of erecting in that country, from the well-known impatience of the government felt by' the inhabitants, a spirit of insurrection leading to the most sanguinary excesses. This is so absolute and strong, and from so high a quarter, that, taken in conjunction with the preceding testimonies, with the evidence furnished by the very pamphlet, of which in this article we have given an account, and by those deputies who came to Europe for the purpose of forwarding the object of emancipation, and of whose instructions to Generat Miranda, as the agent of South America, we have given a full detail;-it affords abundant proof of the disposition of the people to break off their dependence upon the government of Spain, and to become a nation in their own right. Many other proofs, however, might still be added. In a note, for example, to the edition in 1801 of Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe, pendant les Regnes de Louis XV. et de Louis XVI., t. ii. p. 293, is the following pas sage: Pendant la derniere guerre, j'ai traversé le gouvernement de Carraque, et j'ai vu, dans cette fertile province, le mecontentment porté au plus haut degré. 't In another note, in the

same

* See this copy of Instructions, signed by Mr Windham, ibid. p. 29. It is perhaps necessary to remark, that it is the edition of Whitelock's Trial, taken by Blanchard and Ramsay, which is here always quoted..

In the same note, the writer, who is Segur l'Ainé, tells us an anecdote, highly characteristic, and which might often be paralleled nearer home. He had remarked a particular instance of absurd and oppressive policy which, to use his own words, arrêtoit à la fois l'agriculture, la population, et la civilization. Ayant communiqué,' he adds, ces reflections à un moine inquisiteur, fort consideré, le pere me repondit : "La province est bien comme elle est, et rend

same volume (p. 302.), it is said, after mentioning the spirit of revolt manifested by the Indians, Les creoles eux-mêmes paroissent peu attachés à la metropole. J'en ai entendu plusieurs qui, en parlant des Espagnoles, les appelloient forestiers, etrangers.'

The disposition of the people, then, we may conclude with safety, is adverse to every idea of dependence, but probably not yet attached to any particular plan of free government. It is pretty generally known, that they are enamoured of the happiness and prosperity which the Anglo-Americans appear to have procured to themselves; and the most precise conception they have formed of any line of conduct for themselves, is probably that of following the steps of those envied neighbours.

The

Such, then, is the foundation on which we have to proceed; and such are the materials with which we have to work. great question now succeeds-with regard to the manner of the operation itself. In all questions of political change, there are two dangers, of an opposite description, to be considered. The first is the danger of doing too little; the second that of doing too much. The first is by far the most common error; as timidity is a much more universal and powerful source of human misery than rashness; although the evils produced by the second, are much more simultaneous, and, for the moment, much more formidable.

As there are few evils, in the mixed scene of human affairs, without some correspondent good, so the calamitous termination or change of the Spanish monarchy in Europe, has removed a considerable number of difficulties from the great measure of accomplishing the emancipation of South America. No contest is now to be maintained against the troops of Spain, or the ministers of the Spanish government, opposing the change. As those ministers can have no hopes whatever of transferring the government of the country to themselves individually, and as they will now look upon that country as their home, there is every reason to believe that they will cordially cooperate in effecting any beneficent arrangement in its general affairs.

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How

assez d'argent au roi; si, en laissant plus de liberté à ces gens-là, la prosperité et la population croissoient, bientôt la colonie secoueroit le joug de la metropole, comme les colonies Anglaises." Revolté de cette reponse, je lui repliquai, en le quittant: "Mon pere, je ne vois qu'un moyen à ajouter a ceux qu' approuve votre prevoyante politique; ce sera de tuer les enfans nouveaux nés, si, par malheur, la fecondité devient trop grande, et l'accroissement de la population trop dangereux. '