of many authors on abstract subjects, if they would comprehend, and exprefs to themselves, in one fimple and direct propofition, the main object of the inquiry. Thus, had Mr Smith, under the first of the above heads, put to himself this precife queftion, What is money? (which, without his knowing it, is really the problem he propofes to folve), he would either have anfwered the queftion justly and fatisfactorily, or he would at least have had a chance of difcovering that he did not know how to answer it. As the cafe now ftands, he has miffed both objects.

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It may be useful to Mr Smith and other inquirers, if we explain a little more fully the meaning which we attach to the queftion, What is money? Money, like other general terms, denotes a certain combination or large clafs of objects, which are diftinguished into various fpecies or fubdivifions. Thus, guineas are money, and fhillings, and crowns; fo are dollars, and francs; fo, too, are bank-notes,-and cowries, and bullion: falt and nails are in fome places money; and fheep and oxen. The armour of Diomede, fays Homer, coft fo many oxen; the armour of Glaucus fo many more. Now, the word money, being a general term, is to be analyzed pretty nearly in the fame way in which other neral terms are analyzed; viz. by afcertaining the chief qualities in which the different fpecies of objects included under it agree, and the quality or qualities by which they are diftinguished from all other objects. Were it, for example, the question, What is a quadruped? it would immediately occur, that fheep, and horfes, and oxen, and animals of various other denominations, are included under this term; and if a number of errors were derived from a certain obfcurity and confufion in the ideas commonly attached to that term, it would be neceffary to analyze and define it by the fame procefs. Thus horfes, oxen, and the other fpecies of quadrupeds, agree together in all the common qualities which conftitute an animal or living creature, and in this other quality of walking on four feet. This laft quality, however, in which quadrupeds agree, is one in which they differ from all other animals. A quadruped is, therefore, properly defined to be, an animal or living creature which walks on four feet; and if the ideas were well afcertained which belong to the term animal, one great fource of confusion, in any fpeculation relating to the abftract term quadruped, would thus neceffarily be removed.

We have introduced this example of a definition in the antient form, not certainly with a view of inftructing our readers, but undoubtedly in the hope of inftructing a very large proportion of thofe authors who, during the laft ten or twelve years, have favoured the public with fpeculations on money; and of whom we do not believe that above one or two, at the very utmoft, ever. heard

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heard or read what a definition means. It is obvious, too, that the fpecies of analyfis, which we have here recommended, is different in its object from the mere declaration of the fenfe in which any general term is about to be employed. When the ideas involved in the abstract term are themfelves the object of inquiry, the definition is the last refult of the investigation; and the rules of definition pointed out in the antient logic, are, on many occafions, a very useful clue to guide us through the intricacies of a very complicated and abftract problem. They ferve, at least, to keep the object of inquiry fteadily in view; and although of no use in that great department of philofophy which confifts in tracing, by obfervation and experience, the laws of nature, yet, in examining the accidental combinations of human ideas, which have become obfcure by their complexity and abstraction, the principle, on which these rules are founded, might often be applied with fingular advantage, A very clear and penetrating mind might proceed, no doubt, without them. But they would certainly have faved many of the writers on money from that loose and unprofitable talk, which runs on without meaning and without object, and in which fo much of our late writings on that fubject confifts. What are those particulars in which the different fpecies of money agree, is an inquiry in which hardly any man can lose his way; and hardly any man who fhould use but ordinary pains, could make an enumeration, which fhould not be attended with advantage, If an enumeration tolerably complete were once formed, a careful inspection of it could hardly fail to difcover fome important article, in which moneys do not agree with any other class of objects; and thus a general expreffion or definition of money would be obtained, which, even if not perfect, would at leaft difengage fome combination hitherto unperceived, or exhibit fome relation hitherto undifcovered; and would, by this light, afford the means of renewing the fame process with additional chance of fuccefs.

The common mode, without any of this preparation and labour, is, to guefs at a definition, from fome ftriking appearance; and then to write about it and about it, either deducing erroneous conclufions from a mistaken principle, or drawing unmeaning propofitions in loofe and indefinite language. Thus, it has been extremely common to fay of money, that it is the meafure of value.' This, indeed, is a standard propofition, which the writers on this fubject, with hardly any exception, seem to have adopted as a first principle; and as it is an expreffion extremely vague and obfcure, it has too often and too neceffarily communicated thofe characteristics to the fpeculations founded upon it. Nothing can be more inftructive to writers of this defcription, than to analyze fuch ex

preffions

preffions as thofe by which they are apt to be led aftray. Thus, when they talk of money as being the measure of value, they never confider, that measure,' in this propofition, is only a metaphor. When we fay that a pint is a measure of water, or that a yard is a measure of length, the expreffion is literal, and the idea conveyed is clear and diftinct. We know exactly how a pint measures water,—and how a yard measures extent, But how does a fhilling measure a quartern loaf, or a hundred guineas an acre of land? They are faid to measure one another merely when one may be exchanged for another; but between this operation and real measuring, the analogy is very remote, and affords a most frail foundation on which to erect any general conclufions. The extreme inaccuracy of the expreffion may be proved by the most obvious confiderations. Nothing can be looked upon as a standard of measurement which is itself perpetually subject to variation. Were the pint, or the yard, continually altering in quantity,-now lefs, and then more,-they would be entirely useless as measures, and it would be abfurd to fpeak of them in that fenfe. But money is confeffedly fubject to great variations. It is computed to have funk in this country more than one half in value within the last fifty years. How vague, then, and uncertain must be the language in which it is denominated a measure of value !

It must be mentioned, to the praise of our author, that he has feen into this fubject fo much further and clearer than most of his` countrymen and contemporaries, as to perceive the force of thefe confiderations, as far as the precious metals are concerned; and he has, with juftice, ascribed a great part of the futile fpeculations which have appeared, to the notion that thefe, or coins compofed of them, are the measure or standard of value. • The great miftake,' fays he, into which it is conceived the writers upon money have fallen, is, that they have not gone deep enough for a foundation whereon to rear their fpeculations. Finding that gold and filver had, in all ages, been employed as the circulating medium, and that the quantity of these in a coin was always equal or nearly equal, to the value it paffed for, they concluded that thefe metals were the "Standards of value;" and therefore, they have employed all their labour and skill, in vain endeavours to reconcile the different phenomena of money to this idea; and this they did, although, at the fame time, they allowed that the metals themselves varied in value; confequently they ought to have feen the abfurdity of attempting to establish any article of variable value, the invariable standard of value.' But the idea of a standard of value, which had fo greatly mifled his predeceffors, had too firmly taken root in the mind of Mr Smith, to be easily removed. When he discovered, accordingly, that the precious me

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tals,

tals, on which they had fixed, were entirely incapable of dif charging this fervice, it seems never to have occurred to him to fufpect that poffibly nothing elfe was more capable of discharging it. He applied himself, on the contrary, with great zeal, to dif cover fomething to which this function might be affigned; and certainly was reduced to ftraits in the experiment. He could find nothing, either in heaven above, or in earth beneath, to answer his purpose. But being a bold man, even this did not reduce him to defpair. If he found no real standard, he found at least an imaginary one; if nothing in being could perform this fervice, a nonentity, he seems to have thought, might certainly accomplish it.

As much of the confufion which has been introduced into this fubject has arisen from the indiftinct notion of a standard of value, it may be useful, after having fhown how unfounded were the ideas which Mr Smith's predeceffors have entertained on the subject, to enter rather more fully into the expofition of his own notion, than its intrinfic merits might have required, that we may finally remove out of the way this stone of tumbling and rock of offence.

The writers on money,' he says, had they only examined a little further than the precious metals, must have discovered that in every country, there exists another standard of value, a nominal or imaginary one, of which the coins, passing in circulation, are only symbols or tokens; and which standard, from its nature, is perfectly invariable. The nature of this standard may, at once, be explained by a quotation from Montesquieu, who says, "the blacks on the coast of Africa, haye a sign purely ideal for fixing the value of their commodities;-when they wish to make an exchange of them, they say, such an article is worth five macutes, and such another ten; and yet a macute can neither be seen nor felt; it is entirely an abstract term, and not applicable to any sensible object. Is it a coin? Is it a token? Is it a measure? It is neither a coin, a token, nor a measure; for they do not exchange their merchandise for three, five, or ten macutes, but for somé article worth the same number of "This, continues Mr Smith, is an exact description of what is meant by an imaginary standard. The only difference to be observed between the practice of these blacks and that of civilized nations, is, that in place of actually giving one commodity for another, the latter employ sensible objects, as tokens or symbols of the ideal sign. In doing this, these tokens or symbols, are not employed as articles of value themselves, but merely as representatives of the standard. The ideal standard,' he adds, ' or as it will in future be called, the standard unit, appears to be something of the same nature with the letter placed for the unknown quantity in algebra; it has no real value itself, but by it the relative value of all articles is fixed, all accounts are kept, and all exchange of property

macutes.

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is settled. Accordingly, in this country, the pound Sterling will be found doing all these offices, in every transaction, from the highest. to the lowest.' He defines it, therefore, in the following terms: The pound Sterling is the standard of Great Britain, by which the relative value of all articles is ascertained; and the gold, silver, and copper coins, issued by government and circulating in the country, are just symbols or tokens of that standard. A standard unit,' he adds, appears to be absolutely necessary in all countries the least. civilized; and, accordingly, it is to be found every where. In France, the livre Tournois has long been the standard; in Spain and Portugal, the millrea; in Russia, the rouble; in America, the dollar; in the East Indies, the roupee,' &c.

Such is our author's doctrine in regard to the standard of value. To us, we will confess, it appears to involve absurdity in the very terms. He tells us, in the language of Montesquieu, that this measure is a mere abstract term; but how an abstract term should measure any thing, it would puzzle a conjurer to explain. If he reply that it is the abstract idea, represented by the term, which is the standard; what will he say to the doctrine, of which he probably never heard, but which, notwithstanding, appears to be very well established, that there is no such thing as an abstract idea; that there is nothing abstract but terms; and that, whenever the mind forms an idea or conception corresponding to an abstract term, it is the conception of an individual, which individual it contemplates as the representative of all the other individuals comprehended in the class which the abstract term denotes ? If this doctrine be just, it is easy for Mr Smith to see how very different an operation takes place in the estimate of value, from what he has imagined. The mind must conceive some individual object, with the value of which it is acquainted, and that object it compares with the other objects whose value it desires to ascertain. Thus, suppose it is the pound Sterling with which a man is going to measure the value of any commodities, -it is surely not the word pound' with which he is going to measure them; for that can measure nothing. If it is with the idea of a pound, that can be nothing but the express idea of twenty shillings in silver. It is the value, therefore, of an individual commodity, with which he must measure the value of all other commodities.

But, even if we allow the existence of abstract ideas, Mr Smith's theory is in no better condition. Let any one but endeavour to imagine how an abstract idea, which is but a thought in the mind, can measure the value of external commodities. Were it not that we accustom ourselves so miserably to vague and indefinite ideas, such a proposition could not have been mentioned to any intelligent man, without exciting his idicule. No one thing can measure another, but that which has

the