This last is passed in silence, because it proved those conclusions false, which Mr. Onis had drawn from the first. Mr. O. traces the origin of the negotiation to the treaty of 1795, signed by Don Manuel Godoy. He accuses Godoy of a want of geographical knowledge of the countries for which he treated, and of the reciprocal interests of the two powers; of criminal impolicy in ceding to the United States, without necessity, rich and fertile lands, beautiful rivers, the point of Natchez, and other posts important to the defence of Florida. He accuses the United States of a design to extend themselves into the possessions of Spain; of seizing all occasions that had offered; and of not ceasing to foment them. The boundary agreed upon, in the treaty of 1795, between Spain and the United States, is the same as that fixed in the treaty of peace, of 1783, between Great-Britain and the United States. The simple historical account of these treaties, is this: Great-Britain, in possession of Florida previously acquired from Spain, was at war with the United States, France, Spain, and Holland: By her treaty of 1783, the independence of the United States was acknowledged, and their territorial boundaries described: By subsequent treaty, GreatBritain made peace with France, with Holland, and Spain, and ceded to the latter, Florida and Porto Rico. The natural result of these different engagements, was the treaty of 1795, in which Spain and the United States formally recognised the previously well known and established rights of each other. Judging of right and justice by relative power, Mr. O. may conceive this to have been impolitic, since Spain was in a situation, in his opinion, to give law to the American republic; but in justice and honour, Don Manuel Godoy had every reason to support his conduct to the Spanish nation ;-and had his political course been always directed by similar principles, his name would never have been execrated, nor the people of Spain obliged to encounter those dreadful trials, by which they have at once vindicated and exalted their character. What, however, is the object of making Don Manuel Godoy answerable for the principles of the treaty of boundary, of 1795 ? Mr. Onis certainly knows, that Charles IV. in ratifying that treaty, only acted upon principles sanctioned by Charles III.: And Don Manuel G. only reduced to form, promises voluntarily made by the Count Florida Blanca. That the Spanish public may be as well informed as the Chevalier Onis, it is only necessary to make extracts from some documents of not very ancient dates. Soon after the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great-Britain, and the signature of the preliminaries of peace between those powers, General La Fayette, then well known for the services he had rendered to the cause of liberty in the new world, and since illustrious for his services and his sufferings in the same glorious cause in the old, was in Madrid, and about to repair to the American Congress, on the interests of the United States-in promoting which, he had already taken so distinguished a part. He had many conversations with Count Florida Blanca, then minister of his catholic Majesty, which were to be reported to the American government. He submitted to the Spanish minister, the report he intended to make to Congress on his arrival in America, dated at Madrid, Feb. 19, 1783, requesting a word from Count Florida Blanca, to satisfy him that he had forgot nothing. An extract from this letter, is in these words. "With respect to limits, his catholic Majesty has adopted those that are determined by the preliminaries of the 30th November, between the United States and the court of London. The fear of raising a dissention, is the only objection the King has to the free navigation of the Mississippi." The answer of Count Florida Blanca, is as follows: 66 Pardo, 22d Feb. 1783. "Senior,-I cannot better comply with your desire, than by requesting you to receive this as my answer. You have perfectly well understood whatever I have had the honour to communicate to you, with respect to our dispositions towards the United States. 1 shall only add, that although it is his Majesty's intention to abide for the present by the limits established by the treaty of November 30th, 1782, between the English and Americans; the king intends to inform himself particularly, whether it can be in any way inconvenient or prejudicial to settle the business amicably with the United States. (Signed,) To the Marquis de la Fayette." FLORIDA BLANCA. In a letter of the same date, the Marquis de la Fayette says, " On receiving the answer of Count Florida Blanca, I desired an explanation respecting the addition that relates to the limits. I was answered, that it was a fixed principle to abide by the limits established by the treaty between the English and Americans: That his remark only related to more unimportant details, which he wished to receive from the Spanish commandants, that would be amicably arranged, and would by no means oppose the general principle. I asked him, before the ambassador of France, (Mr. Montmorin,) whether he would give me his word of honour for it? He assured me he would, and that I might engage it to the United States. (Signed,) LA FAYETTE." But the name of Florida Blanca is held in reverence, while that of Godoy is detested. The acts of the first will not be condemned from prejudice; though the acts of the latter may meet with that fate. By what original mode of deduction the conclusion is drawn, that this treaty gave the Americans to understand with what facility they could extend themselves into the possessions of Spain, is left to a more fertile imagination, than the writer of this possesses, to conjecture. A deduction from this charge might be drawn, very unfavourable to the candour and understanding of its author: But it is not important to show the motives of Mr. Onis; it is sufficient to prove that his facts are assumptions, and his conclusions errors. That the flag should cover the property-was another fault committed by Godoy in the arrangement of this treaty. Because three or four months after, the Americans stipulated the contrary with Great Britain; hence, England and Spain being at war, Spanish property in American ships was good prize to the British, while British property in American ships was not prize of war to Spain. Mr. Onis does not object to the stipulation itself; he could not without condemning the liberal policy of the celebrated armed neutrality; but he charges the Americans with bad faith, for making subsequently a different treaty with Great Britain. In this he is supported by the Marquis of Casa Irujo, who claims the honour of having originally discovered the insidious designs of the United States. The quantum of honour may be divided between the two negotiators: but should it be given to the first or the last asserter of this folly, it can only prove his credulity in the falsehood, or his unblushing hardihood in the assertion. The stipulation was perfectly reciprocal; it happened unfortunately for Spain, that war broke out with England, the United States remaining at peace; of course, the benefit of the stipulation was first enjoyed by the United States; neither of the parties stipulated, or thought of stipulating, that the other powers of the world should respect this rule: It was for the Government of the contracting parties only. Britain never would consent to introduce this principle into her commercial treaties with any maritime power-which was well known to Spain and the United States. But the Americans are accused of making their treaty with England, four months after their treaty with Spain-with the insidious design of injuring Spain. The dates of the respective treaties, show how false this whole ground is, and leave us bewildered in conjecturing the causes by which these Spanish diplomatists were led to occupy it. The treaty of Great Britain and the United States was made the 10th of November, 1794, and that of Spain and the United States the 27th of October, 1795. The treaty of Britain was published in July, 1795, four months before that with Spain was signed: ten months before its ratification by Spain. This ratification was made with a perfect knowledge of the existence of the preceding treaty with Great Britain, and no difficulty arose from the previous execution of that instrument. Such are the facts. Why they have been misrepresented, to the prejudice of the American government, it is unnecessary to ascertain. The treaty of 1802, made by Don Pedro Cevallos, for the payment of American property plundered by Spanish cruisers, in violation of national laws and the stipulations of treaties, is the next object of Mr. Onis' censure. He conceives that Spain never could be responsible for injuries occasioned by the bad faith of the American Government, in not requiring England to respect, and to be governed by, a stipulation in the treaty between Spain and the United States. A very extraordinary assertion this for a Chevalier of character; a diplomatist of many years. Mr. Onis, although supported by the formidable authority of the Marquis of Casa Irujo, will scarcely find a civilian to coincide with him in the opinion, "that a nation, to entitle itself to redress for a violated treaty, must compel other nations, besides the one with whom it was made, to adopt its principles, and to be regulated by its provisions." Treaties are laws between the contracting powers and no others, and either party is at liberty to form different stipulations with other powers. The United States desired to make the principle, that free ships make free goods, a part of all their maritime treaties; but Great Britain would never agree with the American, or any other government, to recognise it. These remarks are made, on the admission that no claims exist, except those for enemy's goods condemned as prize of war, in American ships, by Spanish courts; an admission altogether gratuitous and unnecessary. The claims of American citizens upon Spain, were some of them of that description; but the largest are for American vessels and American property, captured by Spanish cruisers, condemned, and sold in Spain. The treaty of 1802, was a simple acknowledgment of a just debt, arising from gross outrages, and from a violated agreement, the non-fulfilment of which was injurious to the United States, and dishonourable to the character of Spain. The treaty of cession of Louisiana to France, it is not necessary to touch; whereby the property was vested in France, who sold it for a valuable consideration to the United States. It is true, the Marquis of Casa Irujo, by protesting against it, not only made himself, but his country, ridiculous; as his protest obliged the king of Spain, afterwards, formally to acquiesce in the transfer to the United States. The treaties of Paris and Vienna, have little connexion with this negotiation ;-but it will not escape the attention of the enlightened, that the Sovereigns, assembled at Vienna, would not have found the American government very tractable, had they presumed to interfere with its dominions-as Mr. Onis thinks they should. Omitting to say any thing of the difficulties Senior Onis had to struggle with, in contending with the American Cabinet, with the Congress, and with the Senate, (which is a part of the Congress,) and with public opinion, all of which were triumphantly overcome by the essays under the signature of Verus; we come to the treaty of cession, of 1819. By this, all past reclamations are to be satisfied; all injuries, previously suffered on either side, to be atoned for; and a disputed boundary line, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, between New Spain and the United States, settled. Mr. Onis truly represents, that in consenting to this arrangement, the United States gave up claims to many millions of dollars; waived their right to a territory, fertile, extensive, and important; and all this in consideration of territory of comparatively trifling extent, a property at all times burdensome to Spain, and which, after the transfer of Louisiana, could be rendered of no value to the crown. If all this be true, where is the foundation for charging the United States with ambition and avarice, a wish to foment the divisions, and to profit by the quarrels of Spaniards in the two hemispheres. In the relative situation of Spain and the United States, together with the nature of the Spanish colonial government, and the anxiety of the Spanish Americans to be freed from the dominion of Europe, the American government could but see every temptation to satisfy avarice and ambition-if these had been the springs of its conduct. With a claim of territory to the Rio Bravo; with long standing, just, and unadjusted reclamations upon Spain for various injuries previously committed; why were not the posts of the United States advanced to the boundary claimed by them of the Del Norte? Why was not Florida forcibly occupied, as an indemnity for just demands ?—the more especially, when the inducement was offered to this last step, by the use Spain suffered Britain and her savage allies to make of that territory. Opportunities more favourable, were never suffered to pass, by an avaricious power,-temptations to aggrandizement and extension more strong, were never resisted by an ambitious one. Senior Onis may possibly persuade himself (for there are no limits to the delusions of self-love and vanity) to believe, that all this was prevented by his matchless skill, and that the advantageous treaty of 1819, is to be altogether imputed to his diplomatic adroitness. The rest of mankind will impute it all to the generous forbearance and moderation, of a government which seeks to establish, in its intercourse with other nations, a character in accordance with the principles of its internal construction. The treaty of 1819, "signed on the birthday of Washington, to make it more sacred in the eyes of the Americans," as if any such coincidence of dates were necessary to bind American faith, has not [at the date of this] been ratified by Spain; and Mr. Onis proceeds to detail the causes. A mistake was made by the Chevalier, in supposing the dates, of certain large grants, intended by himself to be annulled, to have been subsequent to the 24th of January, 1818.These donations were, to the Duke of Alagon, Count Punon Rostro, and Don Vargas. Mr. Onis supposes it impossible, that any reasonable person could believe him guilty of a design to overreach the American negotiator, or should imagine, that the error committed, proceeded from other cause than his ignorance of the true dates of these donations. It cannot have escaped Mr. Onis' acuteness, that the circumstances of this transaction are very peculiar. He professed to be ready to stipulate the absolute annulment of these grants: the agent of the principal grantee, Alagon, whose influence with the king was well understood, was in Washington when the treaty was signed if Mr. Onis did not know the dates of these grants, from the office of his department of state, (which is truly a very extraordinary case,) he had it in his power to know them at Washington. His excuse for what occurred, which subjects his character at least to the suspicion of unfair dealing, is simply, that he was ignorant of that which it was his duty to know. Mr. Onis was unwell when this part of the treaty was arranged; but the terms in which it was expressed, were agreed upon at his earnest solicitation. The subsequent advice he gave his government, to seize upon this |