History of the Problems of Philosophy, Volume 2Macmillan, 1902 - Philosophy |
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Page 5
... namely , reason ; and this seems to have been the way in which Protagoras already understood it , when he said that Nature has given to all men the knowledge of what is just ( dikn ) and of what is unjust ( adós ) , and when he makes ...
... namely , reason ; and this seems to have been the way in which Protagoras already understood it , when he said that Nature has given to all men the knowledge of what is just ( dikn ) and of what is unjust ( adós ) , and when he makes ...
Page 8
... it always makes for the good . Its weaknesses and faults are nothing but errors of the intelligence . This follows necessarily from another principle , namely , that the interests of individuals 8 THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
... it always makes for the good . Its weaknesses and faults are nothing but errors of the intelligence . This follows necessarily from another principle , namely , that the interests of individuals 8 THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
Page 9
Paul Janet, Gabriel Séailles Sir Henry Jones. another principle , namely , that the interests of individuals always coincide with the general good . For with Socrates the good is neither pleasure as Aristippus understood it ( Mem . II ...
Paul Janet, Gabriel Séailles Sir Henry Jones. another principle , namely , that the interests of individuals always coincide with the general good . For with Socrates the good is neither pleasure as Aristippus understood it ( Mem . II ...
Page 14
... in the term Supreme Good is also complex in another sense , and made up of elements which were later considered to be heterogeneous , namely , Virtue and Happiness . What , then , is virtue ? 14 THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
... in the term Supreme Good is also complex in another sense , and made up of elements which were later considered to be heterogeneous , namely , Virtue and Happiness . What , then , is virtue ? 14 THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
Page 37
... namely disenchantment . But Lucretius has none of this calm reason- ableness ; of love he gives a terrifying picture , describing it in the same words as the plague and other scourges ( St. Beuve ) . But even while lifting his voice ...
... namely disenchantment . But Lucretius has none of this calm reason- ableness ; of love he gives a terrifying picture , describing it in the same words as the plague and other scourges ( St. Beuve ) . But even while lifting his voice ...
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Popular passages
Page 48 - Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge ; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.
Page 47 - Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.
Page 131 - Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.
Page 131 - This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.
Page 131 - An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.
Page 254 - But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty - the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life - thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine?
Page 232 - Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole.
Page 204 - We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or no...
Page 203 - Self is that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not), which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends.
Page 86 - I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.