History of the Problems of Philosophy, Volume 2Macmillan, 1902 - Philosophy |
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Page 5
... mere convention , a prejudice fostered by the weak , whose interest it serves : Tò dikatov Kai τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ . The Sophists were always ready to assign a conventional origin THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN ANCIENT TIMES 5.
... mere convention , a prejudice fostered by the weak , whose interest it serves : Tò dikatov Kai τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ . The Sophists were always ready to assign a conventional origin THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN ANCIENT TIMES 5.
Page 6
... origin to every kind of institution . Thus , their disciple Critias discerned in the belief in the Gods a successful artifice , em- ployed by legislators in order that fear might prevent , or that remorse might disclose , secret crimes ...
... origin to every kind of institution . Thus , their disciple Critias discerned in the belief in the Gods a successful artifice , em- ployed by legislators in order that fear might prevent , or that remorse might disclose , secret crimes ...
Page 10
... origin in reason , and not , as the Sophists said , in convention . There are two kinds of laws , the written and the unwritten . 6 " But are you aware , Hippias , ' asks Socrates , that there are un- written laws ? ' ' You mean those ...
... origin in reason , and not , as the Sophists said , in convention . There are two kinds of laws , the written and the unwritten . 6 " But are you aware , Hippias , ' asks Socrates , that there are un- written laws ? ' ' You mean those ...
Page 12
... origin , their end is also one , which they pursue in common , and of which their harmonious activity is the realization . For although each of these virtues has an absolute value , and is an end in itself , the particular ends , named ...
... origin , their end is also one , which they pursue in common , and of which their harmonious activity is the realization . For although each of these virtues has an absolute value , and is an end in itself , the particular ends , named ...
Page 22
... origin neither in pleasure nor in interest , but in virtue . Among men we love those who are good , and we love them because of their goodness . Consequently the only true friends are good men , who become united with the sole object of ...
... origin neither in pleasure nor in interest , but in virtue . Among men we love those who are good , and we love them because of their goodness . Consequently the only true friends are good men , who become united with the sole object of ...
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absolute according action Anaxagoras animal appears argument Aristotle attributes becomes body Carneades cause certainty conceive conception consciousness consequently contradiction created creatures criterion Democritus Descartes determined distinct divine doctrine doubt elements Epicureans Epicurus essence eternal Ethics everything evil existence existence of God extension fact faith feeling finite force give happiness harmony Heraclitus Herbert Spencer human Ibid idea ideal immortality individual infinite intelligence intuition Kant kind knowledge laws Leibnitz Lucretius Malebranche material matter merely metaphysical mind monad moral motion nature necessary Non-being object Pantheism passions perceptions perfect Phaedo phenomena philosophy Plato pleasure Plotinus possess possible principle priori proof proved pure Pyrrho rational reality reason regard relation religion scepticism sensation sense sensible Sextus Empiricus Socrates soul Spinoza spirit Stoics substance supreme theodicy theology theory things thought tion true truth union unity universal virtue whole wisdom words καὶ τὸ
Popular passages
Page 48 - Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge ; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.
Page 47 - Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.
Page 131 - Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.
Page 131 - This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.
Page 131 - An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.
Page 254 - But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty - the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life - thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine?
Page 232 - Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole.
Page 204 - We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or no...
Page 203 - Self is that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not), which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends.
Page 86 - I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.