v. Proctor, 1 Dougl. at p. 384. Covenant by B. 'that notwithstanding anything done by him it should be lawful for A. to receive certain moneys witbout interruption by B.' held, that the words ' notwithstanding,' &c., were repugnant to the latter part of the covenart, and must be rejected; Belcher v. Sikes, 8 B. & C. 185. Transposition of clauses (d).-Conveyance by marriage settle. ment to A., the intended husband, his heirs and assigns, and in case A. should die leaving one or more son or sons on the body of his intended wife to be begotten, the elder of such sons and the heirs male of his body being always preferred to take place before the younger. with full liberty to the said A. "to make such reasonable provision as he should think fit for such younger child or children," and in case the said A. should die leaving no son and that there should be one or more daughters, then to such daughter or daughters if more than one, on their attaining their respective ages of twenty one years, their heirs and assigns, share and share alike. Held, that as the intention of the settlement was evidently to provide for all the children, as well daughters as sons, the Court would effect that intention by transposing the clause creating the power and that containing the limitation to the daughters, whereby the words "such younger child or children" would include both sons and daughters; Fenton v. Fenton, 1 Dr. & Wal. 66. Where in a marriage settlement a term for securing younger children's portions was placed subsequent to the estates tail of the sons, it was helped in equity. But query, was this a case of extrinsic evidence? Uvedale v. Halfpenny, 2 P. W. 150. : False Grammar (e).—A Bond is made in these words [*83] "Know all Men that *I Philip Goole do stand bound" (not said to whom) "in the sum of £16, and is to be paid to the said John Garnes the elder's executors; for which pay ment to be made I do bind me, my heirs and executors" (but not said to whom). The condition, after long and senseless recitals, was: "If therefore Philip Goole shall pay to John Garnes the elder's executors within one year after his death, the bond shall be void." Held, that either the words "John Garnes the elder's executors," should be disjoined and be read "John Garnes the elder his executor" and to be taken "John Garnes the elder and his executors," or that the words "the elder's executors" should be wholly rejected as void, and the words be read "to be paid to John Garnes" only; Langdon v. Goole, 3 Lev. 21. Debt on a bond conditioned to pay £7 by 2s. a week till the £7 (d) Parkhurst v. Smith, Willes, 332; Gwyn v. Neath, &c., Canal Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 214: Atto v. Hemmings, 2 Bulstr. 282. The law will rather invert the words than pervert the sense. "Bacon's Law Tracts, Case of Revocation of Uses, cited 2 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 541. (e) 2 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 540, citing Chapman v. Dalton, Plowd. 289; 1 Inst. 225a; Butler v. Wigge, 1 Will. Saund. 64. were paid, and if he failed of the payment of the 2s. at any of the days wherein it ought to be paid, the obligation to be void or else to remain in full force. The obligor omitted to make the payment of the 2s. on one of the days on which it ought to be paid; held, that the condition might be read distributively, by referring particulars to particulars, viz., that if he paid the £7 the obligation should be void: but if he failed of paying the 28. at any of the days, it should remain in force; Vernon v. Alsop, 1 Lev. 77. Incorrect spelling disregarded.—Incorrect spelling disregarded: "Octagenta," "Septemgenta," "Sewtene Pounds," cited James Osborn's Case, 10 Rep. 133a; "quadrans," Cromwell v. Grunsden, Salk. 462; S. C. 1 Ld. Ray. 335; 5 Mod. 278; "Tenerie and Obligarie," Dodson v. Kayes, Yelv. 193; "nobules" for "nobilibus," Matthew v. Purchins, Cro. Jac. 203; "threty-two ponds," Hulbert v. Long, Cro. Jac. 607; "Joaem," without any dash over it, for "Johannem," "quinginta," Downs v. Hathwaite, Cro. Car. 418; "Terdecem," Hopehill v. Searle, Cro. Car. 386; "Septuagintis" for "Septingentis," Walter v. Pigot, Moore, 645; see also Cro. El. 896; "Octogessim," Moore, 864; see other cases collected 2 Rolle, Ab. p. 146, et seq. tit. "Obligation." * Cases where the badly spelt word was held to avoid [*84] the deed: "teneri in terengentate liberis," Hills v. Cooper, Cro. Jac. 603; "Octigent," Fitzhughes' Case, Hob. 19; "quimquagent," Parry v. Dale, Yelv. 95. See as to the effect of bad spelling, whereby it is doubtful what is meant, Fielder v. Tovy, Sty. 241, 257. [* 85] *CHAPTER VII. MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL RULES. The expression of that which is implied has no effect, except that it may alter the construction of a subsequent clause: Express provisions exclude implication: Repugnant clauses: Words to be taken against the person using them, except in the case of the King: Election by grantee. Rule 18.-Expression of implied words.-The expression of a clause that the law implies has no effect. Expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur. Expressa non prosunt quæ non expressa proderunt. Co. Lit. 205a; 2nd Inst. 365; 4 Rep. 73b.27 See per Romilly, M. R., Boldero v. East India Co., 26 Beav., at p. 342. Examples." If a gift in tail be made to a man and to the heirs of his body, and if he die without heirs of his body, that then the donor and his heirs shall re-enter, this is a void condition; for when the issues fail, the estate determineth by the express limitation, and consequently the adding of the condition to defeat that which is determined by the limitation of the estate is void, and in that case the wife of the donee shall be endowed;" Co. Litt. 224b. Reservation of rent in a lease for years to the lessor during his life and his assigns; held, that the reservation to the assigns bad no effect, because the addition of assigns is implied by law; Sury v. Cole, Latch, 44; S. C. (sub nom. Sury v. Brown) ib. 99, 255; see Watton & Edwins' Case, cited 1 Vent. 162. "If lands be letten to two for term of their lives, et eorum [*86] alterius diutius viventi, and one of them granteth *his part to a stranger, whereby the jointure is severed, and dyeth, here shall be no survivor, but the lessor shall enter into the moiety, and the survivour shall have no advantage of these 27 Grammatical construction is not to be adhered to when a contrary intent is manifest. Hancock. Watson, 18 Cal. 137; Jackson v. Lopping, 1 Wend. 388; Sprague v. Edwards, 48 Cal. 239. First, for words et eorum alterius diutius viventi, for two causes. that the jointure is severed. Secondly, for that those words are no more than the Common Law would have implied without them." Co. Lit. 191a. "The clause of distress (in a lease) is no otherwise to be extended than as the grantor gives it; and therefore if the clause were, if the rent be behind, being demanded at another place besides the land, or of his person, then he may distrain,' clearly then he could not distrain without such a demand made first, for there the demand is other than the law requires. But where the clause is no more but if the rent be behind being lawfully demanded, then he may distrain,' it is no more than the law speaks; and therefore the distress implying a demand and distress, one before another, by operation of law satisfies it;" Browne v. Dunnery, Hob. 208. Ejectment on a proviso for re-entry contained in a lease on the rent being in arrear for 21 days, being lawfully demanded. The Act 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, provides that when half a year's rent is in arrear, and the lessor has a right by law to enter for non-payment, he may without a formal demand or entry sue in ejectment. Held, there being five quarters in arrear, that it was not necessary to make a demand of the rent on the premises before bringing the ejectment. Dampier, J., said: "The right to re-enter grows out of the stipulation of the parties. A demand is necessary as a consequence at law, and there was the same necessity for a demand before the statute whether the lease contained the words lawfully demanded or not. Therefore the maxim applies;" Expressio, &c.; Doe d. Scholefield v. Alexander, 2 M. & S. 525. Feoffment reserving rent to the feoffor, "and if it happen the aforesaid rent to be behind in part or in all, that then it shall be lawful for the feoffor and his heirs to enter." It is not necessary to insert the power of re-entry* because the [87] feoffor and his heirs can do so by force of the reservation. "Quæ dubitationis causa tollendæ inseruntur, communem legem non lædunt. Et expressio, &c." Litt. ss. 330, 331; Co. Lit. 205a. Where a mortgage-deed expressly secured the mortgagees' expenses and interest: Doe d. Scruton v. Snaith, 8 Bing. 146; ines for renewals if paid by the mortgagee: Wroughton v. Turtle, 11 M. & W. 561; the expenses incurred by the mortgagee in keeping up a policy of life insurance comprised in the security: Lawrence v. Boston, 7 Ex. 28; the payment by the mortgagor of all taxes on the mortgaged property: Doe d. Merceron v. Bragg, 8 Ad. & El. 620; it was held, that as in each of these cases the moneys expended by the mortgagee for these purposes would have been charged by the law without any express words, the rule applied, and that consequently the deed did not require any ad valorem stamp in respect of the moneys so expended. ་ Unnecessary words apparently restrictive.-The rule is applied where the words state only part of that which the law implies, so that they appear at first sight to be restrictive. Examples. Montague asked this question:-A man makes a lease for term of years by indenture, and the lessor covenants and grants to the lessee, "that he shall have thorns for hedges growing upon the land, by the assignment of the bailiff of the lessor, and necessary fuel to burn in his house." First, whether the lessee can take thorns without the assignment of the bailiff, or not? Secondly, if by the copulative (and necessary fuel) that shall refer to the assignment of the bailiff, or not? For the first, it seemed to Baldwin and Fitzherbert, that the lessee, by virtue of his lease, may well cut thorns without assignment by the order of the law; for by our books the law is, that a termor shall have loppings and shrowdings of trees for necessary fuel; and then to insert these words, "that he shall have fuel by the assignment of his bailiff" is void, for what the law gives him by impli[88] cation in the lease, that he may take without assign ment. For, if I lease to one, two acres of meadow, and that it shall be lawful for the lessee to cut the grass at the assignment of the lessor, notwithstanding these words, the lessee may cut the grass. But if the other covenant on his part be in a negative, "that he will not take thorns without the assignment of the lessor," now that is a good covenant, and if he do contrary to that, action of covenant well lies. Or if it were a condition which is a negative in law, as, "proviso that he shall not take thorns without, &c.," now if he do that, clearly the lessor may enter, &c. But in the other case, it is a grant on the part of the lessor in the affirmative. Wherefore, &c.: Shelley è contra; for when a man takes a lease out of the order of the law, viz., by special words and terms, he shall have it as if the lessor spoke the words, and no otherwise. Wherefore here he hath accepted the lease by such words, "that he shall have thorns by the assignment of the bailiff;" that is as much as to say, he shall not have them without the assignment. Wherefore, &c. And as to the other point, it seemed to him that this copulative (and) should make the fuel pass by assignment, &c.; Dyer, 19b, pl. 115. Feoffment by D. of certain closes reserving unto D. and his heirs all the coals, with liberty for D. his heirs and assigns at all times thereafter, "during the time that D. and his heirs should continue owners of F.," to sink pits, &c. Held, that D. could get coals under the reservation in fee, and that the express liberty was not restrictive of that which would be implied to get the coals; Cardigan v. Armitage, 2 B. & C. 197. S. bargains and sells to G. all the trees growing in and on a manor, and covenants that G. might within five years sell and |