former settlement and Act, which were described in the schedule. Held, that lands not included in the former settlement or Act, though described in the schedule, did not pass; Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury, L. R. 17 Eq. 378. See the settlement and Act given at length, Shrewsbury v. Scott, 6 C. B. N. S. 1.

Special description. Where one having customary tenements, compounded and uncompounded, surrendered to the use of his will all and singular the lands, tenements, &c., whatsoever in the manor, which he held of the lord by copy of court-roll, in whose tenure or occupation soever the same were, being of the yearly rent to the lord in the whole of £4 10s. 8d. and compounded for;" it was held that the words "compounded for " restrained the operation of the surrender to that description of copy-holds then belonging to the surrenderor, and that the words "being of the yearly rent of, &c.," which were not referable to any actual amount of the rents either compounded or uncompounded, though much nearer to the whole than to the compounded only, could not qualify or impugn that restriction; Roe d. Conolly v. Vernon, 5 East, 51.

Cases on Wills.

Words held restrictive. In the following cases, all decided on the construction of wills, the words in italics have been held restrictive.

Words of locality.-Devise of "all his freehold and real estates whatsoever situate in the city of Limerick;" Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244; "All my freehold, copyhold, and leasehold messuages lands and hereditaments in the city of Hereford or the liberties thereof in the county of Hereford;" Moser v. Platt, 14

Sim. 95; "All which said hereditaments in the county of [* 164] Hants are hereinafter described or referred to as my Tedworth estate;' " Webber v. Stanley, 16 C. B. N. S. 698; "All the freehold, copyhold, and leasehold lands, tenements, and hereditaments to which I may be entitled at the time of my decease situate in the parish of Crowhurst; Evans v. Angell, 26 Beav. 202; "All and every his messuages, lands, tenements, tithes, and tithe commutation rent-charge lying and being within the manor and parish of Goulceby;" Lister v. Pickford, 34 Beav. 576; "Leasehold property, situate at C. in the parish of S.; " Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. 330; "All and singular my freehold messuages or tenement lands and hereditaments situate at K.;" Pogson v. Thomas, 6 Bing. N. C. 337; "Messuage or tenement farm lands and premises with the appurtenances situate, lying, and being at A. in the parish of B.;" Doe d. Tyrrell v. Lyford, 4 M. & S. 550: "All the estate and interest whatsoever which I have or can claim either in possession or reversion of or in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments at C.; " Doe d. Browne

v. Greening, 3 M. & S. 171; "All and every my messuages, tenements, or dwelling houses and buildings situate and being at, in, or near a street called S.;” Doe d. Ashforth v. Bower, 3 E. & Ad. 453; "Messuages, cottages, manufactory and land on the west side of High Street;" Smith v. Ridgway, L. R. 1 Ex. 46, 331.

Occupancy. "All the messuages, tenements, land, grounds, hereditaments, and premises situate at T., and now in my own occupation; "Doe d. Parkin v. Parkin, 5 Taunt. 321; "All that capital messuage or tenement and farmhouse. and inter alia woods, woodlands . . . . commonly called T., in the parish of E. in the occupation of W." (the woods in hand did not pass); Whitfield v. Langdale, 1 Ch. D. 61; "All my lands situated at G., now or late in the occupation of S.; Homer v. Homer, 8 Ch. D. 758; "All those two cottages or tenements, the one occupied by A. and the other by B." (the facts were very special); Doe d. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 15 Q. B. 227.

Tenure." All that freehold farm called W., containing 200 acres or thereabouts, occupied by W.;" Hall v. Fisher, 1 Coll. 47; "All and every my freehold hereditaments *and [* 165] estate in the county of Surrey;" Quennell v. Turner, 13 Beav. 240; "All that my freehold estate at or near B. which I purchased of W.;" Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & S. 722. "All my copyhold estates in C.; " Doe d. Brown v. Brown, 11 East, 441. Miscellaneous.—“ Subject to a mortgage," Pullin v. Pullin, 10 J. B. Moo. 464; S. C. 3 Bing. 47 (a); "Which I have surrendered to the use of my will;" Gascoigne v. Barker, 3 Atk. 8. "All freehold and copyhold . . . hereditaments .. whereof I shall die seised or possessed the copyhold part whereof I have surrendered to the use of my will;" Wilson v. Mount, 3 Ves. 191; "Which I became entitled to on the decease of my father;" d. Ryall v. Bell, 8 T. R. 579.

Doe

Examples of rejection of words fitting part only of the property. Examples of rule 45.-Name.-Conveyance of all that part of the Bog of Allen and Clunagh situate in the barony of Carbery and county of Kildare containing 777 acres 3 rods 24 poles, as described by a map annexed hereto." It turned out that part of the land described by the map amounting to 20 acres 3 rods 6 poles formed part of the Bog of Muckland, not of Allen and Clunagh. Held, that the whole of the land described in the map passed. Willes, J., in delivering the opinion of the Judges, said, "The words of the conveyance, taken in connection with the map, which is referred to, and made part of it, are sufficient to describe the land in question, and to express an intention to convey it. The omission to describe the land by the name of 'Muckland,' and even the description of it as within another denomina(a) Here the words "subject to a mortgage were contained in a recital, not in the description itself; see Doe d. Beach v. Jersey, 1 B. & Ald. 550.

tion, amount at most to an erroneous additional description of that which is identified beyond doubt by reference to the map, constat de corpore;" Rorke v. Errington, 7 H. L. C. 617, at p. 625. Apparently, if a lessor convey the reversion by the description contained in the lease, the whole of the property comprised in the lease will pass though, owing to changes made by the lessee, that description applies at the time when the reversion is granted to part only of the premises demised; Burton v. Browne, Palm, 319; S. C. 2 Rol. Rep. 261, 265; Cro. Jac. 648: the reports are not easily reconcilable.

Quantity. If one grant in this manner "all my meadow [* 166] in D., * containing 10 acres," whereas in truth his meadow there doth contain 20 acres, it seems this is a good grant for the whole 20 acres;" Shep. Touch. 248; Willoughby v. Foster, Dy. 80b.

Demise of "all that part of the townland of B., containing 509 acres, arable, meadow, and pasture, English statute measure, for three lives renewable for ever, bounded by" certain specified boundaries. Held, to pass 400 acres of bog and land reclaimed from bog lying within the same boundaries in addition to the 509 acres; Jack v. M'Intyre, 12 Cl. & Fin. 151; S. C. 3 Ir. L. R. 140; 5 Ir. L. R. 229.

A conveyance was made by reference to a schedule, and the portion of the schedule which related to the parcel in question stated it in the first column, which was headed, "No. on the plan of the Briton Ferry Estate," to be "153b;" in the second column, under the heading "Description of Premises," it was stated to be "a small piece marked on the plan;" in the third, it was described as being in the occupation of J. E.; and in the fourth, as containing 34 perches. The piece 153b, as marked on the plan, contained 27 perches only. Held, that the description in the plan must prevail, the acreage being rejected as falsa demonstratio; Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey, 11 M. & W. 183. "The portion conveyed is perfectly described, and can be precisely ascertained, and no diffi culty arises except from the subsequent statement that it contains 34 perches. That, however, becomes merely a false description of that which is conveyed with convenient certainty before. It is a mere falsa demonstratio, and does not affect that which is already sufficiently conveyed;" per Parke, B., at p. 189; S. C. 12 L. J. Ex. 243.

Boundaries." Then it is described as bounded on the east by (inter alia) the defendant's property. But this general description of the boundaries does not cut down the effect of the prior description. When, after a description of a property, it is stated that on one side it is bounded by a certain other property, and it

appears that it is not so bounded for every inch, there is [*167] an inaccuracy in the * statement of the boundary, but this is not enough to exclude what is not so bounded, if

it appears from the evidence to have been part of the property dealt with, and the previous description of that property is sufficient to include it;" per Jessel, M. R., Francis v. Hayward, 22 Ch. D. 181.

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Occupancy. If one grant in this manner All my manor of W., late parcel of the possession of the Abbott of S., and late in the possession of K.," and in truth it was never in the possession of K.; this grant is good notwithstanding;" Shep. Touch. 247.

Lease of "All their farm in B. in the occupation of W." "The lease is of all their farm in B., which word (farm) is a capital messuage, and all the lands lying to it, and signifies the chief house and the lands belonging to it, and not a common house, and so has a certainty in itself. And when it goes further and says, in the tenure and occupation of W., this is of no effect, for it was not in his tenure and occupation, yet it should pass, for there is a certainty in the thing demised, viz., the farm in B., and so another certainty put to a thing which was certain enough before, is of no manner of effect;" per Cur., Wrotesly v. Adams, Plow. 191.

A man having lately purchased a house in D. of T. C., and having no other house in D., made a conveyance thereof by the description, "the messnage lately of R. C. in D.;" Held, that it passed; Windham v. Windham, Dy. 376b. See also Shep. Touch. 247,

248.

Demise of "all that glebe land lying in A., viz., 78 acres of land, and also the tithes of the said 78 acres, all which lately were in the occupation of P." It appeared that P. had never been in occupation of the tithes. Held, nevertheless, that they passed by the lease; Swyft v. Eyres, Cro. Car. 546; S. C. sub nom. Vicars Choral de Litchfield v. Ayres, W. Jones, 435.

Where the words of a deed were sufficient to pass all the property comprised in a former deed, but the description of occupancy was incorrect, the property passed; Wilkinson v. Malin 2 Cr. & J. 636; S. C. 2 Tyr. 544.

* Lease of "All that part of the park called B., situate [* 168] and being in the county of O. and now in the occupation of S.," lying within certain specified abuttals, together with the houses belonging thereto, "and which now are in the occupation of S." Held, that a house on a part within the abuttals, but not in the occupation of S., passed; Doe d. Smith v. Galloway, 5 B. & Ad. 43; S. C. 2 Nev. & M. 240.

A house was demised to A. except the roof, which the landlord retained and soon afterwards demised to the owner of the adjoining house. After the determination of the lease to A., the landlord demised the house by the description of "all that shop, situate at, &c., as the same was late in the occupation of A." Held, that the words, as the same was late in the occupation of A.," were inserted for the purpose of identification only, and not of re

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stricting the property which passed, and accordingly that the roof passed; Martyr v. Lawrence, 2 De G. Jo. & S. 261 (cf. Baird v. Fortune, 4 Macq. 127).

[* 169] 13, cited L. R. 2 Eq. 824).

6

Locality (a).- “If a parish lie in two counties, viz., Berks and Wilts, and one grant in this manner, all his close called Callis in the parish of Hurst in the county of Berks,' and in truth the close doth lie in the county of Wilts; this is a good grant to pass the close" (this case is put in Bacon's Law Tracts, Rule "If the grant be in this manner, All that my house in the occupation of J. S., in St. Andrew's parish,' whereas in truth it is in the parish of K., but in the occupation of J. S., it seems this grant is good to pass the house;" Shep. Touch. 247. But see Dowtie's Case, post, p. 172.

6

"No man can doubt the intent of this deed to pass those lands; it has conveyed so many acres in the possession of A., B., and C., the name of the parish only is mistaken. . . Why did the parties mention the parish at all in the deed? it was unnecessary;" Lambe v. Reaston, 5 Taunt. 207; S. C. 1 Marsh. 23: but see Cotterel v. Franklin, 6 Taunt. 284.

Map.-Demise of all minerals in, upon, or under all or any part of certain hereditaments "described and set forth in the map hereunto annexed, and also in, upon, or under all or any part of M., all which premises are situate in the townships of, &c., and are bounded, &c., and contain together 1400 acres of land or thereabouts, all which are particularly described, delineated, and distinguished in the map or plan thereof annexed to these presents, and which by the agreement of all the said parties hereto is meant and intended to be taken as part of this indenture." Held, on a dispute arising as to the boundary, and the map being on so small a scale that it was impossible that it could ascertain the boundary with sufficient precision, that the words of the demise were not

(a) Vill and parish distinguished.—It is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between a parish and a vill; Co. Litt. 115b, 125a; Addison v. Otway, 1 Mod. 250; 2 Mod. 233 (at 237); Stoke v. Pope, 2 Roll. Ab. 54; 4 Cru. Dig. Tit. 32, Ch. 21, ss. 32, 33. Reg. v. Watson, L. R. 32 B. 762; Rudd v. Morton, 2 Salk. 501.

It appears that a conveyance of all a man's lands in a named parish, or in named liberties, will pass his lands in every vill in that parish or liberties; Waldron v. Ruscarit, 1 Vent. 170; Lever v. Hosier, 2 Mod. 47; but that on the other hand a conveyance of all a man's land in A., where there is both a parish and a vill of that name, will pass only the lands in the vill; Stork v. Fox, Cro. Jac. 120; S. C. sub nom., Stoke v. Pope, 2 Roll. Ab. 54. See also 2 Roll. Ab. p. 54, pl. 31.

Where the parish and a vill in it bear the same name, they will be presumed, till the contrary be proved, to be conterminous; Gibson v. Clark, 1 Ja. & W. 159.

If a place be named generally, it is prima facie a vill; Vinkeston v. Ebden, cited 2 Salk. 501, unless it be the place where a deed is made, when it is prima facie a house; Ward's Case, Latch. 4; S. C. sub nom. Ward v. Kidswin, Latch. 77.