Whitfield v. Taylor, § 5. what was meant by surprise. For a man may be said to be surprised, in every action which is not done with as much discretion as it ought to be. But the surprize here intended must be accompanied with fraud, and circumvention. There must either be Broderick v. suppressio veri, or suggestio falsi. And then it must be fully proved; for fraud is a thing odious in law, and never to be presumed. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239. Treat. of Eq. 9, 10. Picket v. Loggon, 14 Ves. 215. Huguenin Id. 273. 27. Inadequacy of consideration is a ground upon which a court of equity has sometimes avoided a deed; provided it be such as to show that the person did not understand the bargain he made, or was so oppressed, that he was glad to make it, knowing its v. Barclay, inadequacy: for these circumstances will show a command over him, which may amount to a fraud. But there is no case in which it has been held, that mere inadequacy of price is a ground for a court of equity to annul an agreement, though executory, if the same appear to have been fairly entered into, and understood by the parties, and capable of being specifically performed. Still less does it seem to have been considered as a ground for rescinding an agree ment actually executed. Gwynne v. 1 Bro. R. 1. Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 512. Vide Bro. Parl. Ca. Tit. Treat. of Eq. § 10. Hall v. J Ves. 503. 28. Bonds for money, or beneficial leases, taken as rewards for procuring marriages, will be set aside in equity because such transactions tend to induce executors, trustees, guardians, and others, connected with persons of fortune, to betray them into improper marriages. 29. Bonds or other securities given for the purpose Tit. 25. § 82. of obtaining appointments to offices of trust under government, are also void. Tit. 12. c. 4. $48. 30. It has been stated in a former title, that trustees are not allowed by the Court of Chancery to become purchasers of the estate. This rule is extended to assignees of bankrupts, and solicitors. And in a late case, a purchase of a bankrupt's estate, by the solicitor to the commission, was set aside, though he gave the full value for it, at a public auction. And Lord Eldon declared, he would set aside all purchases made by persons having a confidential character, however honest the circumstances. Willis, Bro. Parl. Ca. 245. 31. It has been determined by the House of Lords Middleton that no gift or gratuity to an attorney, beyond his fair professional demands, made during the time that he continues to conduct or manage the affairs of the donor, shall be permitted to stand. 1 Cox. R. 112. 12 Ves. 371. 32. Weakness of understanding is also a ground upon which a court of equity will invalidate a deed. But Lord Thurlow has observed, that there is an in- Att Gen. v. Parnther, finite, nay an insurmountable difficulty, in laying down abstract propositions, upon a subject which 44). depends on such a variety of circumstances, as the legal competency of the mind, to the act in which it is engaged; if its competency be impeached by positive evidence of an anterior derangement, or affected by circumstances of bodily debility, sufficiently strong to lead to a suspicion of intellectual incapacity. 33." If derangement be alleged, it is clearly in- Idem.. cumbent on the party alleging it to prove such derangement: if such derangement be proved, or be admitted to have existed at any particular period, but a lucid interval be alleged to have prevailed at the period particularly referred to, then the burthen of proof attaches on the party alleging such lucid interval; who must show sanity and competence at the period when the act was done, and to which the lucid interval refers, And it certainly is of equal v. Pead, importance, that the evidence in support. of the Lewis i Ves. Jun 18. 14 Ves. 91. allegation of a lucid interval, after derangement at 273. Say v. 1 Ves. & Bea. 195. any period has been established, should be as strong and demonstrative of such fact, as where the object of the proof is to establish derangement." 34. If a woman on the point of marriage charges Or made in Derogation or conveys away her estate to a stranger, without the of the Rights of Marriage. knowledge of her intended husband; such charge or conveyance will be held void in equity; being in fraud of the right which the husband acquired to his wife's property by the marriage. Lance v. Norman, 2 Rep. Cha. 41. Howard v. Carleton v. 2 Vern. 17. 2 Ves. 264. King v. Cotton, 2 P. Wis. 358. 35. Thus, a recognizance entered into by a woman, the day before her marriage, was set aside, and a perpetual injunction granted; though one witness deposed that the husband consented to the drawing of it; but that witness had an assignment of it himself. 36. So where a widow made a conveyance of her estate, prior to her marriage, and without the privity of her intended second husband; it was decreed that the second husband should enjoy the estate notwithstanding. 37. It has been determined, upon the same principle, that a conveyance made by a woman, before her marriage, without the privity of her intended husband, to trustees for her separate use, was void against the husband. 38. Lord Hardwicke has said, that if a woman about to marry, gives away a part of her property, or gives a security or assignment of it, they are relievable against in Chancery. But where a debt is contracted for a valuable consideration, though concealed from the husband, it is no fraud on the marriage. 39. Where a widow assigned over the greater part of her property to trustees, in trust for herself during 674. her widowhood, and in the event of her marrying again, in trust for her second son; but the conveyance was made publicly, and prior to the marriagetreaty with her second husband; on a bill filed by the husband, to set aside this conveyance, Lord King dismissed it; saying it was a very reasonable thing for a widow, while it was in her power, to make a provsion for her children by her former husband. And this being before her treaty of marriage with the plaintiff, it had been impossible to have asked him to be a party thereto; he not being then thought of. 2 Bro. R. 22. 6 Bro. Parl. Ca. 427. 2 Cox. R. 29 40. The Countess of Strathmore, a widow, having Strathmore five children, and being tenant for life of a very con- v. Bowes, siderable real estate, on the 10th Jan. 1777 executed 345. a deed, whereby she conveyed all the estates whereof 1 Ves. Jun. she was seised for life to two trustees, upon trust for her sole and separate use, exclusive of any husband she should thereafter marry, with a power of revocation. This settlement was in fact made in contemplation of Lady S.'s marriage with a Mr. Grey; and was with his knowledge and consent. But on the 17th of the same January she married Mr. Stoney, who afterwards took the name of Bowes. In the following month of May, Lady S., by the terror of personal violence, was compelled by her husband to execute a deed of revocation of the conveyance made before her marriage. In the year 1785, Lady S. quitted Mr. Bowes her husband, and ever after lived separate and apart from him; and exhibited her bill against him, to have the conveyance made before her marriage established; and to set aside the deed of revocation. An issue was directed to try whether the deed of revocation was obtained by duress, and the jury found that it was. The cause then came on before Mr. Justice Buller, sitting for the Chancellor, who decreed that Lady S.'s conveyance before marriage should be established; and upon a rehearing before Lord Thurlow, this decree was affirmed. On an appeal to the House of Lords, it was argued on behalf of Mr. Bowes.-1° That the conveyance was a fraud upon the contract of marriage, being made without the knowledge of the appellant, and concealed from him at the time of such marriage. 2o. That although such conveyance was suggested to have been made in contemplation of a marriage, intended between Lady S. and another person, yet such marriage did not take effect. And although the disposition made by that conveyance might not be fraudulent as against a person knowing of, and consenting to such disposition; yet as it would be clearly fraudulent against creditors, or purchasers for a valuable consideration, there was no sound reason why the same should not be deemed fraudulent as against the appellant; who by the marriage gave to Lady S. a legal title to dower in his own estate, worth at that time, as he asserted, about 1,000l. a year; and became responsible for all the obligations of a husband, and particularly for debts contracted, or to be contracted by her. 3°. That all the cases which had been determined by courts of equity upon the subject, agreed in regarding such a disposition, as fraudulent and void; especially where made merely and only for the immediate and separate benefit of the person making it. 4. That if the decrees complained of should bẹ established, a precedent would exist, destructive |