Holcroft's 1 Atk. 93. 4. 2 Ves. 10. S. P. Stephen v. Olive, 2 Bro. R. 9. Lush v. Wilkinson, 5 Ves. 384. 12 Ves. 147. Walker v. Burrowes, 1 Atk. 93. 19. Thus it is said in a note in Dyer, that if a man conveys land, for the preferment of his children, this shall be good, if he was not in debt at the time : but if he was in debt, it would be otherwise. 20. Lord Hardwicke has said, that it is necessary, on the stat. 13 Eliz., to prove that the person making a settlement was indebted at the time, or immediately after the execution of the deed. And that where a man has died indebted, who in his lifetime. made a voluntary settlement, upon application to the Court of Chancery, to make it subject to his debts as real assets, the Court has always denied it, unless it was shown that he was indebted at the time the conveyance was executed. 21. It was held by Lord Kenyon, when M. R. that a settlement after marriage, in favour of a wife and children, by a person not indebted at the time, was good against creditors, and not within the stat. 18 Eliz. And in another case it was declared by Lord Alvanley, when M. R., that to impeach a settlement, made after marriage, under the stat. 13 Eliz., the husband must be proved to have been indebted at the time, to the extent of insolvency. 22. Conveyances of this kind are however rendered void against commissioners of bankrupts, by the statute 1 Ja. I.; unless made upon the marriage of a child, being of the age of consent. Voluntary 23. Voluntary conveyances are in all cases void Conveyances against subsequent bona fide purchasers, for valuable void against Purchasers. consideration; for the subsequent conveyance to a purchaser sufficiently proves a fraudulent intent in making the former conveyance. And although it is 1 Vent. 194. said in Bovey's case, that a voluntary conveyance was not upon that account to be reckoned fraudulent, or to be avoided by a purchaser for a valuable consi 2 Ves. 10. 3 Atk. 412. deration; and this doctrine has been frequently repeated; yet there is no case in which a voluntary conveyance, though unattended with fraud, has been supported against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration; but, on the contrary, such Tot. 158. voluntary conveyances have always been deemed Moo. 615. fraudulent and void, as against subsequent purchasers. . Dean, 1 Cha. R. 78. 24. The plaintiff's suit was to be relieved upon Leach articles of agreement for the purchase of land from the defendant Richard Dean, who, before any conveyance in execution of the articles, had conveyed the premises by deed to the defendant, Roger Dean his son. The Court, with the assistance of the Judges, declared that the said deed so made to Roger Dean, being a voluntary conveyance, and the said Richard Dean settling the premises to the plaintiff' for valuable consideration, the said voluntary conveyance was a fraud. 25. Settlements made on a wife or children after marriage, unsupported by any other consideration · but that of love and affection, being only founded on a moral duty, are voluntary; and void under the stat. 27 Eliz. as to subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration. Cro. Ja. 158. 26. Thus, in the case of Colvill v. Parker, Just. Woodie's Tanfield cited a case in which it was adjudged, that Case, where a person, after marriage, voluntarily assigned a lease for years, as a jointure for his wife; and afterwards sold it to one who had not any notice of this conveyance; it was within the statute. v. Moses, 27. J. Reade being tenant for life, with remainder Goodright to his daughter Elizabeth in tail; they joined in 2 Black. R. levying a fine to trustees, in trust for the father for 1019. life, and after his decease for the maintenance of Elizabeth and her children during the life of Eliza Though with Chapman v. Emery, infra. Evelyn v. beth, and after her death and that of her husband, to raise portions for their younger children. Elizabeth survived her husband, and made a lease of the premises for 21 years at a rack rent. Upon an attempt to annul this lease by the daughter of Elizabeth, Lord C. J. De Grey delivered the opinion of the Court, that the deed was only a voluntary conveyance, within the true meaning of the stat. 27 Eliz., being founded only upon a good, and not upon a valuable consideration: and therefore could not be set up against a bona fide purchaser. 28. Although a purchaser has notice of a voluntary settlement, before he purchases, yet it will not affect him; and he will be allowed to hold the estate against the persons claiming under such voluntary settle ment. 29. C. Evelyn, by a settlement after marriage, conveyed the premises in question to trustees, to the use of himself for life, remainder to trustees, to pay an annuity to his wife for her life, remainder to other trustees, to raise 4,000l. for younger children, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, with a proviso that it should be lawful for C. Evelyn, by deed, to revoke the uses, and sell the estate; but he covenanted that the money to be raised by the sale of the lands, should be paid to the trustees, to be by them laid out in the purchase of other lands, to be settled to the same uses. J. Templar purchased the settled estate of Evelyn, and paid the purchase money to him. The children of Evelyn, claiming under the settlement, filed their bill against Templar, stating that he had notice of the settlement, and insisting that he ought to have paid the purchase money to the trustees, not to Evelyn. The defendant contended, that the settlement being made after marriage, was voluntary and fraudulent as to him; and claimed the benefit of the statute 27 Eliz. Lord Thurlow said, that although it would have been as well, at first, if voluntary conveyances had not been thought so little of, yet the rule was such, and so many estates stood upon it, that it could not be shaken; and dismissed the bill. 30. J. Manning, by indenture dated in 1783, in Doe v. Manning, consideration of love and affection for his mother, 9 East, 59. sisters, and brother, and for making a provision for them, conveyed the premises in question to trustees, to the use of himself for life, remainder to the use of his mother for life, &c. Two years after, J. Manning, in consideration of 1,800 l. conveyed the premises to R. Otley in fee, and Otley had notice of the settlement of 1783 before payment of the purchase money, and execution of the conveyance. The question was, whether this conveyance to Otley, who brought an ejectment for the recovery of the premises, was good, against the prior settlement. Lord Ellenborough delivered the judgement of the court. He said, as it was found that there was no fraud in fact in the conveyance of 1783, the only point for the consideration of the Court was, whether a voluntary conveyance, without any valuable consideration, be not, according to the legal construction of the statute 27 Eliz. fraudulent against a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration; or, in other words, whether in such case the law do not presume fraud, without admitting such presumption to be contradicted. After stating all the cases, his Lordship concluded in these words: "Thus stand the authorities on both sides of the question; and the weight, number, and uniformity of those which establish the point contended for, on behalf of the plaintiff, do, in our opinion, very much preponderate. And as many estates depend upon the rule, it ought not, we conceive, to be shaken. It appears from a manuscript note, formerly belonging to Mr. Justice Clive, that Mr. Horseman, in the year 1713, advised the making of a mortgage of the estate settled in strict settlement by Sir R. Anderson, after his marriage; thinking it voluntary and fraudulent, as against a purchaser. And the like advice as that which he gave nearly a century ago, probably had been given before; and that it has been given since, and acted upon, we cannot doubt; as Lord Thurlow was not likely to have exante, § 29. pressed himself as he did in Evelyn v. Templar, unless he had known that such had frequently been the case. Feeling ourselves pressed with these authorities and considerations, we think ourselves bound to give judgement for the plaintiff. Much property has no doubt been purchased, and many conveyances settled, upon the ground of its having been so repeatedly held that a voluntary conveyance is fraudulent, as such, within the stat. 27 Eliz.; and it is no new thing for the Court to hold itself concluded, in matters respecting real property, by former decisions, upon questions in respect to which, if it were res integra, they probably would have come to very different conclusions. And if the adhering to such determinations is likely to be attended with inconvenience, it is a matter fit to be remedied by the legislature; which is able to prevent the mischief in future, and to obviate all the inconvenient consequences which are likely to result from it, as to purchases already made. And we cannot but say, as at present advised, and considering the construction put on the statute, that it would have been better if the statute had avoided conveyances only |