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intrusted for the son's wife. Whereas in the case mentioned in 3 Rep. 83 b. the consent seemed to be given by a person at the devotion of the settlor, and appointed by him.

38. Where a deed contains a power of revocation, at the will and pleasure of the settlor, it is immaterial whether the consideration be a valuable, or only a good one; for it is equally void as to a subsequent purchaser. And in an opinion of Mr. Booth's it is said, “The reserving of powers of revocation to the Collect. Jur.

vol. 1. 426. grantors or original owners of the land, though checked by requiring the consent of the trustees, hath of late been disused in settlements; because doubts have arisen whether such settlements are not fraudulent within the statuté of 27 Eliz.” And now powers of revocation, sale, and exchange, are always reserved to the trustees. 39. With respect to the persons who are deemed Who are

deemed Pursubsequent purchasers within the stat. 27 Eliz., it was chasers. resolved in Twine's case, that no purchaser should 3 Rep. 83 a. avoid a precedent conveyance, made by fraud and covin, but he who was a purchaser for money, or other valuable consideration. For although in the preamble it is said, for money or other good consideration, and likewise in the body of the act, yet these words are to be intended only of valuable consideration. And this appeared by the clause respecting powers of revocation ; for there it is said, for money or other good consideration, paid or given ; where the word paid is referred to money, and given to good consideration; which excludes all considerations of nature, or blood, or the like, and were to be intended only of valuable considerations, which might be given.

40. A mortgagee is a purchaser within the stat. 27 Eliz., and may therefore avoid a prior fraudulent conveyance.


41. R. Emery conveyed the premises in question, v. Emery, without any consideration, to the use of himself for Cowp. 279.

life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to their issue in tail. Three years after, Emery mortgaged the premises for 7001. to a person who had notice of the settlement. In an ejectment, the question was, whether the mortgagee should avoid the settlement as fraudulent, under the stat. 27 Eliz. It was contended, 1o. That the statute only related to purchasers, and that a mortgagee was not a purchaser. 2°. That the mortgagee had notice; and no pretence or circumstance of fraud appeared. The settlement was three years prior to the mortgage, therefore could not have been made with a view to defeat it.

Lord Mansfield said, there was no doubt but that a mortgagee was a purchaser. And as to the point of notice, that made no difference; because it was of a conveyance made void by the statute.

42. A lessee at a rack rent is a purchaser within ante, 27. the stat. 27 Eliz.; and in the case of Goodright v. Moses Cro. Eliz.

this point was admitted. But in the case of Upton v. Bassett it was held, that where a person made a lease without receiving any fine, or reserving any rent, the lessee was not a purchaser within the stat. 27 Eliz. and therefore could not avoid a preceding voluntary conveyance.

43. Where the price is inadequate in a considerable degree, or where an apparent inadequacy of price

is coupled with other circumstances, indicating a Twine's Case,

fraudulent collusion between the purchaser and the 3 Rep. 83 b. vendor, to avoid a preceding conveyance; a pur. Routledge,

chaser under such circumstances will not be entitled Cowp. 705. to the protection of the statute. Douglas

44. The consideration of marriage is sufficient to v. Waad,

establish a subsequent conveyance, and to render a 1 Cha. Ca.99.

previous one fraudulent and void, as against such

Doe v.

I Cha.Ca. 170.

Cro. Eliz. 415.

second conveyance. But a settlement upon a wife Martin v. after marriage, or upon children, will not avoid a preceding conveyance, unless it is made in pursuance 1Ab.F.q. 353. of articles entered into before marriage.

45. The statutes 13 & 27 Eliz. only avoid volun- Voluntary tary conveyances, as against creditors and subsequent binding on purchasers ; and therefore the persons making volun- the Parties. tary or fraudulent and covinous conveyances, and all those claiming under them, are as much bound by such conveyances, as if these statutes had not been made. 46. A. made a voluntary conveyance to B., and Rand v.

Cartwright, afterwards a mortgage of the same lands; the first Nels. 101. deed, on a trial at law, was found fraudulent; B. exhibited his bill to redeem the mortgage. It was decreed, that though the deed to B. was fraudulent, quoad the mortgage, yet it was good as to the equity of redemption, and would pass it; for a voluntary deed is good against the party that makes it, and his heirs.

47. In the case of Leach v. Dèan the Court de- ante, $ 24. clared, that as to the voluntary conveyance, the same was not thereby impeached, as between the father and son, for any advancement, or any other thing thereby settled on the said son ; other than making the said articles.

And good as 48. A voluntary deed cannot be defeated by a

to subsequent subsequent voluntary deed. And it has been stated, voluntary that where there are two voluntary conveyances of the same land, the first will prevail.

50. A. made a voluntary settlement of lands in Clavering v. trust for his grandson and his heirs; some years 2 Vern. 473.,

Clavering, after, he made another voluntary settlement of the 1 Ab. Eq 24, same estate, to the use of his eldest son for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail ; and by


Deeds. ante, c. 2.


M m

will gave a considerable estate to his grandson. le was proved that A. always kept the first settlement in his custody, and never published it, but it was found after his death amongst his waste papers; and the after deed was often mentioned by him, and he told the tenants that his eldest son was to be their landlord, after his death; yet the bill was dismissed, as to any relief against the first deed. The decree was

affirmed in parliament. And also as

51. A voluntary settlement is also good against a to Wills.

subsequent will, because neither of them are founded

on a valuable consideration. Villers v.

52. A person who was cestui que trust of a term, by Beaumont, Vern, 100.

a little scrap of paper at an ale-house, but under hand and seal, settled the term on the plaintiffs, to pay his debts; and

and gave them the surplus. Afterwards, being dissatisfied with this settlement, which he had delivered to a creditor, he devised the term, by will in writing, to his half brother, subject to the payment of his debts. The question was, whether the deed or will should prevail.

Lord Nottingham held, that there was no colour for setting the deed aside, to make way for the will : that if a man improvidently binds himself up by a voluntary deed, and does not reserve a liberty to himself, by a power of revocation; the Court of Chancery will. not loose the fetters he has put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly. For if you would relieve in such a case, you must consequently establish this proposition, viz. that a man can make no voluntary disposition of his estate, but only by his will ;

which would be absurd. Boughton v. 53. In a subsequent case Lørd Hardwicke held, Boughton, PAL. 625. thať a voluntary deed, kept by a person, and never cancelled, could not be set aside by a subsequent will,

54. There is a proviso in the stat. 13 Eliz. $ 6. Provisoe in that the act shall not extend to any estate or interest favour of in lands made upon good consideration, and bond on good Con.

sideration. fide lawfully conveyed or assured to any person, not having at the time of such conveyance any notice of such covin, fraud, or collusion. And in the stat. 27 Eliz. there is also a proviso, (S 4.) that the act shall not extend to make void any conveyance, assignment of lease, assurance, grant, charge, lease, estate, or interest, in any lands, &c. made upon good, consideration, bona fide, to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate.

55. In consequence of these provisoes, deeds made for a pecuniary consideration, or in consequence of any stipulations which are beneficial and valuable to the grantor, the word good in these provisoes meaning valuable, are not within these acts, and cannot therefore, be impeached, either by creditors, or subsequent purchasers. 56. Jolin Hammerton being seised in fee of an Roe v.

Mitton, estate charged with an annuity of 50 1. to bis mother, 2 Wils.R. and having two brothers, and being about to be 356. married, prevailed on his mother to relinquish her security upon the whole estate, and take a security upon part : a settlement was made accordingly, by which the estate was limited to John for life, re. mainder to his first and other sons by that marriage in tail male, remainder to the next brother in tail male, remainder over. And the question was, whether the remainder to the next brother of John was volun. tary. The Court held that it was not voluntary, because the mother must be presumed to have stipulated for the limitation to her second son, as the price of her relinquishing her security upon the whole estate, and taking a new security upon part.

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