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before Mar

Plowd. 58.

i Vent. 193.


Settlements 57. Marriage being considered as a valuable conriage.

sideration, deeds made previous to, and in conside

ration of an intended marriage, have been always Bovy's Case. held good within these provisoes, and not impeach

able by creditors, or subsequent purchasers. Kirk v. Clark,

58. A person having an estate in reversion in a Prec. in Cha. copyhold, surrendered it to his eldest son in tail, in

order that his son, coming in as a purchaser, should pay a smaller fine. Afterwards the father, on a treaty of marriage between his son and B., told B.'s friends that this copyhold was so settled; and the marriage was had, and a portion of 2,0001. paid with B. Some time after, the father settled the copyhold on a second wife.

Lord Cowper decreed that the surrender to the son was good; for though it was at first voluntary, yet upon the treaty of the marriage it was a principal inducement, therefore became valuable ; and ought to be considered as if it had then been surrendered

to the son. 1 Ab. Eq.354.

*59. Though a settlement be executed after marriage, yet if it be made in pursuance of an agreement entered into before marriage; or in consideration of an additional portion; it will be as good as if made before marriage.

-60. The defendant's father, some time after marMarsh, riage, in consideration of an additional portion of Forrest, 63.

100% paid by his wife's mother, settled an estate of 100 l. a year on himself for life, remainder to his first and other sons, &c. ; and the mother of the defendant's father, having an interest in the estate, joined with him in the conveyance. Thirteen years after, the father mortgaged the estate to the plaintiff, with the usual covenants, and died.

Lord Talbot said, the question was, whether this

Jones v.

was a voluntary conveyance or not. And it would
be very hard to call this a fraudulent settlement,
since it was in consideration of a marriage had, and
of an additional portion paid by the wife's relations ;
which could not be called voluntary against a mort-
gage made thirteen years after.
61. R. Williams made a settlement, in considera- Brown

v. Jones, tion of a marriage already had, and of a portion of

1 Atk. 188. 1,000l. paid to him by his wife's brother : the hus. band became a bankrupt, and the question was, whether this settlement was good against his creditors.

Lord Hardwicke said, it was admitted, if a settlement was made before marriage, though without a portion, it was good; for marriage itself was a consideration. And it was equally good, if made after marriage, provided it was upon payment of money, as a portion; or an additional sum of money, or even an agreement to pay money, if the money was afterwards paid, pursuant to the agreement. This was allowed both in law and equity to be sufficient to make it a good and valuable settlement. Decreed a good settlement against the creditors.

62. In a subsequent case Lord Hardwicke said, Stileman v that a settlement, though made after marriage, yet 2 Atk. 477.

Ashdown, being in consideration of a portion which, for any Ramsden thing that appeared, was paid at the time, could not v. Hilton, be impeached by subsequent creditors.

63. Where a wife joins with her husband in destroying the settlement made on her marriage, and a new settlement is made, such new settlement will be good ; though a better provision is made for the wife and children than was contained in the original settlement.

64. Sir R. Bell on his marriage settled certain Scott v. Bell, lands on himself for life, remainder to his wife for 2 Lev. 70.

2 Ves. 304,

her jointure, remainder to the first and other sons of the marriage, &c. Sir R. Bell having afterwards contracted debts, and there being no issue, his wife joined him in a fine of the settled estates, and they were sold. Sir R. B. covenanted to stand seised of other estates to the same uses as those contained in the settlement. It was resolved by Lord Hale and the other Judges, that the second settlement was good, and valid against subsequent creditors; for the old settlement being destroyed, and the new one made the same day, an agreement by the husband to make the new settlement, in consideration of the wife's having joined in the fine, to destroy the old settlement, would be presumed. And this considera, tion should extend to all the limitations in the new settlement; although the estates comprised in the new settlement were nearly double the value of those

contained in the old one. Stephens

65. Lord Kenyon, when M. R., held that where a

husband, after marriage, conveyed an estate to 2 Brp. R.9.

trustees, for the separate use of his wife, the cove, pants by the trustees to indemnify the husband against the debts which the wife might contract after the separation, was a valuable consideration; and there. fore that the settlement, though made after the debt due to the plaintiff was contracted, was good against

him. Cadogan v.

66. It was held in a modern case that a settlement, Kennett,

made before marriage, in consideration of the mar: riage, and of a considerable marriage portion, by a person who was indebted at the time, was good against

creditors. How far the 67. In the case of settlements made before mar. cions of mar. riage, there has been a considerable difference of riage extends, opinion respecting the extent to which the considera.

v, Olive,

Cowp. 432.

tion of marriage ought to be carried; it being settled that a deed may be fraudulent as to one person, and " good as to another. In some cases it has been held, that the consideration of marriage extends, not only to the estates limited to the husband and wife and their issue, but also to the estates limited to any branch of the husband's family. 68. Thus where a person, in consideration of the Jenkins

v. Kensis, marriage of his son, and of £ 2,000 marriage portion, Hard. 395. settled the premises to the use of himself for life, remainder to his son and the heirs of his body by that marriage, remainder to the heirs of the body of his son by any other wife; it was contended that this last limitation, not being within the consideration of the marriage settlement, was voluntary, and therefore void against subsequent purchasers. But Lord Hale said, that the consideration of the marriage and marriage portion would run through all the estates raised by the settlement, though the marriage was not concerned in them, so as to make them good against purchasers, and to ayoid a voluntary conveyance.

69. So where a person covenanted, in consideration White s of the marriage of his eldest son, and a marriage Stringer,

2 Ley, 105, portion, to settle lands on him in tail, remainder to his second son ; it was held that the consideration Osgood extended to the second son ; and therefore that the v. Stroud,

2 P. XVms. settlement was not fraudulent against creditors. 245.

70. On the other hand there are seyeral cases where Ball v. the consideration of marriage has only been allowed Burnford,

Prec. in Cha. to extend to the immediate objects of the settlement, 113. and not to any remote ones.

Thus it is said by Lord Staplehill Macclesfield in 10 Mod. 534, that where there is a v. Bully, , marriage portion and settlement, that part of the

2 F. Wnis. settlement only which belongs to the wife, and 249.

Id. 224.

children by that wife, can be esteemed to be founded upon the consideration of that marriage ; for it was absurd to imagine that the friends of the wife should be supposed at all concerned about the remote uses

of the settlement, upon persons to whom they were ante, $ 68. entire strangers.

And as for the case of Jenkins v. Kemis, it ought not to be understood in so absurd a sense as that came to : the meaning of the case was no more than this; that a father, where he makes a marriage settlement upon one son, has such a fair and justifiable opportunity offered him of providing for his other children, as that if he thinks fit to lay hold

upon and embrace it, by inserting in the settlement provisions for them, such provisions shall never be deemed fraudulent, and as such set aside in favour

of creditors. Reeres v.

71. In another case Lord King has said, that where Reeves,

a settlement was made by the father, or other lineal 9 Mod. 132.

ancestor, in consideration of the marriage of his son, in such case all the remainders limited to his children and their posterity were within the consideration of the settlement. But where it was made by a brother, or other collateral ancestor, on his marriage, there, after the limitations to his own issue, allthe remainders limited to his collateral kindred were voluntary, and not within the consideration of the marriage settle

ment, Settlement

72. There is one case in which a conveyance, by a Widow founded on a moral consideration only, has been held on her Children. good against a subsequent purchaser; namely, that

of a widow making a settlement on her children

previous to her marrying a second husband. Newstead 73. Thus where a widow, who had two children, v. Şerles,

by articles previous to her second marriage, with the 1 Atk. 265,

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